Stoker v. Town of Irvington

Decision Date10 August 1961
Docket NumberNo. L--14933,L--14933
Citation71 N.J.Super. 370,177 A.2d 61
PartiesCharles STOKER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF IRVINGTON, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, et al., Defendants.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Israel B. Greene, Newark, for plaintiff.

Max Sherman, Newark, for defendant Gifford Development Co. Inc.

Matthew Krafte, Irvington, for Town of Irvington and others.

LABRECQUE, J.S.C.

Plaintiff, a taxpayer of the Town of Irvington, brings this action in lieu of prerogative writs to revoke five building permits issued by the town building superintendent to defendant Gifford Development Co., Inc., and to enjoin it from proceeding with construction thereunder. He further seeks a declaration that a certain proposed division of land of Gifford is a subdivision, and that the definition of a subdivision as contained in the Irvington land subdivision ordinance is null and void as being inconsistent with the Municipal Planning Act of 1953 (N.J.S.A. 40:55--1.1 et seq.). He further seeks to compel enforcement of the ordinance and statute referred to, as against Gifford.

Defendant Gifford Development Co., Inc. is the present owner of four tracts of land located between Berkeley Terrace, Grove Street, Nineteenth Avenue and Eastern Parkway. Roughly, they comprise a greater part of four city blocks, the intersecting streets being Brighton Terrace, Argyle Terrace and Tremont Terrace. The premises in question were originally owned by the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company which had contracted to sell them to Garden Grove Corporation prior to the issuance of the building permits here under attack. Garden Grove subsequently assigned its rights to the defendant Gifford, who did not however actually take title until April 24, 1961.

On or about March 17, 1961 defendant Gifford submitted to the town planning board (and to the building inspector) a plan entitled 'Map of Parkway Estates situated in Town of Irvington, Essex County, N.J.,' providing for the subdivision of the tract in question into 115 lots on which it was preposed to erect 97 two-family and 18 seven-family houses. Submitted with the plan was an 'application for classification of sketch subdivision plat' and a fee of $30 which was required to accompany an application for a major subdivision. Since Gifford was only the purchaser under contract, an identical application was filed on April 4, 1961 by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, the owner.

A comparison of the proposed subdivision map with the tax map indicates that a portion of the tract in question had been divided into lots prior to 1929. The plat submitted generally indicated lots of a substantially greater size than those on the tax map. It was approved for zoning by the building superintendent and contained a blank form reciting that the subdivision was approved as being exempt, with room for the signature of the chairman of the board or mayor and the town clerk.

In the meantime, and prior to action by the planning board, defendant Gifford concluded that its proposed subdivision did not require the approval of the board. It thereupon made an application to the building superintendent, Edward G. Mrozek, for the necessary building permits to construct four two-family houses on Brighton Terrace and a one seven-family house on Eastern Parkway. These were to be constructed on lots delineated on the 'Map of Parkway Estates' referred to above. Applications for the building permits were filed on March 29 and on that date the superintendent of buildings reported that while the lots upon which it was proposed to construct the buildings were in accordance with the new map and differed from the official tax map in size, nevertheless they complied with the provisions of the 'D' residential zone which were applicable, and involved no new streets or roads. Thereafter, on April 6, 1961, the corporation counsel, Mr. Krafte, rendered an opinion that the subdivision did not come within the jurisdiction of the planning board since, under the ordinance, it was not considered a subdivision, and that the building permits should be issued. They were issued on the 14th day of April 1961 and construction was started on the two-family houses. One of these was well advanced when an application for an injunction Pendente lite was made. The remaining two-family houses had hardly progressed beyond the foundation stage, while no work at all appears to have been done on the seven-family house.

In the meantime, Gifford's application to the planning board was still pending. On April 5, 1961, it had appealed through its attorney to the town commissioners from the 'action or non-action' of the planning board on its application and requested a hearing before the governing body. It was informed that its appeal was premature. The planning board in the meantime had set the matter down for hearing on April 26, 1961, in accordance with the procedure provided in the land subdivision ordinance. Notice of the hearing was published in the local newspaper and Gifford was directed to give notice to the adjoining property owners. On the date set for hearing no representative of Gifford or of the owners appeared and the hearing was adjourned until May 1, 1961. On the adjourned date there was still no appearance on behalf of the applicants, and the board rejected the application. A letter to that effect was dispatched by the board to the town commissioners. The letter gave as reasons for the rejection that no officer or authorized representative of Gifford or of the owner had appeared before it to prosecute the matter, and that no proof of service of notice of hearing, as provided by the ordinance, had been submitted to it.

The proposed subdivision, on a portion of which it is proposed to construct the buildings authorized by the building permits under attack, has never been approved by the planning board or the town governing body, nor has it been certified to be exempt.

Briefly stated, it is the contention of defendant Town of Irvington that the proposed division is not a 'subdivision' as defined in the ordinance. Gifford contends that the planning ordinance expressly 'exempts' from the requirement of the planning board's approval, subdivisions which involve no new streets where the resulting lots comply with the zoning ordinance. It is undisputed that the proposed subdivision does not involve new streets and that the resultant lots are in compliance with the town's zoning ordinance.

The plaintiff contends that the planning board had jurisdiction over the subdivision in question, and that in the absence of action by the planning board or by the municipal governing body exempting the subdivision or approving it, the building permits were improvidently issued and should be revoked. He urges that adoption of the contentions of the defendants would be repugnant to the Municipal Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55--1.2, and would render meaningless and futile the provisions of the land subdivision ordinance in question.

The land subdivision ordinance was passed on the 28th day of June, 1955. Article II sets forth the purpose of the ordinance as follows:

'The purpose of this ordinance shall be to provide rules, regulations and standards to guide land subdivision in the Town of Irvington in order to promote the public health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the municipality. It shall be administered to insure the orderly growth and development, the conservation, protection and proper use of land and adequate provision for circulation, utilities and services.'

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides as follows:

'DEFINITIONS

'1. SUBDIVISION. The division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two or more lots, sites or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development; except that the following division shall not be considered subdivisions provided N.J.S.A. 40:55--1.2 et seq. Section 1.2 defines are involved: divisions of land where the resulting parcels comply with the Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Irvington, divisions of property by testamentary or intestate provision or divisions of property upon court order. Subdivision also includes re-subdivision, and where appropriate to the context, relates to the process of subdividing or to the lands or territory divided.'

The ordinance also defines a minor subdivision as follows:

'Any subdivision containing not more than four lots fronting on an existing minor street Not involving any new street or road or the extension of municipal facilities and not adversely affecting the development of the remainder of the parcel or adjoining property and not in conflict with any provision or portion of the master plan, official map, Zoning ordinance or This ordinance.' (Italics supplied)

Paragraph 1 of Article V requires an owner of land, prior to subdividing, to submit to the Secretary of the Planning Board an original and seven copies of the sketch plat of the proposed subdivision 'for purposes of classification and preliminary discussion.' If the subdivision committee of the planning board unanimously finds that the subdivision is a minor subdivision, the chairman of the board and the town clerk sign a notation to that effect on the plat and no further planning board action is required. If, on the other hand, the plat is classified as a major subdivision, a notation to that effect is to be made on the plat, which is then to be returned to the applicant, who is required to comply with further provisions of the ordinance, including payment of a fee of $30 to the municipal clerk to cover the cost of publishing notice and inspection of the premises by the municipal engineer pending hearing on the subdivision. Upon approval by the planning board, the matter is referred to the governing body for action.

The land subdivision ordinance was passed pursuant to the authority granted by N.J.S.A. 40:55--1.2 e tseq....

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