Stiens v. Mo. Dep't of Agric.

• Docket Number: WD 84773
• Decision Date: 13 September 2022
• Citation: 653 S.W.3d 138
• Parties: Gregory STIENS, Appellant, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

653 S.W.3d 138

Gregory STIENS, Appellant,

v.MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondent.

WD 84773

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: September 13, 2022

Gregory Stiens, Maryville, MO, Appellant, pro se.

Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Brian T. Earll, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, and Sarah E. Carnes, Assistant Attorney General, Kansas City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Before Division Two: Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Mr. Gregory Stiens ("Stiens") appeals from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Nodaway County, Missouri ("circuit court"), denying his motion for default judgment. Because this ruling does not constitute a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal and return the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural History¹

The Missouri Department of Agriculture ("MDA") is a state agency that derives its authority from chapter 261 of the Missouri statutes. Section 261.040 grants authority to the MDA director "to discharge any employee of the state department of agriculture." Stiens was employed by the MDA for seventeen years before he was issued an official letter of termination by MDA's human resources ("HR") director on March 8, 2017.

Stiens filed a pro se complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission ("AHC") challenging the HR director's authority to terminate him. The MDA and Stiens each filed a motion for summary decision. The AHC granted the MDA's motion for summary decision and denied Stiens's motion. On May 15, 2018, Stiens filed a pro se petition for judicial review of the AHC's decision in the circuit court, which was assigned case number 18ND-CC00096. On October 9, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment denying relief, sustaining Stiens's dismissal under the AHC's ruling.

Stiens appealed, and this Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment affirming the AHC's summary decision in favor of the MDA that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Stiens was subject to termination. However, we also concluded:

We agree with Mr. Stiens that on March 8, 2017, the [MDA] Director had not delegated authority to the HR director to discharge Mr. Stiens . On April 2, 2017, Mr. Stiens raised the argument that the authority to terminate him had not been delegated to the HR director. On April 5, 2017 , the MDA director made an express formal delegation of appointing authority to the current HR director to discharge any employee. The MDA argues that the HR director had implied delegation under section 261.040, however, pertinent language of the delegation reads:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me by Chapter 261, RSMo. and specifically Section 261.040.1, RSMo. as an appointing authority for the Missouri Department of Agriculture (the "Department"), I hereby establish the below listed individuals as delegated appointing authorities of the Department with the authority to hire and discharge any employee of the Department.

Garret Hawkins, Deputy Director

Jennifer Hentges, Human Resource Director

(emphasis added)

We find, based upon review of the whole record, that the delegation instrument represents an admission that the authority had never before been delegated . Further, the delegation was made specifically to individuals and not generally to the positions of "deputy director" or "HR director." We, therefore, find the AHC decision unauthorized by section 261.040, to the extent that the AHC has concluded that the termination by the HR director on March 8, 2017, was authorized by statute .

We also find that there is no reasonable basis for an implication to delegate termination authority.

....

Still, when the MDA director responded to Mr. Stiens's administrative appeal in opposition , taking the position that Mr. Stiens was to be terminated, this act by the MDA director constituted an authorized termination under section 261.040 . It is undisputed that the MDA director possessed the statutory authority to terminate Mr. Stiens's employment and, at the very latest, on the date that the MDA director responded to and opposed Mr. Stiens's administrative appeal of the termination, Mr. Stiens had full knowledge of the MDA's position that he was terminated . Since these facts were not established on the record before us, we must ... remand for the AHC to determine the effective and authorized date of termination . Based on this factual determination, Mr. Stiens may be entitled to a determination of back pay owed from March 8, 2017, up to and including the effective authorized date of termination.

Stiens v. Mo. Dep't of Agric. , 587 S.W.3d 666, 673-74 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (" Stiens I ") (emphasis added). We reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the matter:

for further proceedings consistent with our ruling today, so that the AHC may develop a record as to the effective and authorized date of termination, a date that could not have occurred later than the date on which the MDA director opposed Mr. Stiens's administrative appellate challenge to the termination from employment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Id. at 674.

