Stillman v. Fergus County

Decision Date04 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-174,85-174
Citation220 Mont. 315,715 P.2d 43,43 St.Rep. 396
PartiesJames A. STILLMAN and Julia A. Stillman, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FERGUS COUNTY, Montana, and City of Lewistown, Montana, both acting through their joint City-County Planning Board and Board of Adjustment, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Torger S. Oaas, Lewistown, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Joseph P. Gilligan, Smith, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Thomas P. Meissner, Lewistown, for defendants and respondents.

HUNT, Justice.

The Stillmans appeal from an order of the Fergus County District Court dismissing their complaint for damages as to defendant Fergus County. The dismissal was granted pursuant to Fergus County's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the court entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).

Reversed.

The sole issue raised by appellants is whether the District Court properly granted respondent Fergus County's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the District Court can consider matters of public record as well as the allegations in the complaint. All well-pleaded allegations are deemed admitted. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Willson v. Taylor (Mont.1981), 634 P.2d 1180, 38 St.Rep. 1606.

The zoning plan of Fergus County and the City of Lewistown involves two entities. The Board of Adjustments is an agency of the city and has the authority to grant zoning variances. The City-County Planning Board has certain duties regarding notice, and serves in an advisory capacity to the Board of Adjustments. The Zoning Coordinator and Planning Director, John Hughes, is an employee of the Planning Board.

Jerry Cloyd's home is located next to appellant's home in Lewistown, Montana. Both homes are in an area zoned "Residential Two Family" (R-2) under Lewistown's zoning plan. Cloyd applied to the Zoning Coordinator for a variance to allow him to build an addition extending two feet into the five foot side yard set-back area.

Hughes sent out notices on Planning Board stationery to various Lewistown residents informing them of Cloyd's application. Appellants received this notice. Appellants allege these notices were inadequate, misleading, and incorrect.

Cloyd was granted the variance. Appellants allege the Planning Board and the Board of Adjustments granted this variance and that it was granted without proper notice, without a legal hearing, and without considering the legal requirements for the allowance of a variance.

The District Court dismissed appellant's claim as to Fergus County. The court ruled that no set of circumstances could be established to render Fergus County liable for the acts alleged in the complaint. The order contained no findings of fact, but in the transcript the judge concluded that the Board of Adjustments has the exclusive power to grant zoning variances and the Board of Adjustments is an agent of the City of Lewistown. The Planning Board serves only in an advisory capacity. Therefore, the county is not responsible for the actions of the Board of Adjustments including the granting of the variance. This conclusion is incorrect for two reasons.

First, the appellants may be able to show that the Planning Board is directly liable to appellants because of acts committed by the Planning Board itself, through its employee, Hughes. The notice sent by Hughes to appellants stated that Cloyd "requested a variance to allow him to extend his kitchen 2 feet." Cloyd's actual request was for a variance to extend his kitchen 2 feet into the side yard set-back area for a total extension of 13 feet. This notice sent to appellants may give rise to liability of the Planning Board under a theory of negligence, estoppel, or reliance, regardless of which entity actually granted the variance.

Second, even if appellant's claim is based upon an agency theory, this may not preclude liability of the county. While there are no Montana cases on this subject, there is a long line of California cases which hold that, normally, allegations of agency are questions of fact and should not be decided on motion for summary judgment. Skopp v. Weaver (1976), 16 Cal.3d 432, 128 Cal.Rptr. 19, 546 P.2d 307; Farr v. Bramblett (1955), 132 Cal.App.2d 36, 281 P.2d 372. However, when dealing with a government entity, such as a county, this is not always true. A...

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3 cases
  • O'Fallon v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 92-024
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • August 30, 1993
    ...District Court in addition to the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. Stillman v. Fergus County (1986), 220 Mont. 315, 316, 715 P.2d 43; Washington v. Office of Comptroller of Currency (11th Cir.1988), 856 F.2d 1507; Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l Lt......
  • Semenza v. Kniss
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • July 8, 2008
    ...allegations of agency often involve questions of fact which preclude resolution by summary judgment. See e.g. Stillman v. Fergus County, 220 Mont. 315, 317, 715 P.2d 43, 44 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate where a party "fail[s] to present sufficient evidence to give rise to......
  • Sterrett v. Milk River Production Credit Ass'n, 88-239
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 3, 1988
    ... ...         This appeal from the Seventeenth Judicial District, in and for the County of Blaine, involves Larry and Gloria Sterrett's claim in tort against the Federal Intermediate ...         This Court in Stillman v. Fergus County (Mont.1986), 715 P.2d 43, 43 St.Rep. 396, stated: ... While there are no Montana ... ...

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