Stilp v. Com., General Assembly

• Decision Date: 20 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 81 MAP 2007.,81 MAP 2007.
• Citation: 974 A.2d 491
• Parties: Gene STILP, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Robert C. Jubelirer, David Brightbill, Robert Mellow, John M. Perzel, Sam Smith, H.W. DeWeese, Leadership of the General Assembly, Edward G. Rendell, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Robin L. Wiessman, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

974 A.2d 491

Gene STILP, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Robert C. Jubelirer, David Brightbill, Robert Mellow, John M. Perzel, Sam Smith, H.W. DeWeese, Leadership of the General Assembly, Edward G. Rendell, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Robin L. Wiessman, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellees.

No. 81 MAP 2007.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 28, 2008.

Decided July 20, 2009.

Gene Stilp, appellant pro se.

C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., Karl Stewart Myers, Jonathan F. Bloom, Thomas Walter Dymek, Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Gen. Assembly of Com. of PA; Rep. John Perzel, Rep. Sam Smith, H. Wm. DeWeese.

James Francis Tierney, IV, Cipriani & Werner, P.C., Scranton, for Robert Mellow.

John P. Krill, Jr., George A. Bibikos, Anthony Richard Holtzman, Linda J. Shorey, K & L Gates, L.L.P., Harrisburg, for President Pro Tempore and Majority Leader of the Senate.

Calvin Royer Koons, PA Office of Atty. Gen., Amanda L. Smith, for Edward G. Rendell.

Robert Forman Teplitz, PA Dept. of the Auditor Gen., for Jack Wagner.

Leonidas Pandeladis, Harrisburg, for Robin L. Weissmann.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY and GREENSPAN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice TODD.

In this appeal, Appellant Gene Stilp ("Stilp"), acting pro se, asks us to adopt an absolutist view of our Pennsylvania Constitution that would erase over 125 years of case law in his challenge of the receipt of various matters of value received by members of the General Assembly. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the orders of the Commonwealth Court dismissing Stilp's Amended Petition for Review ("Amended Petition").

By way of background, on January 3, 2006, Stilp filed a Petition for Review under the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Respondents included the General Assembly, the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth's Treasurer, the Majority Leaders of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives (collectively, "Appellees"). After certain of the Appellees filed preliminary objections, on February 21, 2006, Stilp filed his Amended Petition.

In his Amended Petition, Stilp challenged, inter alia, various matters of value received by members of the General Assembly as beyond the "salary and mileage" permitted by the Pennsylvania Constitution.¹ PA. CONST. ART. II, § 8. He also contested the maintenance of legislative leadership accounts as being violative of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 14. Stilp sought declaratory relief, requesting the additional compensation provided to members of the General Assembly in excess of salary and mileage be declared illegal and/or unconstitutional; injunctive relief restraining the Treasurer from disbursing monies for the challenged purposes; and the return of unspent monies in leadership accounts. Appellees filed preliminary objections to the Amended Petition.

On November 13, 2006, an en banc Commonwealth Court, in an opinion authored by Judge Robert Simpson, inter alia, (1) dismissed the Governor and Treasurer from the action; (2) sustained Appellees' preliminary objections to 14 of the 15 counts contained in the Amended Petition; (3) overruled the preliminary objections to Count XII (concerning the maintenance of legislative leadership accounts); and (4) permitted Stilp 30 days in which to filed a second Amended Petition with respect to Count XIII(i) (concerning the constitutionality of local grant monies, also known as "walking around money") and the propriety of naming the Treasurer as a respondent.² Stilp v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 910 A.2d 775 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) ("Stilp I").^{3 4}

Thereafter, Stilp failed to file a second Amended Petition; thus, the Governor and Treasurer were dismissed from the action, and only Count XII remained at issue. Appellees filed Answers with New Matter to which Stilp responded. In March 2007, Appellees applied for summary relief arguing that the Commonwealth Court should enter judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count XII of the Amended Petition. On July 11, 2007, Judge Rochelle Friedman writing for a unanimous en banc Commonwealth Court granted Appellees' application for judgment on the pleadings with respect to that count.⁵ Stilp v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 929 A.2d 660 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) ("Stilp II").

