Stile v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 16-3832 (RMB) |
| Parties | JAMES T. STILE, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appearances:
James M. Stile
FCC Allenwood Low Security
P.O. Box 1000
White Deer, PA 17887
Plaintiff, pro se
Jessica R. O'Neill
Assistant United States Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
District of New Jersey
401 Market Street, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 2098
Camden, New Jersey 08101
On behalf of Defendants
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion for judgment on the pleadings by the Defendants, Officer Colina, Officer A. Burns and the United States of America (collectively the "Defendants") (ECF No. 65) (Defendants' Brief, ECF No. 65-1); (Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, ECF No. 68); and Plaintiff's Brief in Supp. of Pl's Response to Defs' Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiff's Brief,") ECF No. 69.) The Court will decide the motions on the briefs, without an oral hearing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b).
Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 26, 2016. (Compl., ECF No. 1). This Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A and determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. (Memorandum and Order, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 8, 2016 (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5), which this Court also screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A and dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, the Americans with Disability Act under 42 U.S.C. § 12101, discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, First Amendment access to the courts, First Amendment retaliation based on a grievance filed in Fall 2015, and claims based on BOP Program Statement 1315.07(1). (Opinion, ECF No. 8; Order, ECF No. 9.) The Court dismissed all claims of supervisory liability, resulting in the dismissal of Defendants Malloy, Robinson, Mason, Hazelwood, and Hollingsworth. (Id.)
At that point, the Court permitted the following claims to proceed: Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Colina retaliated against him as a result of a grievance Plaintiff filed on December2, 2015; Plaintiff's claim that Defendants Colina and Burns violated his right to equal protection; Plaintiff's claim that Defendants Colina, Wilkes, Kwartin, and Rehwinkle demonstrated deliberate indifference to his medical needs; and Plaintiff's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") against the United States. (Opinion, ECF. No. 8 at 29-30.)
Defendants then sought partial summary judgment on certain of the remaining claims. In an Opinion and Order dated March 26, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's remaining retaliation claim and Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Opinion, ECF No. 60; Order, ECF No. 61). As a result, the only claims remaining are Plaintiff's claim that Defendants Colina and Burns violated Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and his FTCA claim against the United States.
Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings.
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017). To succeed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a movant must show "there are no material issues of facts, and he is entitled to judgment asa matter of law." Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 417 (quoting Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Soc'y Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980)). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept the non-moving party's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 418.
While Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment was pending, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).1 In Abbasi, the Court noted Congress passed a statute in 1871, later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, entitling a person to money damages if a state official violated his or her constitutional rights. Id. at 1854. Congress, however, has never passed an analogous statute for violations of constitutional rights by federal officials. Id.
The Court described its concern with the separation of powers between Congress and the courts.
When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under a federal statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis. The question is "who should decide" whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?"
Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1857 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)).
The Court reviewed the three cases where it had previously implied a remedy for constitutional violations by federal actors. In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), holding that, absent statutory authorization, the Court would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by Fourth Amendment unreasonable searches and seizures by federal officers. Id. at 1854.
The Court recognized an implied Bivens cause of action in two later cases involving constitutional violations. Id. First, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) an administrative assistant sued a Congressman under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for gender discrimination in employment. Id. Second, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), a prisoner's estate sued federal prison employees under the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual PunishmentsClause for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. Id. at 1855.
In Abbasi, the Court stated that "expanding the Bivens remedy is now a 'disfavored' judicial activity." Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). In most instances, the Court's precedents now instruct that the Legislature is in the better position to consider if "'the public interest would be served'" by imposing a "'new substantive legal liability.'" Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1857 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426-427 (1988) (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390)). In Vanderklok v. United States, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that its past pronouncements on whether an implied Bivens remedy was available is no longer controlling without performing the analysis required under Abbasi. 868 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. ().
First, courts must determine whether a case presents a new Bivens context. Id. at 1859. The context is new if the case is different in any meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by the Supreme Court. Id. Some examples of how cases may differ in a meaningful way include:
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how anofficer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Id. at 1860. The "new-context" inquiry is easily satisfied, even if only small but meaningful differences exist. Id. at 1865.
If a court finds that a case presents a new Bivens context, the second step is to conduct the special factors analysis to determine whether Congress or the courts should decide whether a damages action should be allowed. Id. Special factors are considered in the aggregate. See, e.g., id. at 1861-62. One factor counseling hesitation to imply a Bivens remedy is when alternative methods of relief are available. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1863. A court should also consider other reasons Congress might doubt the necessity of a damages remedy. Id. at 1865.
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