Stodder v. Coca-cola Bottling Plants Inc.

• Citation: 48 A.2d 622
• Parties: STODDER v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING PLANTS, Inc.
• Decision Date: 26 July 1946
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

48 A.2d 622

STODDER

v.COCA-COLA BOTTLING PLANTS, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 26, 1946.

Action of negligence by Beulah M. Stodder against Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., to recover for injuries sustained when a bottle burst in plaintiff's hand. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions and moves for a new trial.

Exceptions sustained and motion for new trial sustained.

Edward W. Bridgham and Harold J. Rubin, both of Bath, for plaintiff.

Locke, Campbell & Reid, of Augusta, and John P. Carey, of Bath, for defendant.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and HUDSON, MURCHIE, TOMPKINS, and FELLOWS, JJ.

FELLOWS, Justice.

This is an action of negligence brought by Beulah M. Stodder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1444.46. The case comes to the Law Court on defendant's exceptions, and motion for new trial.

The plaintiff, Beulah M. Stodder, on July 24, 1944, operated a small restaurant in Bath, Me., where she sold sandwiches, ice cream, and soft drinks. On that day the plaintiff purchased from the defendant two cases of Coca-Cola and these were delivered to her by an employee of the defendant. The day was warm, and the bottles had been carried by truck from Lewiston to Bath.

The driver carried the cases of Coca-Cola from the truck into the plaintiff's restaurant and placed them on the floor. After the driver left, the plaintiff took out a bottle of Coca-Cola to place the same in the cooler for refrigeration. While she was transferring the bottle, the bottle burst, causing injuries to the plaintiff's hand.

The plaintiff claimed that she did not strike the bottle against any hard object, and insists that the cause of the explosion must have been over carbonation. The plaintiff and also an employee testified, over objections of the defendant, that three weeks before, two bottles of Coca-Cola had exploded in her store.

The allegations in the declaration were that the defendant ‘so carelessly, negligently and wantonly caused said ‘Coca-Cola’ to be bottled with such an excessive amount of carbonation that when the plaintiff attempted to take hold of one of the aforesaid bottles of ‘Coca-Cola’ which she had purchased from the said defendant, the said bottle exploded by reason of the excessive amount of carbonation inserted therein by the defendant's servants and agents.'

The allegation of negligence in the declaration, is excessive carbonation. The declaration makes no claim of any crack or other defect in the bottle. There is no general count for negligence.

It is well known that Coca-Cola and other ‘soft drinks' consist of syrup placed in a bottle into which is poured water containing carbonic acid gas. The bottle is then capped. The gas makes a sparkling drink, when the contends of the bottle are taken out. While the product is confined in the bottle there is necessarily a greater or lesser degree of pressure.

There was no evidence of negligence submitted by the plaintiff beyond the breaking of the bottle, and the fact, strenuously objected to, and to which exception was taken, that on a date three weeks previously another bottle, or two other bottles, which she bought of the defendant, had broken in her restaurant without apparent cause. The bottle was a standard bottle and there was no evidence of negligence in the defendant's plant where the bottling was done. The plaintiff relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to make a prima facie case.

The defendant showed that a carbonated and palatable beverage has an internal bottle pressure of from 30 to 45 pounds per square inch. If the pressure is under 30, the drink is flat and insipid; if it is over 45, it is sharp and disagreeable. Hourly tests are therefore made to keep the pressure between 30 to 45 pounds. When filling a bottle, if the pressure becomes excessive, the contents are likely to foam out before the bottle can be capped, or, if capped, the cap will undoubtedly leak and permit the gas to escape. From experiments made with standard Coca-Cola bottles, the tensile strength of the glass will ordinarily withstand a pressure of 500 pounds. The bottle was not made by the defendant, but was purchased as a standard Coca-Cola bottle from a reputable manufacturer.

In actions for negligence it is the general rule that a person asserting negligence, or other wrong, has the burden of proof. It is also the general rule that the mere fact of injury does not indicate negligence on the part of anyone. Sometimes, however, slight proof is sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence, and the burden is thus cast upon the other party to explain. Thus a prima facie case is made out where it appears that an accident occurred to the plaintiff, without fault on his part, while he was a passenger of a common carrier, by reason of the failure of the machinery or other means provided by the defendant for transportation, Stevens v. E. & N. A. Railway, 66 Me. 74; or, where an automobile and the operation thereof are within the control of the defendant, an accident may be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. Chaisson v. Williams, 130 Me. 341, 156 A. 154.

The maxim of res ipsa loquitur, ‘the thing itself speaks,’ might, in practice, be translated, ‘the accident spells negligence.’ It does not dispense with the requirement that the one who alleges negligence must prove it. It is a rule of evidence that relates to the mode of proof. It is applicable, where there has been an unexplained accident, and the instrument that caused the injury was under the management or control of the defendant, and in the ordinary course of events the accident would not have happened if the defendant had used due care. The unexplained circumstances may, in a particular case, warrant an inference of negligence. The inference can be rebutted by the defendant upon showing how the accident actually happened, and that it was not defendant's fault, or by showing that the defendant had done his full duty in trying to guard against it. Great A. & P. Co. v. Kennebec Water Dist., 140 Me. 166, 34 A.2d 729. There must be negligence. The defendant is not an insurer. Edwards v. Cumberland County Power & Light Co., 128 Me. 207, 146 A. 700.

It must not be a question of conjecture. The circumstances of the accident must indicate negligence. Nichols v. Kobratz, 139 Me. 258, 29 A.2d 161; Winslow v. Tibbetts, 131 Me. 318, ...