Stockand v. Bartlett

• Decision Date: 29 August 1892
• Citation: 31 P. 24,4 Wash. 730
• Parties: STOCKAND ET UX. v. BARTLETT ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

31 P. 24

4 Wash. 730

STOCKAND ET UX. v. BARTLETT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 29, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Jefferson county; MORRIS B. SACHS Judge.

C. C Bartlett & Co. were enjoined from selling the community property of Peter R. Stockand and wife. Subsequently, on undertaking to sell the husband's interest in such property, Bartlett & Co. and Richard Delanty, sheriff, were adjudged guilty of contempt of court, and appeal. Affirmed.

Tyler, Hays & Tyler, for appellants.

A R. Coleman and W. S. Bush, for respondents.

SCOTT J.

This was an appeal from an order made subsequent to a judgment adjudging appellants guilty of contempt of court. The respondents were husband and wife, and brought an action to restrain the appellants from selling their community real property to pay the individual debt of the husband. A trial was had, and appellants were enjoined from selling such real estate. Subsequently the appellants sued out a writ of execution upon the judgment, and directed the sheriff to levy upon all the right, title, and interest of the defendant Peter R. Stockand in said real estate, which he was about to sell, when these proceedings for contempt were instituted. The appellants contend that the injunction restraining them from selling the community real estate in question did not enjoin them from selling the husband's interest therein. In the case of Manufacturing Co. v. Miller, 3 Wash St. 480, 28 P. 1035, it was stated that the interest of one of the parties in community real estate could not be sold separately. We are satisfied with this holding. Such real estate is not the property of either of the parties, but of the community; and, owing to the peculiar nature of the ownership of such property, it would result in interminable confusion if the interest of either of the parties could be sold separately under execution. If the whole interest of one of the parties could be so sold, a part interest of one of them could be sold likewise, and the relation of the parties to the property would be destroyed thereby. The property left could not be held to be the community property of the husband and wife, for their interests after the sale would be unequal, provided they each had an interest therein; and, if the whole interest of one of the parties therein was thus sold, the remaining part belonging to the other spouse would not come under any of the definitions of property which...