Stodghill v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 363 M.D. 2015,363 M.D. 2015
• Citation: 150 A.3d 547
• Parties: David Manning STODGHILL, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

150 A.3d 547

David Manning STODGHILL, Petitioner

v.PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent

No. 363 M.D. 2015

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs: January 22, 2016

FILED: November 23, 2016

David Manning Stodghill, pro se.

Joseph G. Fulginiti, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY¹

David Manning Stodghill (Stodghill), pro se, filed a petition for writ of mandamus (Petition), wherein he asks this Court to order the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) to interpret Section 9718.1(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.1(b), to require participation in , rather than completion of , the Department's sex offender treatment program to render an inmate eligible for parole consideration. In response, the Department filed preliminary objections to Stodghill's Petition seeking to dismiss the Petition under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1028(a)(4) for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The Department's preliminary objections are currently before the Court.

This Court's review of preliminary objections is limited to the pleadings. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res. , 909 A.2d 413 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), aff'd , 592 Pa. 304, 924 A.2d 1203 (2007).

[This Court is] required to accept as true the well-pled averments set forth in the ... complaint, and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Moreover, the [C]ourt need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and, where any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.

Id. at 415–16 (citations omitted).

According to the Petition, Stodghill is currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Somerset (SCI–Somerset), Pennsylvania. Stodghill averred that the Department is intentionally "misrepresenting" the wording of Section 9718.1 of the Sentencing Code, Petition at ¶ 2, which states in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.— A person ... shall attend and participate in a [Department ] program of counseling or therapy designed for incarcerated sex offenders [(sex offender treatment program) ] if the person is incarcerated in a [s]tate institution for any of the following provisions under [the Crimes Code] (relating to crimes and offenses):

(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses) if the offense involved a minor under 18 years of age.^[2]

....

(b) Eligibility for parole.— For an offender required to participate in the program under subsection (a), all of the following apply:

(1) The offender shall not be eligible for parole unless the offender has :

(i) served the minimum term of imprisonment;

(ii) participated in the program under subsection (a) ; and

(iii) agreed to comply with any special conditions of parole imposed for therapy or counseling for sex offenders, including sexually violent predators.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.1 (text emphasis added). Stodghill contends in the Petition that since Section 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) of the Sentencing Code does not require completion of , but rather participation in the Department's sex offender treatment program, an inmate's attendance at some sessions is sufficient to meet the parole eligibility requirement.

The Department objects to Stodghill's standing to bring this action. See Preliminary Objections ¶ 15. Specifically, the Department argues that, since the allegations in the Petition are general to "offenders who have participated in but not completed the programs [and who] are deemed ineligible for parole consideration and removed from the parole eligibility docket," it is not clear that Stodghill's parole eligibility has been affected. Petition at ¶ 5; see also Petition at ¶¶ 2, 10, 12, 16 and the relief clause. We disagree.

One seeking judicial resolution of a dispute must satisfy a threshold requirement of standing to bring the action by demonstrating a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation. Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa. 196, 888 A.2d 655 (2005). A substantial interest is an interest exceeding the interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law; an interest is direct if there is a causal connection between the asserted violation and the harm complained of; an interest is immediate if the causal connection is neither remote nor speculative. City of Phila [.] v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 838 A.2d 566 (2003).

Finn v. Rendell , 990 A.2d 100, 103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Further,

[m]andamus is an extraordinary writ designed to compel performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal right in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the respondent, and want of any other adequate and appropriate remedy. Mandamus is not available to establish legal rights, but is appropriate only to enforce rights that have been established.

Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 942 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citations omitted). "Where the party acquires an interest special to himself as distinguished from that of the general public, he is able to bring mandamus proceedings in his own name." Douros v. Newtown Twp. , 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 606, 530 A.2d 1002, 1003 (1987).

Although the majority of the allegations in the Petition refer generally to ineligible offenders, Stodghill specifically pled in the Petition:

1. [Stodghill] is an inmate under the care[,] custody and control of the [Department,] housed at SCI–Somerset.

2. [The Department] is intentionally misrepresenting the wording of [Section] 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) [of the Sentencing Code] to the damage of [Stodghill ] and other offenders housed by [the Department].

Petition at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, this Court has held that "[t]he allegations of a pro se complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by attorneys. If a fair reading of the complaint shows that the complainant has pleaded facts that may entitle him to relief, the preliminary objections will be overruled ." Danysh v. Dep't of Corr. , 845 A.2d 260, 262–63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff'd, 584 Pa. 122, 881 A.2d 1263 (2005) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

Because our fair reading of the Petition reflects that Stodghill is an inmate who may be aggrieved (i.e., denied parole consideration) by the Department's interpretation of Section 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) of the Sentencing Code, we hold that the Petition demonstrates that he has a "substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation," and thus has standing.³ Finn , 990 A.2d at 103. Accordingly, the Department's objection to Stodghill's standing is overruled.

The Department also objects to the Petition on grounds that Stodghill fails in the Petition "to state a claim relative to his allegations that the Department has intentionally misrepresented and misapplied [Section 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) of the Sentencing Code], and thus inappropriately caused [Stodghill] to be disqualified for parole eligibility." Department Br. at 3, 6; see also Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 16–22. The Department specifically contends that inmates do not have the right to parole, and it is the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board), rather than the Department, that makes parole eligibility and rehabilitative programming determinations. We agree.

Section 6132(a)(1)(i) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code), 61 Pa.C.S. § 6132(a)(1)(i), gives the Board the exclusive power to parole inmates. Pursuant to Section 6137(a) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a), the Board has the discretion to parole any inmate after the expiration of his minimum sentence release date. Under Section 6137(g) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(g), the Department initiates the parole process by identifying parole-eligible inmates for the Board's consideration. However, the Department is constrained by Section 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) of the Sentencing Code from certifying as eligible, offenders who have not attended and participated in the Department's sex offender treatment program.

Stodghill's claim that the Department erred by interpreting Section 9718.1(b)(1)(ii) of the Sentencing Code to require completion of the Department's sex offender treatment program in order to be eligible for parole consideration by the Board is contrary to the law.

First, in Section 9718.1(c) of the Sentencing Code, the General Assembly mandated that "[t]he [D]epartment shall develop and provide the [sex offender treatment program ]. The [D]epartment shall have the sole discretion with respect to counseling or therapy program contents and administration, including the scheduling of an offender's attendance and participation ." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.1(c) (emphasis added). Thus, although the Board ultimately determines whether an inmate should be paroled, the Department establishes the contents of and is responsible for the inmate's attendance and participation in the program that renders the inmate parole eligible in the first instance.

Moreover,

[t]he common law writ of mandamus lies to compel an official's performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. McGill v. P [a. ] Dep [' ]t of Health, Office of Drug [& ] Alcohol Programs, 758 A.2d 268, 270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). ‘The burden of proof falls upon the party seeking this extraordinary remedy to establish his legal right to such relief.’ Werner v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 681 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1996). Mandamus requires ‘[1] a clear legal right in the plaintiff, [2] a corresponding duty in the defendant, and [3] a lack of any other

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