Stated another way, in Stiens I , we concluded that the purported attempt by MDA's HR director to terminate Stiens on March 8, 2017 was not a lawful termination pursuant to section 261.040 ; but, after the formal delegation of appointing authority by the MDA director on April 5, 2017, the HR director was, at that time, vested with appointing authority to lawfully terminate Stiens on behalf of MDA. Thus, we remanded for the express and specific purpose for the AHC to develop the factual record as to what, if any, termination communications occurred after March 8, 2017, (i.e. the ineffective termination attempt) if said termination communication was by the MDA director; on or after April 5, 2017 (i.e. the date when the MDA director delegated appointing authority to the HR director) if said termination communication was by the HR director; and, if no such termination communications occurred by either the MDA director after March 8, 2017, or by the HR director on or after April 5, 2017, to then determine the date upon which the MDA director first communicated opposition to Stiens's administrative appeal (i.e. a date that would constitute an authorized termination under section 261.040 ).

On remand, the AHC conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2020, and determined that the first date upon which the MDA director opposed Stiens's administrative appeal of his termination was April 19, 2017, when the AHC held a pre-hearing conference on Stiens's original administrative appeal and at which time Stiens was made aware that his complaint would be challenged by the MDA director. There was no evidence presented suggesting any other attempted termination communication to Stiens by either the MDA director at any time after March 8, 2017 (i.e. the date upon which Stiens I concluded was a legally ineffective termination attempt), or the HR director on or after April 5, 2017 (i.e. the date upon which the MDA director delegated appointing authority to the HR director), such that the first authorized termination communication occurred on April 19, 2017, when the MDA director first lodged opposition to Stiens's administrative appeal. Notwithstanding our express mandate in Stiens I that March 8, 2017 was not an authorized termination notice, any lawful termination notice could only have occurred after March 8, 2017, and no delegation by the MDA director to the HR director occurred prior to April 5, 2017,² the AHC proceeded to take evidence in violation of our mandate and specific remand instructions³ and again concluded in its January 11, 2021 decision that Stiens's termination on March 8, 2017, was the authorized and effective date of termination.

Thereafter, on February 2, 2021, Stiens filed a petition for judicial review of the AHC's January 11, 2021 decision in the existing circuit court case number 18ND-CC00096 arguing, inter alia , that the AHC's decision had improperly exceeded the scope of this Court's remand instructions in Stiens I .⁴ The MDA did not file a responsive pleading.⁵ On March 16, 2021, Stiens filed a motion for default judgment, and the MDA filed suggestions in opposition. On June 18, 2021, the circuit court heard arguments at a hearing on Stiens's motion for default judgment on his petition for judicial review of the AHC's January 11, 2021 decision and took the matter under advisement. On August 20, 2021, the circuit court entered its order denying Stiens's motion for default judgment on two grounds: first, the circuit court concluded it had no authority to consider Stiens's petition for judicial review; and second, even if the circuit court had authority to act upon Stiens's motion, the MDA "would not be in default because Rule 55.25, requiring the filing of an answer, does not apply to review of administrative actions taken under chapter 536, RSMo."

Stiens filed his notice of appeal of the circuit court's order on September 1, 2021.

Analysis

Stiens raises three points on appeal, asserting in each that the AHC erred in finding that the effective date for his termination was March 8, 2017, because: such a finding violates the law of the case doctrine (Point I); the statutory authority to terminate employees is limited to the director of the MDA (Point II); and the decision was not supported by competent and substantial evidence (Point III).

Before we can reach the merits of the issues Stiens raises in this appeal, we have a duty to determine, sua sponte , whether we have jurisdiction. Stagner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Tr. for Aegis Asset Backed Sec. Tr. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1 , 632 S.W.3d 443, 448-49 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing Wilson v. City of St. Louis , 600 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 2020) ). " ‘For this Court to have...