Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 May 1941 |
| Citation | 41 Del. 330,21 A.2d 283 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
| Parties | CALVIN P. STIDHAM v. DIAMOND STATE BREWERY, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware |
Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 43, November Term 1940.
Motion for non-suit.
This was an action brought by Calvin P. Stidham against Diamond State Brewery, Inc., a corporation of the State of Delaware. The action was instituted to recover damages which the plaintiff contended he sustained by reason of the malicious prosecution by the Brewery of a prior criminal proceeding against Stidham for embezzlement. The original charge was heard before the Municipal Court of Wilmington, and Stidham was held in bail to await the action of the Grand Jury of the County. At the next term of Court the Grand Jury presented a true bill against Stidham for embezzlement and subsequently an entry of nolle prosequi was entered on this indictment by the Attorney-General.
Under these facts Stidham brought this present case of malicious prosecution and completed his testimony.
The defendant made a motion for a non-suit.
Motion for a non-suit granted.
George W. Lilly for plaintiff.
John J Morris, Jr., and David F. Anderson for defendant.
OPINION
Generally there are at least six essential elements in an action for malicious prosecution.
(1) There must have been a prior institution or continuation of some regular judicial proceedings against the plaintiff in this action for malicious prosecution.
(2) Such former proceedings must have been by, or at the instance of the defendant in this action for malicious prosecution.
(3) The former proceedings must have terminated in favor of the defendant therein, the plaintiff in the action for malicious prosecution.
(4) There must have been malice in instituting the former proceedings.
(5) There must have been want of probable cause for the institution of the former proceedings.
(6) There must have been injury or damage resulting to the plaintiff from the former proceedings.
Several of the named essentials are admittedly present in this case. (1) There was a former criminal proceeding instituted against Calvin Stidham, the present plaintiff. (2) Such proceeding was instituted by or on behalf of the present defendant by an agent acting in the apparent scope of his employment. (3) The former proceeding terminated in favor of the defendant therein by the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the criminal charge. Without reference to this entry of nolle prosequi on the issue of probable cause in the commencement of the original action (which question will be later considered), such entry of nolle prosequi and the consequent discharge of the defendant is such a sufficient termination of the cause in favor of the defendant as would furnish the basis of the present suit. Finally (6) there was admitted some evidence of damage to the present plaintiff.
This then leaves to be considered the two great elements of the action, viz.: (4) The existence of malice in the original prosecution, and (5) the want of probable cause in instituting such original prosecution.
The law does not discourage attempts to bring to justice the supposed perpetrators of criminal offenses and does not penalize prosecutors in such cases when they act without malice and upon sufficient and probable cause. It is only when one person prosecutes another with malice and without probable cause that the law makes him liable for his actions in such a case as this.
Both elements of malice and want of probable cause must exist and the burden of showing both rests upon the plaintiff.
Malice in such a case as this is not easy to define in such a way as to include all of its characteristics. It does not necessarily mean that there must exist actual spite ill will or grudge. These may exist but their presence is not essential. For an act to have been done in such a way as to form the basis of a suit for malicious prosecution the...
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Sanders v. Daniel Intern. Corp.
...363, 394 P.2d 739, 741 (1964); Smith v. Globe Ford, Inc., 39 Conn.Supp. 27, 467 A.2d 1262, 1266 (1983); Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, Inc., 41 Del. 330, 21 A.2d 283, 285 (1941); Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 640-41 (D.C.1978); Erp v. Carroll, 438 So.2d 31, 40 n. 3 (Fla.App.1983); Io......
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Schwab v. Wood, Civ. A. No. 88-657 MMS.
...under Delaware common law, namely, the former criminal proceeding must have caused injury or damage. Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, 41 Del. 330, 21 A.2d 283 (Super. Ct.1941); Homlish v. Diamond Motor Sports, Inc., slip. op. No. 81C-OC-19 (Del. Super. February 8, The parties concede that ......
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Wiers v. Barnes, Civil Action No. 95-125 MMS.
...the former proceedings. Megenhardt v. Nolan, 583 A.2d 660, 1990 WL 169009 at *1 (Del.1990) (citing Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, 41 Del. 330, 21 A.2d 283, 285 (Del.Super.Ct.1941)). In the present case, defendants argue that Wiers has not proffered evidence of malice, and therefore faile......
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Anthony v. White
...not be imposed unless the prosecution in question was instituted both with malice and without probable cause. Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, 41 Del. 330, 21 A.2d 283 (1941); Brown v. Cluley, 179 A.2d 93 5 The Delaware rule is substantially identical. In Plummer v. Collins, 1 Boyce 281, 7......