Stockly v. Doil

• Decision Date: 05 April 2005
• Parties: A. HOLMES STOCKLY et al. v. AYNNE M. DOIL et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

2005 ME 47

870 A.2d 1208

A. HOLMES STOCKLY et al. v. AYNNE M. DOIL et al.

Docket: Cum-04-321.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: January 11, 2005.

Decided: April 5, 2005.

Juliet T. Browne, Esq. (orally), Scott W. Boak, Esq., Verrill Dana, LLP, One Portland Square, Portland, ME, Attorney for plaintiffs.

James B. Haddow, Esq. (orally), Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, ME, McCourt Logging Company did not file a brief, Attorney for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶1] Aynne M. Doil appeals and A. Holmes and Doris Stockly cross-appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Humphrey, C.J.) finding Doil liable pursuant to both 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 7552¹ and 7552-A² (2003). Doil asserts that the court erred by finding her liable pursuant to both statutes and by awarding attorney fees to the Stocklys. The Stocklys argue that the court erred by: (1) determining that the stumpage value of the lost trees was the proper measure of damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A; and (2) reducing Doil's responsibility for damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552(3)(B). Because the trial court erred by holding Doil liable under section 7552 and failed to consider the Stocklys' claim of restoration costs, we vacate the judgment.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶2] The case was presented on stipulated facts. The Stocklys own approximately twenty acres of undeveloped land in Falmouth. Doil owns land abutting the Stocklys' property. Neither Doil nor the Stocklys developed or cleared their properties prior to the spring of 2001. Both properties were naturally forested with a mix of mature hardwoods and softwoods.

[¶3] In the spring of 2001, Doil engaged Matthew McCourt to "conduct a selective harvest of timber" on her property. McCourt helped Doil obtain authorization for the cutting from the Department of Conservation. McCourt also assisted Doil in obtaining a copy of the tax map of her property. Doil understood that McCourt wanted the tax map so that he could determine the boundary of her property. The boundary line between the Stockly and Doil properties is impossible to locate on the face of the earth based exclusively on information provided in the tax map. McCourt agreed to indemnify Doil in the event that the cutting resulted in trespass and tree cutting to any land she did not own. The indemnification provision in the agreement was "important" to Doil because she "just wanted to make sure that [she] wasn't liable for anything that might . . . happen." Doil did not authorize or direct McCourt to cut any trees located on the Stockly property.

[¶4] Stonewalls mark the boundary between the western and southern edge of the Stocklys' property and the eastern edge of Doil's property. The eastern, northern, and southern edges of the Stocklys' property, abutting Doil's property, had been surveyed and flagged by the Stocklys prior to the spring of 2001. No other markers indicated the boundary between the two properties.

[¶5] Doil was aware that McCourt had walked on her property and that he had identified the stonewall boundaries on at least one edge of the property. Doil believed that McCourt had the information he needed to determine the boundary of her property. Doil failed to mark her boundaries and therefore concedes liability under section 7552-A.

[¶6] During the spring and summer of 2001, McCourt cut trees on thirty acres of Doil's property and on twenty acres of the Stocklys' property. The Stocklys lost approximately 725 trees as a result of the cutting. Most of the trees that were cut on the Stocklys' property were large hardwoods and softwoods. The Stocklys did not authorize the cutting and were not aware of it until after it occurred. McCourt paid Doil $17,000 to $18,000 for the trees cut.

[¶7] The trees cut on the Stocklys property had a fair market or "stumpage value" of $14,127.30. The forfeiture value of the trees, pursuant to 17 M.R.S.A. § 2510(2) (1983 & Supp. 2004), was $59,525.49. The Stocklys assert and Doil concedes, "the cost to clean up the debris and slash left behind from the timber harvesting would be: $35,750." To restore the property would cost approximately $370,000. The cutting did not have a significant impact on the fair market value of the Stocklys' property. The Stocklys contend, however, that their property was ninety-five percent clear-cut and is now of little or no value to them, as they are no longer able to use it for recreational purposes.