Stilp appealed to our Court. Before our Court, Stilp raises two issues which we address seriatim. The issues as stated by Stilp are:

a. Did the Commonwealth Court err by sustaining the demurrers thereby permitting members of the general assembly to continue receiving various forms of compensation in excess of a base salary and mileage, in light of the constitution's express language limiting their compensation to salary and mileage only?

b. Did the Commonwealth Court err by granting summary relief and judgment for Appellees wherein it ruled continuing appropriations that are not spent in the ensuing fiscal year, but used to amass large spending accounts controlled by legislative leaders do not violate the state constitutional provision that mandates all surplus be appropriated during the next fiscal year?

Stilp's Brief at 4.

The principles to be applied in our review of Stilp's issues are well established. With regard to the Commonwealth Court's action in sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer of Counts I to XI, XIII(i), XIII(ii), and XIV, the question presented in a demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law indicates with certainty that no recovery is possible. MacElree v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 544 Pa. 117, 124, 674 A.2d 1050, 1054 (1996). In reviewing a lower court's decision to grant a demurrer, our Court's standard of review is de novo. Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 588 Pa. 470, 480 n. 4, 905 A.2d 462, 468 n. 4 (2006).

Critically for purposes of this appeal, which concerns limitations on the power of the General Assembly, a reviewing court must narrowly construe a constitutional provision which places limitations on the power of the Legislature, as, unlike the federal Constitution, the powers not expressly withheld from the General Assembly inhere in it. Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Keiser, 340 Pa. 59, 66, 16 A.2d 307, 310 (1940). Thus, as our Court warned in Russ v. Commonwealth, 210 Pa. 544, 554, 60 A. 169, 172 (1905): "The Constitution has given us a list of the things which the legislature may not do. If we extend that list, we alter the instrument, we become ourselves the aggressors, and violate both the letter and spirit of the organic law as grossly as the legislature possibly could."

Additionally, a constitutional provision is to be interpreted insofar as possible in terms of its spirit and intention. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 514, 164 A. 615, 616 (1932). Furthermore, such a provision is to be interpreted in its popular sense as understood by the people who adopted it. Ieropoli v. AC&S Corporation, 577 Pa. 138, 148, 842 A.2d 919, 925 (2004). The "ultimate touchstone, nevertheless, must remain the language of the Constitution itself." Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 565, 353 A.2d 833, 835-36 (1976).

Finally, as this matter ultimately involves compensation provided through statutory enactments, we point out that legislation enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality; it will not be invalidated "unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution, and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of constitutionality." Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Spa Athletic Club, 506 Pa. 364, 370, 485 A.2d 732, 735 (1984). The party challenging the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly has a "very heavy burden of persuasion." Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 583 Pa. 275, 292, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (2005). With these principles in mind, we turn to Stilp's first issue.

Article II, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution addresses the compensation to be received by the members of the Legislature:

The members of the General Assembly shall receive such salary and mileage for regular and special sessions as shall be fixed by law, and no other compensation whatever, whether for service upon committee or otherwise. No member of either House shall during the term for which he may have been elected, receive any increase of salary, or mileage, under any law passed during such term.

PA. CONST. ART. II, § 8 (emphasis added).

In his Amended Petition, Stilp contends the receipt of certain benefits by the members of the General Assembly violates Article II, Section 8. Stilp's primary focus is on the text of Article II, Section 8. He maintains the Pennsylvania Constitution, by its plain and unambiguous terms, limits legislative members' compensation to a base salary and mileage. According to Stilp, various matters of value received by members of the General Assembly are not salary and, thus, are illegal and unconstitutional. Moreover, Stilp asserts the challenged compensation is not "fixed by law" as required by the Constitution in that these "unconstitutional" forms of compensation are not available in the "last 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin provisions." Appellant's Brief at 20. Pointing out that leadership members receive additional salary as provided by statute, Stilp claims this too is in contravention of the Constitution's ban on "other compensation, whatever, whether for service upon committee or otherwise." Id.

Appellees reply that the language, the framers' intent, and our Court's decisions all make clear the matters objected to by Stilp are constitutionally permissible. More specifically, Appellees counter the items Stilp identifies as unconstitutional "other compensation"—including vehicle...