Stinnie v. Holcomb
| Decision Date | 23 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-1740,17-1740 |
| Parties | DAMIAN STINNIE, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; DEMETRICE MOORE, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; ROBERT TAYLOR, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; NEIL RUSSO, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. RICHARD D. HOLCOMB, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant - Appellee. THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE; LAW PROFESSORS; VIRGINIA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; ALABAMA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA; CENTER FOR CIVIL JUSTICE; CENTER FOR JUSTICE; COLORADO CENTER ON LAW AND POLICY; EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW; FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES, INC.; KANSAS APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW; MISSISSIPPI CENTER FOR JUSTICE; NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE; NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER; PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER; SOUTH CAROLINA APPLESEED CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; TEXAS APPLESEED; TZEDEK DC; WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS; WESTERN CENTER OR LAW & POVERTY, Amici Supporting Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, Senior U.S. District Judge. (3:16-cv-00044-NKM-JCH)
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Duncan joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Tennille Jo Checkovich, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jonathan T. Blank, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia; Angela A. Ciolfi, Patrick S. Levy-Lavelle, Mario D. Salas, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER, Charlottesville, Virginia; Leslie Kendrick, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Matthew R. McGuire, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. William R. Maurer, Bellevue, Washington, Jeffrey Redfern, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus The Institute for Justice. Frederick Liu, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Law Professors. Cynthia Cook Robertson, Robert C.K. Boyd, Washington, D.C., Thomas V. Loran III, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici The Virginia State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Center for Civil Justice, Center for Justice, Colorado Center on Law and Policy, Equal Justice Under Law, Florida Legal Services, Inc., Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Mississippi Center for Justice, National Center for Law and Economic Justice, North Carolina Justice Center, Public Justice Center, South Carolina Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Texas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Tzedek DC, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and Western Center on Law & Poverty.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
This case arises out of a constitutional challenge to Virginia Code § 46.2-395, pursuant to which anyone who fails to pay court costs or fines imposed after a conviction is subject to suspension of his or her driver's license. Plaintiffs Damian Stinnie, Demetrice Moore, Robert Taylor, and Neil Russo owe court debts and, because of their inability to pay, have had their licenses suspended. They allege that the statute violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' case without prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
Virginia Code § 46.2-395 provides, in relevant part:
In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they are indigent Virginia residents who have had their driver's licenses suspended for failure to pay court costs and fines imposed following their convictions. Plaintiffs filed suit individually and on behalf of a class of additional unnamed plaintiffs similarly situated against Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") Commissioner Richard Holcomb ("the Commissioner") seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Notwithstanding the language of Virginia Code § 46.2-395(B)—providing that the "court shall forthwith suspend" the driver's licenses—Plaintiffs alleged that it is the DMV, not the state court, that actually implements and issues the orders of suspension. Further, Plaintiffs alleged that to remove the license suspensions, they have to pay the amount owed to the court or establish an acceptable payment plan, and pay a reinstatement fee to the DMV. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claimed that Virginia Code § 46.2-395 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. They asserted that it "unfairly punishes them for being poor," J.A. 11 ¶ 7, and traps them in a catch-22: because Plaintiffs do not have money to pay court costs, they do not have driver's licenses, and because they do not have driver's licenses, they are unable to obtain employment which would allow them to pay the court costs.
The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted his motion without prejudice. It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims against the Commissioner because the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine,* the Commissioner was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Plaintiffs lacked standing. In granting the motion to dismiss, the district court was careful to note that "it may be possible to reconstitute [Plaintiffs' claims] in a form and against a defendant such that a lower federal court would have jurisdiction." J.A. 608. Plaintiffs then filed a Rule 59 and Rule 60 motion for reconsideration, along with several supporting exhibits purporting to demonstrate the court's jurisdiction. The Commissioner opposed this motion, and filed a motion to strike the exhibits. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion to strike. This appeal followed.
The Commissioner argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' appeal because the district court's dismissal without prejudice was not a final order. We agree.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that the courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . ." The finality requirement of § 1291 "advances the important interest of avoiding piecemealreview of ongoing district court proceedings." MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1994). We recently had the opportunity to examine at length the circumstances in which a dismissal without prejudice is considered a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015). In Goode, we held that "[a]n order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not an appealable final order under § 1291 if 'the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint.'" Id. at 623 (quoting Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993)). If " 'the grounds of the dismissal make clear that no amendment could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case, the order dismissing the complaint is final in fact' and therefore appealable," but a " 'plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of his complaint without prejudice unless the grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that no amendment [in the complaint] could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case.' " Id. (quoting Domino Sugar, 10 F.3d at 1066-67) (alterations in original).
We also noted that dismissals are generally final and appealable "in cases in which the district court granted a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds that no amendment to the pleadings could cure," but that dismissals without prejudice are not final "in cases in which the district court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to plead sufficient facts in the complaint . . . ." Id. at 624. This approach "requires us to examine the appealability of a dismissal without prejudice based...
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