Stith v. Virginia State Bar, 850882

• Decision Date: 24 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 850882,850882
• Citation: 233 Va. 222,355 S.E.2d 310
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Salvage Delacy STITH v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR. Record

Page 310

355 S.E.2d 310

233 Va. 222

Salvage Delacy STITH v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR.

Record No. 850882.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 24, 1987.

Salvage Delacy Stith, Portsmouth, pro se.

Gregory E. Lucyk, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., James T. Moore, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: CARRICO, C.J., and COCHRAN, ^* POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON, RUSSELL and THOMAS, JJ.

COCHRAN, Justice.

This is an appeal of right by Salvage DeLacy Stith from an order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board suspending for three years his license to practice law in the Commonwealth. On appeal, Stith contends that the Disciplinary Board erred in denying his motion to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that under our Rules only the Fourth District Committee, and not the Fifth District Committee, had the authority to investigate his conduct, and in denying his petition to rehear. Holding that neither of Stith's contentions is tenable, we will affirm the order of the Disciplinary Board.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. The Fifth District Committee heard two complaints against Stith. The first complaint was based on the fact, admitted by Stith, that a client deposited $3,200 with Stith to be used in the purchase of real estate. The proposed sale was never consummated. When the client requested return of the deposit, Stith gave a check on his trust account which the bank refused to honor. Stith admitted that he had used the money for his own purposes and eventually reimbursed the client. The second complaint was based on the fact, also admitted by Stith, that between January and August 1983 he had borrowed from his trust account various sums for his own use so that the balance in the account was insufficient to cover the amounts deposited in trust for his clients.

The Disciplinary Board, based on the undisputed facts, ruled that Stith had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 9-102(A), 9-102(B)(3), 9-102(B)(4), 9-103(A), and 9-103(B) as to the first complaint (Disciplinary Board Docket No. 84-44), and had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 9-102(A), 9-102(B)(3), 9-103(A), and 9-103(B) as to the second complaint (Disciplinary Board Docket No. 85-21).

At the hearing conducted by the Disciplinary Board, Stith conceded that he had appeared before the Fifth District Committee on the first complaint and had not challenged the authority of the Committee to investigate the charges. He also conceded that he did not appear before the Committee on the second complaint or file any written motion or pleading challenging its authority. He asserted, however, that he had verbally informed a member of the Committee that his offices were in the Fourth District, he resided in the Fourth District, and the conduct complained of had occurred in the Fourth District.

Under Part 6, § IV, Paragraph 13 of our Rules, it is the duty of a District Committee to investigate charges of misconduct against an attorney when the misconduct occurs in that district or the attorney resides in or maintains an office in the district. However, we have held that this Rule establishes venue rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Smolka v. Second Dist. Comm., 224 Va. 161, 165, 295 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1982). Venue is waived if timely objection is not made. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 269.

Stith appeared before the Fifth District Committee on the first complaint and did not raise...