Stockton v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2017
• Docket Number: No. W2016-01175-COA-R3-CV,W2016-01175-COA-R3-CV
• Parties: JOYCE STOCKTON, ET AL. v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

JOYCE STOCKTON, ET AL. v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

No. W2016-01175-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

February 14, 2017 Session

May 12, 2017

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-13-6

Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring.

I concur fully in the majority Opinion. I also agree with the dissent that this Court "has no authority to overrule or modify Supreme Court's opinions." Bloodworth v. Stuart, 428 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tenn. 1968). I, however, disagree with the dissent regarding duty of care as the Trial Court was in fact cognizant of and adhered to our Supreme Court's majority opinion in Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). At an April 19, 2016 hearing on Ford's motion for a new trial or judgment in accordance with a directed verdict, the following exchange occurred between the judge and counsel:

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Counselors. And, again, I gave advanced consideration to the arguments that you are presenting to me before today.

This is another situation where, of course, the Court finds again, as I previously ruled, that Satterfield, a 2008 case, applies here. There was a duty existing under Tennessee law. I considered Mr. Stockton's testimony and recall it as far as his testimony regarding the warnings or the lack thereof.

And I agree that there was quite a bit of evidence introduced regarding Ford's warnings to its own employees but not warnings to the end users.

But when I consider all of the evidence presented during the course of the trial and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I find that the defense motion should be overruled as far as this particular grounds.

Is causation next?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I think we swept in causation and duty.

THE COURT: Tied it all together.

The facts of Satterfield are not identical to those of the present case. However, the facts herein are sufficiently analogous to Satterfield as to the application of the eight factors. This is not an uncharted or novel extension of duty, but rather is one that logically follows from Satterfield. Both cases involve asbestos exposure. The same reasoning and policy whereby our Supreme Court found a duty of care extending to an employee's household member applies equally as well to a consumer's household member. I reject the view that finding and holding a duty of care to a consumer's household exists would lead to a flurry of harmful litigation at odds with public policy. While such litigation might be harmful to the defendants in such a suit, it is no more or less harmful than other litigation where the actions of those defendants may have resulted in injury to individuals. I disagree further that adopting my, and the Trial Court's, position is at odds with Satterfield. In my judgment, the Trial Court decided correctly when it acknowledged Satterfield and applied its holding to find a duty of care in the present, analogous case.

I also write separately to express my opinion that despite my view that Satterfield was adhered to in this case as required, I believe there are inherent and serious problems resulting from Satterfield. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Satterfield held that:

[T]he trial court erred by granting Alcoa a judgment on the pleadings, and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed that order. Based on the facts in Ms. Satterfield's complaint, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Alcoa did not owe a duty to Ms. Satterfield. Our ruling does not foreclose the possibility that Ms. Satterfield's estate will not be able to present sufficient evidence to support her claim. Thus, Alcoa is certainly free to challenge any element of Ms. Satterfield's claim via a motion for summary judgment or motion for directed verdict.

Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375. In other words, the Tennessee Supreme Court held in Satterfield only that the unproven allegations in the complaint were sufficient to prohibit granting the defendant a judgment on the pleadings on the issue of whether Alcoa owed a duty to Ms. Satterfield.

My concerns about a trial judge applying the eight balancing factors as set forth in Satterfield to determine whether a duty exists results from there involving necessary factual determinations best decided by the jury and not a trial judge. This is especially so as to the first factor, foreseeability, as "the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring" requires, I believe, a factual determination and is one that the jury ultimately should be required to make. Id. at 367. The second factor, "the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury," is likewise a factual question. Id. In fact, most if not all eight of the Satterfield factors involve fact questions that should be resolved not by the trial judge but by the jury. Certainly foreseeability is a fact question. If a plaintiff fails topresent sufficient proof as those factors, a defendant still has recourse, as stated by the Supreme Court in Satterfield, to move for a directed verdict or to move prior to trial for summary judgment if the defendant can satisfy the requirements for a directed verdict or summary judgment.

In short, I fail to see how in real life a trial judge can determine by utilizing the Satterfield factors, especially foreseeability, except in rare situations, that a "defendant does not owe a duty to the plaintiff" without "invad[ing] the province of the jury." Sa...