Stiles v. Judd, Case No. 8:12-cv-02375-T-27EAJ
| Decision Date | 29 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:12-cv-02375-T-27EAJ |
| Parties | KATIE STILES, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF GRADY JUDD et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants', Sheriff Grady Judd, etc., Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. 56),1 and Defendant, Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Crystal Parker, and Timothy McRae, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. 58). Plaintiff responded in opposition to each (Dkts. 59, 60). Upon consideration, the motions (Dkts. 56, 58) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Bradley Norris was arrested by the Auburndale Police Department in May 2010 and booked into a jail operated by Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd. Dkt. 55 ¶ 19.2 During intake, jail personnel allegedly learned that Norris was clinically depressed, bipolar, taking psychiatric medication, and had a history of auditory hallucination. Id. ¶ 20. One week after his arrest, Norris was transferred toLake Wales Medical Center to be treated for seizures. Id. ¶ 21. While hospitalized, Norris attempted to take a detention officer's sidearm during a foiled escape attempt. Id. ¶ 22. When questioned about the bid to escape, Norris allegedly told law enforcement that he tried to take the sidearm so that he could commit suicide. Id. He was soon returned to Polk County Jail and placed on suicide watch in an isolation cell. Id. While on suicide watch, Norris disclosed previous suicide attempts to Dr. Timothy McRae, the psychiatrist in charge of his care. Id. ¶ 25. McRae is an employee of Defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS), an independent contractor that provides medical services to inmates in Polk County. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.
Detention personnel allegedly observed Norris physically harm himself and attempt suicide on multiple occasions, leading authorities to place him in restraints and extend his stint in isolation. Id. ¶ 22. On May 24, about two weeks after the initial escape and suicide attempts, Norris was taken off suicide watch, although he remained housed in isolation. Id. ¶ 24. At this time and throughout his incarceration, Norris allegedly informed detention personnel that he continued to suffer from auditory hallucinations and refused take his medication. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
On October 16, Norris was caught attempting to remove a razor blade from a safety razor. Id. ¶ 29. He allegedly informed detention personnel that he would have harmed himself with the blade had they not intervened. Id. This led to reinstatement of his suicide watch. Id. The next day, Norris unsuccessfully attempted suicide by cutting himself with a razor blade he managed to procure. Id. As a result, he was again placed in various restraints while on suicide watch. Id. ¶ 30. On October 21, McRae allegedly noted in his interdisciplinary progress notes that Norris was to remain on suicide watch. Id. ¶ 31.
The following day, October 22, McRae recommended that Norris be taken off suicide watch "per detention priorities," despite Norris allegedly telling McRae that he was upset about his family situation and that his medication was not working. Id. ¶ 33. Defendant Crystal Parker, a licensed practical nurse also charged with Norris' care, prepared and signed an incident report indicating that Norris' suicide watch was to be discontinued, giving "detention priorities per psychiatrist" as the reason. Id. ¶ 32. Pursuant to the report, Norris was removed from suicide watch on October 23. Norris hanged himself the next day in his isolation cell. Id. ¶ 35.
Norris is survived by his wife, Katie Stiles, who brings this suit individually and as the personal administrator of Norris' estate. Id. ¶ 1. Stiles alleges that Sheriff Judd promulgates specific regulations governing the administration of the jail, including the manner in which suicidal and mentally ill inmates are incarcerated. Id. ¶ 37. The regulations provide that suicidal inmates may be taken off suicide watch when medically cleared by the medical health facility. Id. ¶ 39. She further alleges that suicidal inmates should not be housed in isolation cells unless they are kept under constant supervision and care. Id. ¶ 42.
Stiles filed the initial complaint in this case on October 19, 2012. Dkt. 1. After Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Dkts. 4, 6), Stiles amended the complaint as of right. See Dkt. 8. CMS, McRae, and Parker answered the First Amended Complaint, but the remaining Defendants again moved to dismiss. Dkts. 24, 25. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Stiles moved for leave to amend her complaint. Dkt. 37. The motion was granted (Dkt. 40), and Stiles filed the Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 41. After review, the Second Amended Complaint was sua sponte stricken as a shotgun pleading (Dkt. 49) because it included lengthy and unnecessary recitation offactual detail, incorporated all preceding paragraphs into each count, and lumped together multiple claims against multiple defendants. Id. Stiles was granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, which she did on May 20, 2013. Dkt. 51. Stiles then moved, with the consent of Defendants, for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. Dkt. 53. The motion was granted (Dkt. 54), and the Fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. 55) is currently pending.
In her fifth version of the complaint, Stiles brings twelve claims against eleven defendants. Counts I through IV are Eighth Amendment claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I is brought against Sheriff Judd. Count II is against CMS. Count III is against Defendants Burke, Wulf, Palmer, Daughtry, Mcintosh, Mizell, and Rayburn. And Count IV is brought against Parker and McRae. Count V is a § 1983 claim against Sheriff Judd for violations of Norris' right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count VI alleges that Sheriff Judd violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Counts VII through IX are state law wrongful death claims against Sheriff Judd, Parker, and Dr. McRae, respectively, brought under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, §§ 768.16-768.26, Florida Statutes. Counts X and XI allege vicarious liability on the part of CMS for the actions of Parker and Dr. McRae leading to the wrongful death of Norris. And Count XII is a wrongful death claim against CMS.
A complaint should contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This rule does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, conclusory accusation of harm. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must "plead all facts establishing an entitlement to relief with more than 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a causeof action.'" Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
"The complaint must contain enough facts to make a claim for relief plausible on its face." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679 . Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Although it is axiomatic that the Court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
Initially, Defendants argue that the Fourth Amended Complaint should be stricken in its entirety because it is a shotgun pleading. This argument is unpersuasive. The Fourth Amended Complaint adequately separates distinct claims against Defendants into separate counts, incorporating only those preliminary allegations necessary to support the specific cause of action alleged in that count. Moreover, the Fourth Amended Complaint adequately puts Defendants on fair notice of the individualized claims against them.
I. Introduction
In Counts I through IV, Stiles alleges that Defendants violated Norris' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,3 by acting with deliberate indifference to Norris' serious medical needs. Stiles is also suing Sheriff Judd in his official capacity as Polk County Sheriff. Dkt. 55 ¶ 2. Defendants argue that Counts I and III should be dismissed because (1) Stiles fails to allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; (2) Stiles fails to allege the personal involvement of Sheriff Judd and Defendants Burke, Wulf, Daughtry, Mcintosh, Mizell, and Rayburn;...
To continue reading
Request your trial