Stockton v. National Bank of Jacksonville
| Decision Date | 26 May 1903 |
| Citation | 34 So. 897,45 Fla. 590 |
| Parties | STOCKTON v. NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, duval County; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.
Bill by the National Bank of Jacksonville against Telfair Stockton and another. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant Stockton appeals. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. In equity, as well as at law, a pleading is to be construed most strongly against the pleader thereof.
2. It is incumbent upon a complainant to allege in his bill every fact, clearly and definitely, that is necessary to entitle him to relief.
3. All the evidence offered in a case should correspond with the allegations in the pleadings, and be confined to the issues.
4. No objection will be allowed to be taken in the appellate court to the admissibility of any testimony, oral or documentary found in the record in a chancery cause, unless the record affirmatively shows that the objection thereto was presented to the chancellor, and expressly ruled upon by him in the court below at or before the final hearing of the cause.
5. Section 1972, Rev. St. 1895, relating to the recording of conveyances, places creditors and subsequent purchasers upon the same footing as to prior unrecorded conveyances.
6. The lien of a judgment rendered in an action at law dates, as to property previously attached in such action, from the time of the record by the clerk of the circuit court in the lien book of a notice of the levy and a description of the property levied upon, in accordance with the provisions of section 1651, Rev. St. 1895.
7. Where land in possession of a tenant is conveyed, the continued possession of the tenant, as tenant of the grantee is not constructive notice of the unrecorded deed.
8. When the person in possession is other than the grantee, it is necessary that there should be a visible change, which should indicate to others that there had been a sale, to have the effect of giving notice to a subsequent purchaser or attaching creditor. Therefore where one who had been a tenant of the grantor before the giving of the unrecorded deed attorned to the grantee at the time it was given, and remained in possession afterwards until after the attachment such possession alone cannot furnish notice of the conveyance, or be held to put an attachment creditor upon inquiry.
A. W. Cockrell & Son, for appellant.
John E. Hartridge and M. C. Jordan, for appellee.
On the 21st day of June, 1898, the appellee, a corporation, filed its bill in chancery in the circuit court of Duval county against the appellant and Napoleon B. Broward, as sheriff of the said county of Duval, alleging, in substance, therein as follows: That on the 9th day of August, 1897, appellee purchased from William H. Caulk and wife and Julia Dearing a certain lot in the city of Jacksonville, therein described receiving a deed from said grantors on said date, under which appellee was given possession of and went into possession of said lot on said date, and then and thereafter continued to occupy the same through its tenant, William Starke; that, after having paid a part of the purchase price of said lot on said 9th day of August, and entered into possession thereof, appellee was led to believe that said deed was defective by reason of certain erasures and rewriting over said erasures, and for other informalities, and appellee was advised to require and obtain another deed from the grantors to said lot, free from erasures and rewriting; that, without giving up said original deed, appellee requested the grantors to execute another deed to said lot, which said grantors did by executing and delivering the same in the post office on the 12th day of August, 1897, which was received and recorded by appellee on the 14th day of August, 1897, both of said deeds being attached as exhibits to the bill and made a part thereof; that on the 13th day of August, 1897, appellant instituted an action of attachment in the circuit court of the said county of Duval against the said William H. Caulk, one of the grantors in said deed, and then and there caused a writ of attachment to be issued and levied by the said sheriff of said county upon said lot as the property of said Caulk, although said lot at the date of the levy of said writ was the property of appellee by purchase as aforesaid, and appellee was in possession thereof by its tenant; that such proceedings were had by appellant in said action of attachment as resulted in a judgment being entered against the said William H. Caulk in favor of appellant on the 2d day of June, 1898, for the sum of $640.26, and upon which judgment an execution had been duly issued and levied by said sheriff on said lot, and that the same was being advertised for sale on the 4th day of July, 1898, and that the same would be sold on said date by said sheriff, unless he should be restrained from so doing by an order of the court; that, in the event of such sale, a cloud would be cast upon appellee's title to said property, and the value thereof depreciated and appellee greatly damaged. The prayer of the bill was for an injunction and general relief. The answer of the defendants under oath was waived.
On the 22d day of June, 1898, the appellant filed his answer to the bill, in which he positively denied all the material allegations in the bill, and averred, among other things, that appellee and its chief officers knew, prior to seeing the original deed from said grantors, that appellant, as agent of the owner, sold said lot to one Edward F. Clark, for which appellant claimed compensation, and which claim formed the basis of his judgment referred to in the bill of complaint; that appellee and its chief officers knew, upon seeing said deed, that appellant's name and his business as a real estate agent were printed upon the back of said deed, that said deed was drawn by appellant, and that, as so drawn by appellant, it was executed in the state of Kentucky, that the names of the witnesses were subscribed thereto in the state of Kentucky, that the rewriting of the name of appellee over the name of the said Edward F. Clark in said deed was done by some other than, and without the knowledge of, appellant, and long after said deed had been executed; that said deed was in itself notice to appellee of the said sale and conveyance to said Clark, and of the compensation due in that behalf to appellant; that, though appellee and its chief officers had an opportunity to tell appellant of its negotiations and acts in the matter, and it was their duty to do so in the premises, yet the said officers so worded their conversation with appellant then and there as to mislead appellant. Said answer was sworn to by appellant, and the same benefit was claimed therein as though a formal demurrer had been interposed to the bill.
On the 27th day of June, 1898, the bill was dismissed as to the said sheriff, and on the same date the cause came on to be heard before the chancellor below upon the application of appellee for a temporary injunction, affidavits being also filed on behalf of appellee; and said chancellor on said date made an order to the effect that appellant, his agents, attorneys, servants, and all other persons claiming to act by or through him, or in his behalf, be enjoined and restrained from selling the lot in question, and from attempting to enforce the said judgment of appellant, until the further order of the court.
Appellee filed a replication to the answer of appellant, a special examiner was appointed to take testimony in said cause before whom considerable testimony was taken by the respective parties and duly reported to the court, and on the 12th day of May, 1900, a final decree in said cause was entered by the chancellor below, in which the temporary injunction was made perpetual and the costs were adjudged against appellant. From this decree appellant entered an appeal to this court, assigning some six errors. However, in view of the conclusion reached by us, it becomes unnecessary to consider said several errors in detail. Upon some points there was quite a conflict in the testimony, but, for reasons which will appear in the opinion, it is unnecessary to set it forth. Sufficient will appear in the opinion to indicate the view which we take of it, and, as will be seen, upon the point which is decisive of the case there is practically no conflict in the...
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