Stinson v. Cushman
| Decision Date | 23 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | RE-18-0013 |
| Parties | JOANNE M. STINSON and BETH A. CORMIER, Plaintiffs, v. GREGORY S. CUSHMAN and JENNIFER S. CUSHMAN, Defendants, and NANCY COBB and JERRY COBB, Intervenors. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS, INTERVENORS, AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before this court are the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motions are denied.
The parties all own property within the Crescent Lake Development Association's subdivision plan (the "Plan"). All deeds relevant to this action have referenced and adopted the Plan into the language of the deed. Plaintiffs own lots 135, 136, 137 and 138 as depicted on the Plan. Interveners own lots 34 and 35 as depicted on the Plan, as well as 128 and 129. Defendant's own lots 124, 125, 126, and 127 as depicted on the Plan.
The Plan depicts over 150 numbered parcels of land. Beginning in 1931, the Crescent Lake Association began selling parcels by deed, which referenced a specific numbered lot in the Plan. Most deeds stated:
"Said lot is conveyed together with a right of way in common with others to and from the premises to the town road between Webbs Mills and East Raymond by such common ways as are or may be established by this Corporation."
This action concerns a strip of land described in the Plan as 33A. Parcel 33A is but one of several "A" designated parcels, all of which are depicted in the Plan as narrow strips that run from various points along Haskell Ave to Crescent Lake. Unlike other lots depicted on the Plan, which are fully demarcated by enclosed boundaries, 33A and other "A" parcels are not demarcated by fully enclosed boundaries. Instead, the Plan's illustration depicts the "A" lots to be closed on three sides, but do not depict any enclosure in regards to Haskell Ave, similar to how Haskell Avenue flows from one street to another.
Parcel 33A is only twenty feet wide and runs between lots 33 and 34 33A provides a walking path from Haskell Avenue to the Crescent Lake shorefront. Plaintiffs hold title to Lot 135 by deed and an express easement over 33A. The following language regarding 33A can be traced back in Lot 135's chain of title to the Association's original grant of the deed:
"Said lot is conveyed together with a right of way in common with others to and from said premises to the town road between Webbs Mills and East Raymond by such common ways as are or may be established by the Corporation and a right of way in common with others over . . . lot 33-A as shown on said map”
(Jt. Ex. 7; Jamison Aff. Ex 14; PSMF ¶ 14; Defs.' R PSMF ¶ 14) (emphasis added.) Lots 128 and 129, were conveyed to the Intervenors' family in the early 1930s, whose deed also states:
"Said lots are conveyed together with ... a right of way in common with others to and from said premises over Haskell Ave. . . . and over lots 23A, and 33A, as shown on said map."
(Int. and Pls.' JSMF ¶ 5.) This language can also be traced back in the chain of title to the Association's original grant of the deed. (Jamison Aff. Ex 11.) Although the parties dispute the legal classification of 33A, the Defendants do not hold title to any deed that specifically references 33A, or hold any express easement over the parcel.
The history of the Association, which developed and sold lots in the subdivision, is also at issue in this case. The Association was formed on August 11, 1928, with its owners being Harry P. Woodbury (48 shares of stock), Josiah D. Winship (2 shares of stock), and Byron E. Haskell (48 shares of stock). On October 14, 1940, the Association conveyed property to Byron Haskell by deed, which included:
(JSMF ¶ 15, Ex 12.) The Association ceased doing business on June 9, 1941.
Byron Haskell subsequently deeded to Bertha G. Haskell "all unsold lots belonging to [Byron] which [he] obtained by deed from Crescent Lake Development Association" on October 14. . Neither the deed to Byron or Bertha Haskell contained a specific reference to 33A. Bertha Haskell also was the sole devisee under Byron Haskell's will after Byron died in December, 1943.
The Association ceased doing business on June 9, 1941. Then, Bertha Haskell died in March, 1965. Roy N. Cummings was the sole devisee under Bertha Haskell's will. Roy N. Cummings died on November 2, 2014. Adrian H. Schreiber was the sole devisee under Roy Cumming's will. During the pendency of this litigation, Adrian Schreiber issued a release deed to the Defendants, which purported to convey any interest he held in 33A.
The Plaintiffs and Intervenors believe that only those who have an express easement over 33A are allowed to use it. In or around 2014, the Defendants' represented that they had a right to use 33A to access the lake, for which Plaintiffs and Interveners incorrectly assumed to mean the Defendants had an express easement over 33A. The Defendants proceeded to install a seasonal dock at the end of 33A. The parties disagree about the nature and extent to which the Defendants have since utilized the dock, which will be treated as a disputed issue of fact. There is no evidence regarding whether other individuals with a deeded right of way over 33A or other "A" lots have maintained a private dock. There is also no evidence regarding if, how, or when, any person without a deeded right of way may or may have not utilized 33A, other than for a walking trail.
The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that: (1) the Defendants have no right to use 33A, by virtue of deed or otherwise; (2) the Defendants have no right to erect a dock at the end of 33A, regardless of any interest they might have in the property; (3) Defendants do not hold a fee interest in 33A by virtue of the release deed issued by Adrian Schreiber; (4) if the Defendants hold a fee interest in 33A, their use of the dock still impairs Plaintiffs and Interveners' deeded right of way over 33A; and (5) the Defendants cannot hold fee title to 33A by virtue of the Paper Streets Act. The Intervenors have joined in the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment.
The Defendants have filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment that: (1) the Defendants have an easement over 33A by virtue of the Plan and thus have a right to maintain a private dock; (2) Defendants own 33A by virtue of the release deed Adrian Schreiber and his alleged inheritance of the land; (3) the Defendants own an interest in 33A by virtue of Adrian Schreiber and his alleged inheritance of a shared interest in 33A; and (4) the Defendants own an interest in 33A by virtue of Adrian Schreiber and his alleged inheritance of the shares in the Association held by Byron Haskell.
When there are cross-motions for summary judgment, the rules for consideration of summary judgment are applied separately to each motion. F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, NA., 2010 ME 115, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 646. The record on each summary judgment issue must be considered most favorably to the party objecting to the grant of summary judgment on that issue. Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Properties LLC, 2009 ME 101, ¶ 23, 980 A.2d 1270. A party is entitled to summary judgment when review of the parties' statements of material facts and the record to which the statements refer, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821; M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). A contested fact is "material" if it could potentially affect the outcome of the case. Id. A "genuine issue" of material fact exists if the claimed fact would require a factfinder to "choose between competing versions of the truth." Id. (quotations omitted).
Once a properly supported motion is filed, the party opposing summary judgment must show that a factual dispute exists sufficient to establish a prima facie case for each element of the defense raised in order to avoid summary judgment. Watt v. Unifirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 21, 969 A.2d 897. A party who moves for summary judgment is entitled to judgment only if the party opposed to the motion, in response, fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of the defense raised. Lougee Conservancy v. Citi Mortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774.
Unlike a stipulated record for trial, a judge is required to make certain inferences in favor of the non-moving party on issues presented at summary judgment. See generally Blue Sky West LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137, ¶ 16, n.lO, 215 A.3d 812. Accordingly, "[a] record of stipulated facts does not, by itself, mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Blue Sky West LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137, ¶ 16, n.lO, 215 A.3d 812.
First ail parties seek a declaratory judgment that they hold an easement over 33A. The Plaintiffs and Intervenors seek a judgment that they hold an express easement over 33A and that the Defendants hold no easement rights. Conversely, the Defendants seek a judgment that they hold an...
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