[¶8] The Stocklys commenced an action against Doil and McCourt seeking damages for (1) breach of statutory duties pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 7552 and 7552-A; (2) negligence; (3) nuisance; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doil filed a cross-claim seeking indemnification from McCourt. McCourt failed to appear and a default judgment was entered against him. The Superior Court granted the Stocklys' motion for a summary judgment with respect to Doil's liability under 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A, for failure to mark her property line. The remainder of the case was submitted to the Superior Court to decide based on the stipulated facts.

[¶9] The Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of the Stocklys, (1) finding Doil responsible for damages of $28,254.60, or double the "stumpage value," pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A, for failing to mark her property line; and (2) finding Doil and McCourt responsible for damages of $119,050 (double the forfeiture value of the trees), pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552, for negligently cutting, destroying, damaging, and carrying away trees from land without the property owner's permission. Although the court initially found McCourt and Doil jointly responsible for damages in the amount of $119,050, it then reduced Doil's responsibility to $35,750 pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552(3)(B) (2003).³ The Stocklys were awarded $45,000 in attorney fees and $1537 in other costs pursuant to section 7552(5). Doil appealed and the Stocklys cross-appealed.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Liability

[¶10] The Superior Court applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965) to establish Doil's liability for McCourt's trespass.⁴ However, we have never recognized Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 as the law in Maine, see Dexter v. Town of Norway, 1998 ME 195, ¶ 10, 715 A.2d 169, 172 ("We are far less certain whether and under what circumstances we would recognize the doctrine variously described as involving ' a peculiar unreasonable risk.'"), nor do we recognize it now. In addition to the doubt we expressed about the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 in Dexter, 1998 ME 195, ¶ 10, 715 A.2d at 172, the plain language of 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 indicates the Legislature's intention to occupy the field entirely and to limit liability under 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 to the person who actually commits a trespass or a person liable for their independent contractor's trespass under the narrow circumstances articulated in Bonk v. McPherson, 605 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 1992).⁵

[¶11] "[W]e look first to the plain meaning of statutory language as a means of effecting legislative intent. Unless the statute itself discloses a contrary intent, words in a statute must be given their plain, common, and ordinary meaning, such as people of common intelligence would usually ascribe to them." S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 27, ¶ 15, 868 A.2d 210, 216 (citation omitted). The plain language of 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 simply provides that "a person" may not "cut down" someone else's trees and that "a person" who violates this prohibition is liable to the owner of those trees.⁶ Nothing in this statute indicates that the language "a person" and "cut down" was intended to also include one who engages an independent contractor to cut down someone's trees for 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A already creates such liability.

[¶12] Although it is unnecessary to look at the legislative history because the plain language elucidates the Legislature's intent, we note that the history supports the intent stated in the plain language. The legislative history of section 7552 and its subsequent amendments support the conclusion that liability should be limited to the person who actually commits a trespass or, at most, a person who has assumed the liability for their independent contractor's trespass under the narrow circumstances articulated in Bonk, 605 A.2d at 79.

[¶13] In 1977, the Legislature amended 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 and repealed and replaced § 7552-A. P.L. 1977, ch. 313, §§ 1-2 (effective October 24, 1977). The statement of fact accompanying these amendments provided:

This new draft clarifies the purpose of the original bill. It increases the damages for which the trespasser himself is liable, in section 1 of the new draft. Section 2 of the new draft clarifies the law with regard to the landowner who authorizes cutting, but fails to mark his property lines, with the result that timber is cut on the abutting owner's land.

L.D. 1816, Statement of Fact (108th Legis. 1977) (emphasis added). Over the course of the next decade a number of amendments,⁷ not bearing on issues relevant to this case, were made to section 7552 until in 1989 it read:

Whoever cuts down, destroys, injures or carries away any . . . timber, wood, underwood, stones, gravel, ore, goods or property of any kind from land not that person's own, without license of the owner, or injures or throws down any fences, bars or gates, or leaves such gates open, or breaks glass in any building is liable in damages to the owner in a civil action. If such act or such acts are committed willfully or knowingly, the defendant is liable to the owner in treble damages and, in addition, for the costs of any professional services necessary for the determination of damages, for the attorney's fees, and for court costs.

14 M.R.S.A. § 7552, amended by P.L. 1989, ch. 555, § 13 (effective September 30, 1989) (emphasis added). In 1992, we...