Stiles v. Wright

• Citation: 32 N.E.2d 220,308 Mass. 326
• Parties: STILES v. WRIGHT and three other cases.
• Decision Date: 25 February 1941
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

308 Mass. 326

32 N.E.2d 220

STILES

v.WRIGHT and three other cases.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 25, 1941.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Sheehan, Judge.

Four actions of tort by Viola C. Stiles, by Wayne E. Stiles, and by Wayne E. Stiles and others, administrators, against Margaret Wright to recover for injuries, death and damage to automobile resulting from an automobile collision, wherein there were verdicts for plaintiff Viola C. Stiles in the sum of $3,560, for the plaintiff Wayne E. Stiles in the sum of $150, for the administrators of John D. Stiles for conscious suffering of their intestate $7,300 and for damage to the automobile $423, and for the death of the intestate $1, and the defendant saved exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.

B. H. Stoodley, and R. E. Kempton, both of Boston, for defendant.

J. N. Esdaile, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

DOLAN, Justice.

These four actions of tort arise out of a collision of automobiles at a street intersection. The first and third actions are brought to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by the respective plaintiffs as a result of the collision. The second action is brought to recover for property damage to the automobile of the plaintiff administrators' intestate, John D. Stiles, and for conscious suffering of the intestate resulting from the collision. The fourth action is brought to recover for the death of the intestate. The cases were referred to an auditor, who found for the plaintiff in the first three cases and for the defendant in the fourth case. They were then tried to a jury upon the auditor's report and further evidence. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs in all the cases, the verdict returned in the action for death being in the sum of $1. The defendant's exceptions to the denial of her motion for a directed verdict in each case and to the denial of certain requests for instructions bring the cases before us.

Material findings of the auditor follow. The accident occurred at about 4:30 P. M. on February 15, 1938, at the intersection of Bridge Street, a State highway known as route 17, and McKeen Street, in the township of Auburndale, Florida. The weather was clear, the roads were dry, and visibility was good. Bridge Street runs east toward Winter Haven and west toward Haines City. McKeen Street runs north and south and intersects Bridge Street. McKeen Street is about eighteen feet wide. Bridge Street is somewhat wider. Both are tar roads.

The plaintiff Wayne E. Stiles was operating an automobile owned by his father, John D. Stiles. The latter and the plaintiff Viola C. Stiles were riding in the vehicle as passengers. This automobile came east on Bridge Street, and approaching McKeen Street was being operated to the right of the road at a speed of between twenty-five and thirty miles an hour. When one hundred feet back of the intersection, the operator Stiles could see north up McKeen Street for about one hundred or more feet. McKeen Street was a ‘stop street, so called’ and ‘a person confronted with a stop sign should legally stop his automobile before proceeding into Brige Street from McKeen Street.’ There was, however, no sign at this intersection, but there were orange strips at the entrance of McKeen Street into Bridge Street. The operator Stiles was familiar with the fact the McKeen Street was a ‘stop street, so called.’ He saw the automobile operated by the defendant shortly before the accident. His automobile was twenty-five or thirty feet from the intersection, when the defendant's vehicle was about fifty feet from the intersection. It was proceeding to the south at a speed of about forty miles an hour, and the automobile operated by Stiles was being operated at a rate of speed of about twenty-five miles an hour. At this time the operator Stiles ‘formed an opinion that the * * * [defendant's vehicle] would stop.’ He shifted his gaze to two automobiles that were coming on Bridge Street from the opposite direction and entered the intersection. The defendant's automobile entered the intersection at a rate of speed exceeding forty miles an hour and collided with that operated by Stiles at about the driver's seat. The defendant in the presence of several witnesses stated that she had not seen the Stiles automobile and that ‘it was wholly her fault’ that the accident happened. The plaintiffs Wayne and Viola and the intestate, John D. Stiles, suffered personal injuries. The intestate died subsequently as a result of the injuries suffered by him. The Stiles automobile was damaged as a result of the collision.

Sections 1294 and 1926 of Compiled General Laws of Florida (1927) were before the auditor. They read as follows: ‘1294. * * * Every person operating or driving a motor vehicle on the public highways of this State shall also, when approaching * * * a cross road outside the limits of a city or incorporated village or any intersecting highway, or street or curve or corner in a highway or street where the operator's view is obstructed, slow down the speed of the same and shall sound his horn or other device for signaling, in such manner as to give notice and warning of his approach.’ ‘1296. * * * No person shall operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this State recklessly, or at a rate of speed greater than reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highways so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person. * * * If, except within the limits of an incorporated city, the rate of speed of motor vehicles operated on the public highways of this State, where the operator's view of the road and traffic is obstructed, when approaching a crossing intersecting public highway * * * exceeds fifteen miles an hour such rate of speed shall be prima facie evidence that the person operating such motor vehicle is operating the same at the rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper and in violation of the provisions of this Chapter.’

The auditor also found that the operator of the Stiles automobile could reasonably anticipate that no automobile would enter Bridge Street from McKeen Street without ‘first stopping, and that said automobile would slow down before entering the intersection’; that the prima facie case of excessive speed as set forth in said section 1296 was overcome by the evidence before him; and that the operator of the Stiles vehicle was in the exercise of due care when the accident occurred.

Other evidence presented at the trial would warrant the jury in finding that just before coming to the intersection the Stiles vehicle was slowed down to fifteen miles an hour in conformity to section 1296; that a view of McKeen Street to the north, from which direction the defendant's automobile was coming, could be had for two hundred yards when the Stiles automobile was two hundred feet from the intersection; and that fifty feet from the intersection a person could see ‘clear down’ McKeen Street to the north; that the plaintiff Viola first saw the defendant's vehicle when the Stiles automobile was about fifteen feet from the intersection; and that at that time the defendant's automobile was about forty-five feet from the intersection and ‘was going about forty to fifty miles an hour.’ No contention has been made by counsel for the defendant that the evidence would not warrant a finding of negligence on her part.

The defendant's motions for directed verdicts were made at the close of the plaintiffs' cases. They were denied, and a memorandum of the law of Florida ‘having application to these cases' was submitted to the judge by the defendant before arguments. The defendant's motions in the cases of Viola and Wayne Stiles were based on the ground that, as a matter of law, each was contributorily negligent at the time of the accident. In the actions brought by the representatives of John D. Stiles, the motions were based on the grounds that, as matter of law, the operator of the Stiles vehicle was guilty of negligence at the time of the accident and that, as matter of law, any negligence on the part of the operator of the vehicle would bar recovery by the...