Stiles v. State

Decision Date03 July 2003
Docket NumberNo. C6-02-1730.,C6-02-1730.
PartiesJustin Brooks STILES, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Leslie J. Rosenberg, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Wolfson, Asst. County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

A jury convicted Justin Brooks Stiles of the first- and second-degree murder of Heinz Moorman. He was sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal Stiles argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion in two regards: first, it denied relief based on the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on three lesser-included offenses; and second, it denied relief on two evidentiary rulings of the trial court. We affirm the district court.

Appellant Justin Brooks Stiles was nineteen years old when he and four of his friends attempted to rob eighteen-year-old Heinz Moorman of a half pound of marijuana. The young men were habitual marijuana users, and frequently bought drugs from Moorman. On the day of the shooting, however, Stiles and his friends could not pay for the marijuana, so they devised a plan to steal the drugs.

Stiles' friend, Brandon Connor, called Moorman and arranged to meet him in Augsburg Park in Richfield to buy some marijuana. The young men planned to bring guns along to the meeting, which they could use to scare Moorman into turning over the marijuana. On the day of the shooting, Stiles had taken a .12 gauge sawed-off shotgun outside his house and shot it at a tree to see if it was working. Earlier in the week Stiles had sawed off the stock and barrel of the shotgun.

Around 9:00 p.m. on January 8, 1998, the five men—Stiles, Connor, and three other friends, Sean Ueland, Charlie Seepersaud, and Jason Valleen—drove to Augsburg Park in a van, and Moorman drove into the park a short time later. Stiles had the .12 gauge sawed-off shotgun and Seepersaud had a .20 gauge shotgun. Moorman approached the van, but refused Connor's invitation to get in the van. Instead, Moorman invited Connor out of the van and opened the trunk of his car. He took out a shoebox, which he had previously used to transport marijuana for the group. The shoebox contained a half pound of marijuana. Once Moorman took out the shoebox, Stiles and Seepersaud jumped out of the van, cocked their shotguns, and yelled, "give us your shit!"

Instead of turning over the drugs upon seeing the guns, Moorman threw the shoebox back into the trunk of his car, slammed the trunk shut, and reached toward his waist. According to Connor, Ueland yelled to his friends. Ueland saw that Moorman had a gun in his waistband and that Moorman was reaching for a gun. Stiles and Seepersaud fired at Moorman, hitting him several times. Moorman died from multiple gunshot wounds. After the shooting, Seepersaud ran off, and the other four men got in the van and drove to Connor's house. Stiles threatened the others not to tell anyone what had happened. Nevertheless, Stiles told several other friends that he had shot Moorman after Moorman pulled a gun.

The evening of the shooting, Stacy Stegora picked Stiles up from his house and took him to her home in Big Lake, Minnesota. Stiles asked Stegora to find the guns and hide them. He also told Stegora that he was going to tell police he was someone else. When the police found Stiles at Stegora's home on January 11, 1998, Stiles attempted to conceal his identity. After his arrest, he was charged with two counts of first-degree murder (while committing attempted aggravated robbery and the sale of a controlled substance), and one count of intentional second-degree murder.

The state presented its case against Stiles using testimony from his friends and three of his accomplices, Ueland, Connor, and Seepersaud. One friend testified that while Connor led the planning, Stiles participated in discussions of how the robbery would proceed and agreed to bring his gun to the meeting with Moorman. Seepersaud testified that Stiles carried a .12 gauge shotgun to the park. Ueland testified that Stiles chambered a round as Moorman opened the trunk of his car. All three accomplices testified that Stiles shot three times at Moorman—twice after Moorman had fallen to the ground. To shoot the second and third time, Stiles had to manually pump his shotgun to chamber each additional shell. Ueland testified that immediately after the murder, Stiles threatened to kill Ueland if he told anyone what Stiles had done. The state elicited testimony from Suresh Beni and Stacy Stegora that Stiles told them he killed Moorman.

In addition to presenting testimony from Stiles' friends and accomplices, the state called a ballistics expert from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension State Crime Laboratory. The expert concluded, based on his analysis of shotgun shell wads and shotcups discovered both at the crime scene and during the autopsy, that three shots were fired from the .12 gauge shotgun, and one from the .20 gauge shotgun. He testified that the pattern of holes found on Moorman's jacket was consistent with shots from the .12 gauge, one at a distance of less than two feet, and the second from between five and ten feet. The state also called the medical examiner, who concurred with the ballistics expert about the number and relative proximity of shots.

The defense theory was that Stiles did not shoot Moorman, but that Connor and others implicated Stiles in order to shift blame from themselves. Stiles presented two defense witnesses who had been jailed with Connor, who testified that Connor had reported that Valleen and Seepersaud were the shooters. A third witness attacked the credibility of Stegora, who had testified that Stiles admitted killing Moorman. Stiles did not testify in his own defense.

Initially, the question of intent played only a minor part in Stiles' defense. While Stiles' defense counsel argued in his opening statement that Ueland and Valleen never intended to harm Moorman, intent became an important subject of testimony when Seepersaud took the stand at the end of trial. Seepersaud explained that he did not intend to kill Moorman, but panicked when he saw the gun in Moorman's waistband. Stiles' defense counsel argued in his closing that no one went to the park intending to kill, but he did admit that the shooters intended to shoot Moorman before Moorman shot them. Toward the close of trial, defense counsel petitioned the court to include three lesser-included offenses in the instructions to the jury: second-degree unintentional felony murder, third-degree murder, and first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter. The defense also requested a self-defense instruction. The trial court denied the requests because it found there was sufficient evidence of intent to convict of the charged offenses, noting that the testimony indicated Stiles "intended to kill [Moorman] or to do an act that would have that result." After eleven days of trial, the jury convicted Stiles of two counts of first-degree murder, and one count of second-degree murder. The court then sentenced him to life in prison.

Stiles' defense counsel did not bring a timely direct appeal, but did bring a postconviction appeal.

The postconviction court ruled against Stiles on the two issues he raises here. First, it denied Stiles' request for a new trial based on the trial court's refusal to include lesser offenses in the jury instructions. Second, the postconviction court denied Stiles' contention that any evidentiary errors were a substantial factor in the trial's outcome. Stiles appeals from the decision of the postconviction court.

I. Lesser-included Offenses

Our review of a district court's postconviction ruling is limited. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of a postconviction court will not be overturned. King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn.2002).

Our case law on lesser-included offenses mandates that the trial court instruct the jury on the requested offense if the defendant establishes three things: the lesser offense is included in the higher charge, the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged, and the evidence provides a rational basis for convicting the defendant on the lesser-included offense. Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Minn.1986); State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn. 414, 421-22, 228 N.W.2d 120, 125-26 (1975). The mandatory nature of the rule acts as a safeguard within our jury system. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, it safeguards against juries who may be improperly predisposed to find defendants guilty by offering the jury alternatives. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)

("[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction"). If, over the course of a trial, evidence develops that would provide a rational basis to acquit on the charged crime, and the defense counsel requests an instruction on a lesser-included offense supported by the evidence, the judge should grant it lest the jury be left with a Hobson's choice between the higher offense or nothing.

In order for an instruction on a lesser-included offense to function as a safeguard, however, the defendant must meet the legal test outlined above—that the lesser offense is included in the charged offense, and that the evidence provides a rational basis for an acquittal on the offense charged and a conviction on the lesser offense. Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273. If that legal test is not met, a lesser-included offense could improperly provide the means for a jury to express sympathy for the defendant by finding the defendant guilty of an unwarranted lesser...

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