Sting v. Davis

• Decision Date: 08 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 32,32
• Citation: 384 Mich. 608,185 N.W.2d 360
• Parties: Edgar STING, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Norman DAVIS, Kenneth Harrington and Louise Harrington, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 360

185 N.W.2d 360

384 Mich. 608

Edgar STING, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Norman DAVIS, Kenneth Harrington and Louise Harrington Defendants and Appellants.

No. 32.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 8, 1971.

Van Benschoten & Van Benschoten, by Duane S. van Benschoten, Saginaw, for plaintiff-appellee.

Smith & Brooker, P. C., Saginaw, for defendants-appellants.

Before the Entire Bench.

ADAMS, Justice.

The facts and proceedings in this case, as stated in a per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals (22 Mich.App. 373, 177 N.W.2d 203), affirming the trial court, are as follows:

'This case arises from an automobile accident which occurred in the pre-dawn hours of August 5, 1962, in Saginaw County, Michigan. Plaintiff was driving north on Davis Road at about 35 miles per hour. Defendant, Norman Davis, was driving south in a vehicle owned by defendants Kenneth and Louise Harrington at about 50 miles per hour. North of where the collision occurred, Davis swerved his vehicle off the road to the right allegedly in an effort to avoid hitting a dog. The Davis vehicle continued in a southerly direction partially off the road until it suddenly veered back on the road, crossed the center line and collided with the Sting vehicle, thereby injuring plaintiff.

'Plaintiff, in his action, alleged negligence against defendant Davis and negligent entrustment against defendants Harrington in light of Davis' poor driving record. Defendants answered that Davis was free from negligence in that the dog allegedly created a sudden emergency and further alleged contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff in failing to make an effort to avoid the collision.'

These further facts and proceedings are pertinent to this appeal: Sting testified that he noticed Davis' car, when several hundred feet down the road, 'was quite far over on his side of the road' but that he thought little of it. The next thing, he knew, Davis' car 'had me pinned down head-on.' Davis was cross-examined without objection as to the traffic conviction arising out of the accident. It was admitted on the trial that Davis' prior driving record could be shown because plaintiff had included a count in negligent entrustment by co-defendants. The trial judge overruled defendants' objection to questions regarding Davis' post-accident traffic convictions. The trial judge relied mainly on standard jury instructions in charging the jury. He told them to consider the testimony regarding Davis' driving record for the purpose of testing credibility. Defendants objected to the judge's refusal to give the instructions offered as to contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against all defendants.

I. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendants claim the trial court's standard jury instructions failed meaningfully to relate the definition of contributory negligence to the pertinent testimony in this case, quoting from Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp. (1965), 374 Mich. 194, 207, 132 N.W.2d 54. The charge in the case at bar was given on January 23, 1969, prior to our order of April 14, 1970, with regard to standard jury instructions. (383 Mich. xv). The trial judge might have better related the law and the evidence in accordance with Hill. However, the trial judge did charge as to contributory negligence in accordance with the standard jury instructions. Upon a reading of the court's entire charge in which the judge carefully explained the duty of plaintiff to use ordinary care for his own safety, that plaintiff could not recover if he was negligent and such negligence was a proximate contributing cause and plaintiff's burden of proof, we find no error.

II. GCR 607 AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT

Defendants here principally complain of the questions to defendant Davis relating to post-accident traffic convictions. However, they now also object to the questions relating to ante-accident convictions on the ground that plaintiff's negligent entrustment count was a mere 'evidentiary subterfuge' to gain admission of otherwise improper evidence. As to all the questions relating to Davis' driving record, defendants here argue that revised GCR 607 ¹ does not permit such questions to test a defendant's credibility in an auto tort case unless there is other independent basis for admissibility. They say only questions relating to crimes involving moral turpitude can be said to truly test the credibility of the witness and that precautionary instructions cannot overcome the likelihood of prejudice against a defendant.

The right to impeach a witness' credibility by cross-examination and the possibility of prejudice as a result of such interrogation were examined at length in the opposing opinions iin Taylor v. Walter (1970), 384 Mich. 114, 180 N.W.2d 24. A further extended discussion is unwarranted.

GCR 607 was adopted by this Court in accordance with its rulemaking powers as to evidentiary matters. The central issue in practically every contested motor vehicle accident case is whether defendant-driver was guilty of negligence and, if the plaintiff was the driver of the other motor vehicle, whether he was free from contributory negligence. As to the defendant, the question which confronts the jury is whether to believe the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant was negligent or the claim of the defendant that he was not negligent and, as to plaintiff-driver, the issue is just the reverse. Almost invariably, as in this case, the defendant asserts, 'I did not drive in a negligent fashion.' If the plaintiff was also a motor vehicle driver, as in this case, he makes the same assertion as to his driving upon finding himself accused of being the responsible party because of negligent driving. On the issue of whom to believe, the driving record of a plaintiff or of a defendant can become a crucial evidentiary factor. That driving history, both before and after the accident, whether it be for serious or minor infractions of the vehicle code, can have a vital bearing in enabling a jury to determine the truth of a plaintiff's or defendant's testimony as to the exercise of due care.

We conclude that under GCR 607, as presently adopted by this Court, a trial judge has no discretion to exclude cross-examination with regard to the driving history of a plaintiff-driver or of a defendant-driver, such cross-examination being proper to test the credibility of the witness' testimony with regard to the central fact issue in the case.

The issue as to negligent entrustment was not properly saved. Furthermore, our...