Stinson v. C., St. P. & M. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1880
• Citation: 6 N.W. 784,27 Minn. 284
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF STINSON, ETC. v THE C., ST. P. & M. R. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

27 Minn. 284

6 N.W. 784

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF STINSON, ETC.vTHE C., ST. P. & M. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed October 9, 1880.

Appeal from order of district court, Ramsey county.

Bigelow, Flandrau & Clark and R. B. Galusha, for appellant.

Davis, O'Brien & Wilson, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Ramsey county denying the appellant (Stinson's) motion for a new trial in condemnation proceedings. The report of the commissioners was filed June 25, 1879, and the trial in the district court took place in November following. The lands condemned consisted of some 70 lots and blocks in Stinson and Arlington Hill's addition to St. Paul. In the district court R. W. Johnson testified that he had had charge of Stinson's addition since it was laid out, in 1872. Had sold property in it for Stinson-20 or 30 lots. These sales were made during the last seven years. Last sale was Friday, week before last. Sold two lots in June or July, 1879, not far from the time this award was filed. They were in the immediate vicinity of this property. It was similar property (superficially considered) to that now in controversy. The ground from the south side slopes to the railroad, and there is a rise to the north side; so they are similarly situated, although, probably, a little steeper on the north side than on the south side. The sales were bona fide to persons desiring to purchase, and who paid the money.

Question by appellant: “What were the prices for which that property was sold that you speak of?” Respondent's counsel objected, and questioned the witness for the purpose of forming a basis for the objection. The witness answered: “There are 77 acres in this addition-about 480 lots; sold last spring lot 11, in block 13, and lot 11, in block 11; have sold other lots in this addition in the last seven years, along at different times, from year to year; can't give the dates when, within a year before selling those two lots, I sold any others; I sold five here two or three days ago; should say that I have sold three or four within a year from June 25, 1879.” Respondent's counsel then objected to the appellant's question as incompetent and immaterial, and not evidence of the value of the condemned property under the situation testified to. The court excluded the question, and appellant excepted. The witness then testified that the lots spoken of, as having been sold by him in the immediate vicinity of this property, are of the same size and similarly situated as lots in the property in dispute; they are similarly situated with lots opposite them on the land in dispute, though not situated exactly alike; they are both on an inclined plane; one is more inclined than the other; they are a little steeper on the side the railroad wants to condemn; I know what these 30 or 40 lots, that have been sold there, were sold for.” Upon this foundation the appellant asked the witness: “What has been the average value, or the average price, for which those lots have sold?” The question was objected to as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and was excluded by the court, appellant excepting.

1. Whether these questions were properly excluded is the principal subject of inquiry in this case. We think the questions were properly excluded for several reasons. If it be admitted that evidence of the price at which property similar in character and situation to other property sought to be condemned was sold, is admissible to show the value of the latter property as is held in some states,-notably in Massachusetts,-still, the rule is that the determination of the question whether the similarity of character and situation is sufficient, and the sale sufficiently recent to make the proposed evidence admissible, is a matter not regulated by any fixed rules, but wholly within the sound discretion of the trial court. Shattuck v. S. B. R. 6 Allen, 115;Benham v. Dunbar, 103 Mass. 365;Green v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 262;Chandler v. J. P. A. Co. 122 Mass. 305. Upon the foundation laid, as we have seen in this case, and upon the plat or map produced upon the trial, we think that the court below, in the exercise of sound discretion, might well have excluded the question asked, upon the ground that the requisite similarity of the property condemned to that sold was not shown to exist; and so, also, with regard to the time of the sales inquired about, the court might very properly exclude the question upon the ground that some of the sales were so remote in time from the date of the award that the average prices inquired for could...