Stidwell v. State

• Decision Date: 25 July 1895
• Citation: 107 Ala. 16,19 So. 322
• Parties: STIDWELL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

19 So. 322

107 Ala. 16

STIDWELL v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 25, 1895

Appeal from circuit court, Pike County; J. W. Foster, Judge.

The appellant, Minzy Stidwell, was indicted and tried for the murder of Sam Raiford, was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for 10 years, and appeals. Affirmed.

On the trial of the cause, as is shown by the bill of exceptions, it was shown that the deceased came to his death from the effects of a blow which fractured his skull, the blow being struck by the defendant. The testimony for the state further tended to show that the defendant and the deceased, together with other men, were in a barroom in the city of Troy; that the deceased, who was a man about 35 years old, was drinking that the defendant, a boy about 18 years old, asked the deceased to give him a piece of paper that was lying on the counter in the bar; that to this request the deceased replied: "Do you think I am a d___n fool; I'll hurt some of you d___n kids if you fool with me;" that thereupon the defendant replied, "Well, I'll get it myself;" that as he was passing by the deceased to get the paper, the deceased struck the defendant on the head with a piece of the lid of a goods box about 4 inches wide, about 2 feet long and 1/4 of an inch thick; that thereupon the defendant picked up a rod of iron used as a poker, which was about 3 or 4 feet long, 1 inch square, and started to strike the deceased with it, but was prevented from doing so by one of the persons standing near; that then the deceased started towards the front door; that when he had gone about 20 feet the defendant seized the piece of iron and started after him with the statement: "He hit me and I'll hit him;" and as the deceased turned his head, the defendant struck him with the piece of iron, fracturing his skull, from the effects of which blow the deceased died in about seven days. The testimony for the defendant tended to show that after the deceased struck the defendant with the piece of plank, he, the deceased, drew his knife; that as the deceased started out of the barroom the defendant picked up the poker and as the deceased turned on him with his knife drawn the defendant struck him with the poker. The witnesses for the state testified that they did not see a knife in the possession of the deceased. Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the court, in its general charge to the jury, among other things, instructed them as follows: "That if the deceased had abandoned the fight and was leaving the scene of the difficulty, and the defendant followed him, and on being overtaken the deceased turned on the defendant, and the defendant then struck the fatal blow, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense, although the deceased had a knife in his hand." To the giving of this portion of the court's general charge the defendant duly excepted, and also separately excepted to the court's giving, at the request of the state, the following written charges: (1) "The court further charges the jury that the law implies malice from the use of a deadly weapon." (2) "The court further charges the jury that the law presumes that a man intends the natural or probable results of his act." (3) "The court further charges the jury that if the deceased had abandoned the combat, and defendant overtook him after he had gone, and struck him a blow from which death ensued, then he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense." (4) "The court further charges the jury that the charges asked by defendant, and given by the court, are not in conflict with the oral charge given by the court." The defendant then asked the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: (a) "A killing in sudden passion, if not otherwise excusable, excited by sufficient provocation without malice, is manslaughter, not because the law supposes that passion...