Stogner v. State, 83-84
Decision Date | 20 January 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-84,83-84 |
Citation | 674 P.2d 1298 |
Parties | Ralph R. STOGNER, III, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Robert J. Pickett and Harley McKinney, Pickett & McKinney, Rock Springs, for appellant.
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen.; and Allen C Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.
Johnson, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was found guilty, after a jury trial, of first degree sexual assault. In appealing from the verdict and resulting judgment, he words the issues as follows:
We affirm.
" * * * [O]n appeal the reviewing court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the successful party's evidence and gives the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. * * * " City of Rock Springs v. Police Protective Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975, 980 (1980).
See Fitzgerald v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1015 (1979); Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 (1977); Johnson v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1294 (1977); Horn v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1141 (1976); and Blakely v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 857 (1975).
Viewed in this fashion, the facts of this case are as follows:
On June 8, 1982, appellant confronted victim with a gun at a store in Rock Springs where she was working and forced her to accompany him to a trailer house where he bound and gagged her and committed multiple sexual assaults on her. The case was set for trial on March 29, 1983. On March 23, 1983, appellee filed a motion in limine to prevent introduction of evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim. On March 25, 1983, appellant filed a motion for a hearing on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the prior sexual conduct of the victim, contending that he received information on March 24, 1983, that the victim had engaged in acts of prostitution in the past and that such evidence was necessary to support his defense to the sexual assault charge, i.e., that the sexual acts were engaged in voluntarily by the victim in anticipation of payment for them.
Section 6-4-312, W.S.1977, provides:
admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this section. The court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted.
"(c) Any motion or affidavit submitted pursuant to this section is privileged information and shall not be released or made available for public use or scrutiny." 1
At the hearing on appellant's motion to admit evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct and on appellee's motion in limine to prevent the introduction of such evidence, the evidence in question was determined to be testimony by Karen Singleton that she knew the victim to have been a prostitute in 1977 or 1978. She responded "no" to a question by the court as to her knowledge of prostitution by the victim since 1978.
In granting the motion in limine and in denying the motion to admit the evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim, the court said:
The court thus found noncompliance by appellant with the ten day requirement of § 6-4-312(a)(i), supra; it found the proffered testimony not to be relevant; and it found the probative value of the evidence did not substantially outweigh the probability that its admission would create prejudice.
"Determinations of relevancy rest largely with the discretion of the trial court, [citations], and absent a clear abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on admission of evidence, [citation]. * * * " Barnard v. Wendling, Wyo., 627 P.2d 603, 605 (1981).
See City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 (1982); and Canyon View Ranch v. Basin Electric Power Corporation, Wyo., 628 P.2d 530 (1981).
The trial court's ruling was not an error of law under the circumstances. It could reasonably conclude as it did.
* * * "Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).
But appellant contends that the statute itself is unconstitutional by denying Although the constitutionality of rape-shield statutes, such as § 6-4-312, supra, has been upheld, "almost without exception" by courts confronted with the issue, Annotation: Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statutes Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4th 283, we need not concern ourselves...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Burke v. State
...the evidence and the probability of prejudicial impact on the defendant under the circumstances of the particular case. Stogner v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1298, 1302 (1984). Appropriate objections and subsequent curative instructions may cure any error. Lindsey v. State, We agree with the tri......
-
Cardenas v. State
...specify material evidence which he could have produced if the district court had granted his motion for a continuance. See Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298 (Wyo.1984). We hold that Appellant failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a Appellan......
-
King v. State
...the probability of prejudicial impact on the defendant under the circumstances of the particular case. Burke, 746 P.2d 852; Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298 (Wyo.1984). The question, which implied that appellant was guilty in the eyes of the prosecutor, was improper. Appellant calls our atte......
-
Lindsey v. State
...have prejudiced her right to a fair trial. The admission of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Stogner v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1298 (1984); City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 (1982); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied,......