Stoddard v. Dist. of D.C.

• Decision Date: 18 February 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–1366 (BAH).
• Citation: 764 F.Supp.2d 213
• Parties: Keith O. STODDARD, Plaintiff,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.1
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

764 F.Supp.2d 213

Keith O. STODDARD, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.1

Civil Action No. 09–1366 (BAH).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Feb. 18, 2011.

Keith O. Stoddard, Washington, D.C., pro se.Robert A. Deberardinis, Jr., D.C. Office of the Attorney General, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's motion to dismiss and the Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the former and deny the latter.

I. BACKGROUND

At all times relevant to the complaint, the Plaintiff was housed at the D.C. Jail. According to the Plaintiff, the cell to which he was assigned was “a well defined dungeon, a dark crawl space, without air circulation, without ventilation of any kind and without windows.” Compl. at 2. In addition, “while being made to dwell within this animalistic living condition, Plaintiff suffered from ... extreme exposure to cold.” Id. As a result, he experienced “breathing complications and sensory deprivation,” as well as “mental anguish and emotional trauma.” Id. His requests for a transfer to another cell went unanswered, id., and he “was subjected to these inhumane conditions for a little over 30 days,” id. The Plaintiff brings this action against the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Compl. at 1, and the Court construes the complaint as alleging violations of his right under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He demands “judgment against the Defendant[ ] in the sum of $1,000,000.00 with interest and costs.” Id. at 3. The District of Columbia moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. of Dist. of Columbia to Dismiss Compl. (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 4–12.

II. DISCUSSION ²

A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff properly has stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

The Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C.Cir.1997). In addition, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2064, 176 L.Ed.2d 418 (2010) (other citations omitted). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must offer “more than labels and conclusions” to provide “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Or as the Supreme Court more recently stated, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). To this end, the Court “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nor must the Court accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50 (citation omitted). A complaint alleging facts which are “ ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability ... ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ' ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (brackets omitted).

B. The Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim

The District moves for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint alleges neither an Eighth Amendment claim, see Def.'s Mem. at 8–10, nor the District's liability for any alleged constitutional violation, see id. at 10–12.

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

Id. In other words, “Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated [his] constitutional rights.” Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 645 (D.C.Cir.2001). To state a claim under Section 1983, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that the conduct of which a plaintiff complains (1) was committed by a person acting under color of District of Columbia law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally-protected right. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

The District of Columbia is a municipality and is considered a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. See, e.g., Best v. District of Columbia, 743 F.Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C.1990); D.C.Code § 1–102 (establishing the District of Columbia as “a body corporate for municipal purposes” which may “exercise ... powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of [the D.C. Code]”).

In considering whether the Plaintiff states a claim for municipal liability, the analysis proceeds as follows:

First, the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. Second, if so, then the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.

Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). To establish “a predicate constitutional violation,” id., the Plaintiff must make “an objective showing that the deprivation alleged is ‘sufficiently serious,’ and a subjective showing that prison officials had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ one marked by ‘deliberate indifference.’ ” Smith–Bey v. CCA/CTF, 703 F.Supp.2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)); Anderson–Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51, 61 (D.D.C.2006). To show deliberate indifference, the Plaintiff must show that a prison official knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm but disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Pryor–El v. Kelly, 892 F.Supp. 261, 267 (D.D.C.1995) (“[A] prison official must actually know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”).

1. The Plaintiff Adequately Alleges a Constitutional Violation

The Plaintiff's allegations pertain to prison conditions, and prison conditions “are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 928 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citation omitted). The Eight Amendment does not require that prisons be comfortable, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), but they may not “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392. In other words, prison conditions “must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor ... be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.” Id.

The Plaintiff alleges that, for a period of approximately 30 days, he was confined in a dark, cold, and windowless cell without ventilation, resulting in “irrepairable [sic] physical damage” such as sensory deprivation and “breathing complications” for which he obtained medical treatment. Compl. at 2. He “inform[ed] officers via verbal complaints of the horrific living arrangement ... to no avail.” Id. It is questionable that these conditions were of such severity or duration as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Rocha v. CCCF Admin., No. 10–1158, 408 Fed.Appx. 141, 142–44, 2011 WL 167264, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) (concluding that prisoner's allegations of exposure to extremely cold conditions when air conditioning was turned up “are deficient because there is no objective indication that the cold was so severe as to pose a substantial risk of serious harm”); Muñiz v. Richardson, 371 Fed.Appx. 905, 908 (10th Cir.2010) (finding that allegations “about living conditions center[ing] on excessive heating and air conditioning, dirty mops, insufficiently sized showers, and television programs played continuously in a loop” do not state Eighth Amendment violations); Warren v. Stempson, 800 F.Supp. 991, 992 (D.D.C.1992) (finding that plaintif...