Stiffler v. Continental Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17761.,17761.
• Citation: 288 Conn. 38,950 A.2d 1270
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Juliann STIFFLER v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

950 A.2d 1270

288 Conn. 38

Juliann STIFFLER v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 17761.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 8, 2008.

Decided July 22, 2008.

Michael A. Colombo, Jr., with whom was Devin Janosov, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kerry R. Callahan, with whom was Eric D. Eddy, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

NORCOTT, KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in an action to recover underinsured motorist benefits, offer of judgment interest awarded pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a(b)¹ is based on the amount of the jury verdict (verdict amount), or on the amount of the judgment thereon after the trial court orders a remittitur due to the limits of the plaintiff's underinsured motorist coverage (judgment amount). The plaintiff, Juliann Stiffler, appeals² from the judgment of the trial court in her favor, which included an award of prejudgment interest on the judgment amount rather than the verdict amount. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly calculated the interest due her. We disagree, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff originally brought this action against the defendant, Continental Insurance Company, now known as Encompass Insurance Company,³ seeking underinsured motorist benefits for personal injuries she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was insured under a policy issued to her parents by the defendant that provided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $50,000. After exhausting the $20,000 limit of the tortfeasor's policy, the plaintiff brought this action seeking additional compensation by way of underinsured motorist benefits. Before trial, the plaintiff filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $20,000. The defendant did not accept the offer, and, therefore, it was deemed to have been rejected pursuant to § 52-192a(a).⁴

Following a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $465,234.43. The defendant thereafter filed a motion for collateral source reduction, and the trial court reduced the verdict by $10,000 to $455,234.43, to reflect medical payments made on the plaintiff's behalf. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for remittitur, asserting that the verdict was excessive as a matter of law given the $50,000 limit of the applicable underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion, and reduced the award to $20,000.⁵ Thereafter, the court ordered that the defendant pay offer of judgment interest pursuant to § 52-192a (b) in the amount of $7800,⁶ which was computed using the judgment amount of $20,000 rather than the verdict amount. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly calculated offer of judgment interest pursuant to § 52-192a(b) by calculating the interest based on the judgment amount rather than the verdict amount.⁷ Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the legislative intent and policy underlying § 52-192a(b), as well as this court's decisions in Cardenas v. Mixcus, 264 Conn. 314, 823 A.2d 321 (2003), and Accettullo v. Worcester Ins. Co., 256 Conn. 667, 775 A.2d 943 (2001), support her contention that offer of judgment interest should be calculated on the verdict amount rather than the judgment amount. The defendant responds that this court's decision in Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 208 Conn. 82, 544 A.2d 158 (1988), controls the outcome of this case, and that the legislative history and genealogy of § 52-192a(b) dictate that offer of judgment interest is to be calculated on the amount of the trial court's judgment rather than on the verdict itself. We agree with the defendant.

The plaintiff's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation, over which we exercise plenary review. See e.g., Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 836, 905 A.2d 70 (2006). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine the meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z⁸ directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 836-37, 905 A.2d 70.

Although we generally begin with the text of the statute, we note that we are not writing on a clean slate as the purpose and structure of our offer of judgment statute have been identified. The purpose of § 52-192a(b) is to "encourage pretrial settlements and, consequently, to conserve judicial resources." Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., 239 Conn. 708, 742, 687 A.2d 506 (1997). The statute is intended to "[encourage] defendants to accept reasonable offers of judgment," and requires defendants who fail to accept such offers to pay penalty interest. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Section 52-192a(b) therefore "requires a trial court to award [12 percent annual] interest to the prevailing plaintiff from the date of the filing of a complaint to the date of judgment whenever: (1) a plaintiff files a valid offer of judgment within eighteen months of the filing of the complaint in a civil complaint for money damages; (2) the defendant rejects the offer of judgment; and (3) the plaintiff ultimately recovers an amount greater than or equal to the offer of judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 55, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). The interest awarded pursuant to § 52-192a(b) "is solely related to a defendant's rejection of an advantageous offer to settle before trial and his subsequent waste of judicial resources." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., supra, at 742, 687 A.2d 506.

We turn next to the text of the statute. General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a(b)⁹ provides in relevant part: "After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an `offer of judgment' which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain stated in the plaintiff's `offer of judgment', the court shall add to the amount so recovered twelve per cent annual interest on said amount. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The text of § 52-192a(b) calls for interest to be calculated on the "amount so recovered," which phrase is not defined in the statute. The statute also does not use the terms "verdict" or "judgment."

This court previously has considered the question of the amount on which offer of judgment interest is to be calculated, although not in the present context of a verdict that has been reduced due to the limits of the plaintiff's insurance coverage. See General Statutes § 38a-336(b).¹⁰ In Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 208 Conn. at 84-85, 544 A.2d 158, the court considered whether the term "recovered" in § 52-192a (b) referred to the verdict amount or the judgment amount when the jury returned a verdict in excess of the amount in the offer of judgment, but the court subsequently ordered a remittitur, resulting in a judgment of less than the offer of judgment amount. More specifically, the plaintiffs brought an action against multiple defendants and thereafter filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $125,000. Id., at 83 n. 1, 84, 544 A.2d 158. Prior to trial, two defendants settled with the plaintiffs for $36,000. Id., at 83 n. 1, 544 A.2d 158. The jury, unaware of this prior settlement, returned a verdict of $153,522 against one of the two remaining defendants. Id., at 83, 88, 544 A.2d 158. In an effort to avoid unjustly enriching the plaintiffs, the trial court ordered a remittitur of $36,000, thereby reducing the plaintiffs' recovery to an amount less than the amount of the offer of judgment. Id., at 89, 544 A.2d 158. The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment refusing to order offer of judgment interest on the verdict amount. Id., at 84, 544 A.2d 158. On appeal, this court considered, inter alia, the issue of "whether a plaintiff who has obtained a jury verdict for an amount in excess of his offer of judgment, when that verdict later is properly reduced by the trial court to a sum less than that offer, is entitled to interest pursuant to § 52-192a(b) for having `recovered an amount equal to or greater than' his offer of judgment." Id., at 84-85, 544 A.2d 158. This court determined that, given the particular fact situation presented in Civiello, the plaintiffs were not entitled to offer of judgment interest, reasoning that, "[w]here a jury verdict is properly deemed excessive and accordingly reduced by a remittitur when judgment is rendered, [§ 52-192a(b)] could not have been intended to impose the interest penalty upon a defendant for failing to accept an offer of...