Stoeger v. Burlington Northern R. Co.
Decision Date | 24 September 1996 |
Citation | 323 Or. 569,919 P.2d 39 |
Parties | Edward STOEGER, Petitioner on Review, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY; and Elf Atochem North America, Inc. aka Atochem North American, Inc., Respondents on Review. CC 9304-02196; CA A82933; SC S42068. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Christ, of Mitchell, Lang & Smith, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition were Douglas S. Querin and Stacy J. Hankin, of Bricker, Zakovics & Querin, P.C., Portland.
Larry E. Leggett, of Kroschel & Gibson, Bellevue, Washington, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review Burlington Northern Railroad Company.
Jerard S. Weigler, of Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, Portland, argued the cause for respondent Elf Atochem Northern American, Inc. With him on the brief was Robin A. Jones, Portland.
Michael H. Simon, of Perkins Coie, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.
Anthony A. Allen, of Law Offices of Michael B. Dye, Salem, filed a brief amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, GRABER and DURHAM, JJ. *
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BN), brought this action alleging that he was injured while working on sidetracks owned by defendant Elf Atochem North America, Inc. (Atochem). The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding defendants' alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Stoeger v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 132 Or.App. 552, 889 P.2d 391 (1995). For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
On review of a summary judgment, this court determines whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C; Fields v. Jantec, Inc., 317 Or. 432, 437, 857 P.2d 95 (1993). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. That is true even as to those issues on which the opposing party would have the burden of proof at trial. Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc., 296 Or. 208, 218, 675 P.2d 172, reh'g den., 296 Or. 713, 679 P.2d 866 (1984).
Atochem owns and maintains sidetracks connecting its plant to BN's main line. BN owns and operates the trains that run on Atochem's sidetracks. A contract between Atochem and BN obligates Atochem to maintain its sidetracks and connecting switches.
At the time of his alleged injury, plaintiff was assisting in switching cars from one sidetrack to another in Atochem's yard. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he injured his back when he attempted to throw a switch for tracks numbered five and six, sometimes called the "five/six switch." 1 To do that, he had to bend down, lift a handle and turn it sideways, or horizontally. He claims that the switch handle "stuck" or "hung up" while he was turning it and that the sudden added resistance caused him to strain various muscles and ligaments.
That same day, plaintiff reported his injury on a BN "Personal Injury Report" form. When asked to identify any "defects involved" in his injury, plaintiff checked a box marked "none." The next day, BN sent an inspection team to examine the "five/six switch." The team reported that the switch was properly lubricated and free of defects. Atochem's shipping supervisor and engineer also inspected the switch the day after the incident and found no defects.
Twenty-one days after the alleged injury, O'Dell, BN's investigator, recorded (with plaintiff's permission) an unsworn and uncounseled telephone conversation with plaintiff as follows:
Plaintiff brought this action against BN under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 USC § 51 et seq., 2 and against Atochem under the common law of negligence, alleging as to both that the switch was defective and that the defect caused his injury. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that the switch was defective and, therefore, that there was no evidence that they had been negligent. Defendants relied on plaintiff's statements to O'Dell that plaintiff did not think that the switch was defective or abnormally resistant. Defendants also argued that, even if the switch was defective, there was no evidence that they knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the defect.
In response, plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating in part:
The trial court ruled that plaintiff's affidavit was "inadmissible" to contradict his earlier statements to O'Dell and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. We first address the trial court's ruling that plaintiff's affidavit is inadmissible to contradict his earlier statements to O'Dell.
ORCP 47 C provides in part:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
We find nothing in ORCP 47 that gives a trial court, in a summary judgment proceeding, the authority to rule that an affidavit of a party is "inadmissible" simply because it states facts that are inconsistent with a prior statement by the same party. 3 We hold that the trial court erred by excluding plaintiff's affidavit from consideration on summary judgment.
The next question is whether plaintiff's affidavit creates a "genuine" issue of material fact, sufficient to defeat defendants' motions for summary judgment. Defendants argue that plaintiff's affidavit fails to present a sufficient explanation for the inconsistency between his affidavit and his earlier statements to O'Dell and, therefore, summary judgment was proper. Defendants rely on a series of Court of Appeals opinions which held that where the nonmoving party makes a statement that absolves the other party of liability, a later inconsistent statement does not create a genuine issue of...
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