Stimpson v. Tuscaloosa

• Decision Date: 30 August 1999
• Docket Number: 98-6186,Nos. 98-6142,s. 98-6142
• Citation: 186 F.3d 1328
• Parties: (11th Cir. 1999) Sandra Leigh STIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, J. Russell Gibson, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1328

186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999)

Sandra Leigh STIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, J. Russell Gibson, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 98-6142, 98-6186.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 30, 1999.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (No. 95-CV-570-W), U.W. Clemon, Judge.

Before COX, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and NANGLE^*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The City of Tuscaloosa ("the City") and the Civil Service Board of Tuscaloosa ("the Civil Service Board") appeal a judgment against them under Title VII for wrongful termination based on sex. They argue that the district court wrongly denied their motion for a judgement as a matter of law because the plaintiff did not introduce any evidence that the City's alleged discrimination directly caused her termination. We agree, and therefore REVERSE.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Sandra Stimpson was employed as a police officer by the city of Tuscaloosa since 1975. Over the course of her employment, she had a troubled disciplinary record. She received various forms of punishments ranging from reprimands to suspensions, for such transgressions as: giving beer to a prisoner; several instances of deception, including lying about making secret tape recordings of conversations with a superior officer; rudeness to the public; insubordination; several unexcused absences, including at least one while moonlighting; and one instance of threatening to shoot her partner. Despite the repetitive and serious nature of some of these violations, Stimpson was given many chances to improve her behavior.

In September of 1992, Stimpson came to work with her hand and wrist immobilized in a splint. She presented a note from her doctor, Dr. Ikard, stating that she was fit to return to work. After seeing the splint, Stimpson's superiors became concerned that her immobilized hand might hinder her ability to perform some of her official duties safely. Chief Swindle decided that the City needed to verify that Dr. Ikard knew what Stimpson's job duties were and took those duties into account when he deemed her fit to return to work. When Assistant Chief Wilkins contacted Dr. Ikard to clarify these issues, Ikard refused to discuss the matter unless Stimpson signed a medical release. Wilkins next sent Stimpson's sergeant to get her to execute a release, but Stimpson refused to sign. The next day, Wilkins himself requested that she sign the release, but Stimpson again refused. The following day, Wilkins again approached Stimpson. This time he had developed a new "return to work" form that described a patrol officer's job duties and explained that there was no alternative "light-duty" assignment available. He asked Stimpson to return to Dr. Ikard and have him sign the new form. Stimpson refused. He then ordered Stimpson to go to the Emergi-Care clinic to have a different doctor examine her hand and wrist and determine whether she could safely perform her job functions. Faced with suspension if she did not comply, Stimpson went to the clinic.

Stimpson was very agitated when she got to the clinic. According to several witnesses, she raised her voice and used profanities. Some of the witnesses filed complaints and expressed shock that a police officer would behave that way in public, especially in uniform. Once in the doctor's office, she refused to cooperate with the nurse's initial examination and threatened to sue the doctor, Doctor Lovelady, if he contradicted Dr. Ikard's recommendation. After being threatened, Lovelady refused to perform the examination. Later, he called the police department and complained about the incident to Chief Swindle. Stimpson returned to work, telling her supervisor that Lovelady did not examine her and she therefore did not get the return to work form signed. She was then suspended until such a time as she could produce the form signed by a doctor. Only after being suspended did she contact Dr. Ikard and get him to sign the form. After getting the signature, she returned to work with the form and was reinstated.

In October, following an investigation of the Emergi-Care incident by the Tuscaloosa Police Department, Stimpson was suspended with pay. Based on her behavior at Emergi-Care coupled with her history of disciplinary problems, Chief Swindle recommended that she be terminated. Under Alabama state law, the City of Tuscaloosa has no power to unilaterally fire a police officer. Instead, Alabama has created a Civil Service Board of Tuscaloosa, whose members are appointed by the Governor of Alabama. The Board, alone, has the power to terminate a police officer. Chief Swindle informed Stimpson that he intended to recommend her discharge to the Board. He offered her the chance to resign instead, as he testified he had done with all of the other officers he had intended to refer to the Board for discharge. She refused to resign, and so Swindle instituted proceedings before the Civil Service Board. The Board, which at the time consisted of two men and one woman, held a three-day hearing in January of 1993. Stimpson was represented by counsel at this hearing and put on witnesses in her defense. On January 8, 1993, the Civil Service Board unanimously decided to terminate Stimpson based on her conduct surrounding the Emergi-Care incident, after also considering some of the most recent and egregious misconduct in her disciplinary record.

In April of 1993, Stimpson filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging discriminatory discharge based on sex and age against the City of Tuscaloosa. After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Stimpson filed suit in the Northern District of Alabama under Title VII and the ADEA. She eventually added counts under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Swindle and Wilkins and added the members of the Civil Service Board as defendants in their official capacity. Before trial, the 1983 claims were dropped and the Civil Service Board's motion for summary judgement was granted. The Board was subsequently reintroduced as a Rule 19 defendant because it would be needed procedurally if reinstatement was granted to Stimpson, but the Board was no longer a defendant for liability purposes.

Prior to the introduction of evidence at trial, Stimpson voluntarily dismissed her age discrimination claim. Before and at trial, Stimpson's case was based on trying to show that the City's decision to recommend her termination was the discriminatory adverse employment action. At no time did Stimpson ever introduce any evidence or even make a concrete allegation that the Board's decision to terminate her was based on her sex. The City moved for judgment as a matter of law on several grounds, including that it had not actually terminated Stimpson, and that she had not proven that the decision to terminate her, made by the Board, was based on sex. Following the district court's denial of the motion, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Stimpson. The court's final judgement ordered her reinstatement and awarded her $300,000 damages plus back pay and attorneys fees. Appellants filed timely...