Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS

• Decision Date: 16 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-236.,02-236.
• Citation: 2004 WY 84,94 P.3d 412
• Parties: PEDRO/ASPEN, LTD., a Wyoming Limited Partnership, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR NATRONA COUNTY, Wyoming, a political subdivision of the State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

94 P.3d 412

2004 WY 84

PEDRO/ASPEN, LTD., a Wyoming Limited Partnership, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR NATRONA COUNTY, Wyoming, a political subdivision of the State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 02-236.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 16, 2004.

Representing Appellant: Richard W. Walden and Robert D. Singletary of Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: R. Michael Shickich, Casper, Wyoming and Eric A. Easton, Natrona County Attorney, Casper, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. (Pedro/Aspen) sought to subdivide land it had acquired through a contract for deed into parcels larger than thirty-five acres. The Natrona County Board of County Commissioners (Natrona County) required that Pedro/Aspen obtain approval for the subdivision pursuant to its zoning regulations. Contending Natrona County did not have the authority to regulate the division of land into parcels greater than thirty-five acres, Pedro/Aspen sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. The district court determined Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to maintain its action, but proceeded, upon stipulation of the parties, to determine Natrona County's zoning regulation for "major land subdivisions" was within the authority granted to counties by the legislature. We disagree with both conclusions and reverse.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Pedro/Aspen poses the following issues for our consideration:

A. Whether Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. has standing to bring a Declaratory Judgment Act claim challenging the validity of Chapter IX of the Natrona County Zoning Resolution ("NCZR").

B. Whether Chapter IX of the NCZR is a proper exercise of county zoning authority.

[¶ 3] Natrona County's view of the issues is quite similar:

A. Whether Natrona County has the authority to regulate the division of land pursuant to the exercise of its zoning authority.

B. Whether Pedro/Aspen has standing to seek judicial relief.

FACTS

[¶ 4] Natrona County adopted a zoning resolution entitled "Major Land Subdivisions," which purports to require approval of any division of land into parcels that are between thirty-five acres and eighty-acres in size. On or about October 8, 1999, Pedro/Aspen entered into an agreement with Robinett Property Holdings, LLC for the sale of certain real property in Natrona County and recorded a document entitled "Notice of Execution of Agreement." Beginning November 9, 1999, Pedro/Aspen began selling individual forty-acre parcels and executing agreements entitled "Standard Agreement for Sale of Real Estate" with individual buyers. Simultaneously, Pedro/Aspen submitted the following letter, together with a major land division application, to the Natrona County Planning Department (Planning Department):

Enclosed please find our application for a major land division.

By way of background, we have been in business for over 30 years and have never been involved in a lawsuit with a government agency or with anyone who has ever purchased land from us. Our market is primarily people who wish to speculate on land or simply want to own a "piece of the West" and not necessarily for residential use.

Since 1989 we have owned the Aspen Highlands subdivision west of Casper near Garfield Peak. One of our owners in this subdivision is Congresswoman Barbara [Cubin].

Should you need any additional information, please feel free to contact me.

Natrona County began receiving calls from individuals requesting information as to what was necessary to construct residences on the property.

[¶ 5] The Planning Department reviewed the application and directed a report to the Chairman of the Natrona County Zoning and Planning Commissioners on January 25, 2000, recommending that the preliminary plat be approved subject to a list of sixteen contingencies. One of those contingencies was that the record title owner of the subject property, Robinett Property Holdings, LLC, also sign the application. Natrona County intended to consider the application on February 15, 2000, but the applicant asked that it be postponed until Natrona County's March 7, 2000, meeting. By letter dated February 22, 2000, the Planning Department notified the applicant that the Board had passed a resolution instituting a moratorium on major land divisions in Natrona County.¹

[¶ 6] On March 3, 2000, Pedro/Aspen filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court, contending that Chapter IX of the Natrona County Zoning Resolution (NCZR) was in direct contravention of Wyoming law and, therefore, ultra vires and of no force and effect. In addition, Pedro/Aspen asked that Natrona County be enjoined from enforcing Chapter IX. On June 16, 2000, Pedro/Aspen filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the validity of NCZR, Chapter IX. In its response, Natrona County contended Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to challenge the regulation and the statutes granted it ample authority to adopt the same. The parties stipulated that the district court could decide the motion for partial summary judgment based on the briefs and without oral argument. In a letter opinion dated March 4, 2002, the district court concluded Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to challenge the regulation because it was not the record owner of the property. However, it also found it was "appropriate to decide the issue on the merits." The court then declined to rule that NCZR, Ch. IX, was invalid and on April 23, 2002, it issued an order denying Pedro/Aspen's motion for partial summary judgment. Pedro/Aspen filed an amended complaint, alleging additional claims that Natrona County's actions constituted arbitrary and capricious agency action, inverse condemnation (which included Pedro/Aspen's assertion that Natrona County could not require that the owner of record of the lands in question also sign the land division application), an uncompensated taking, an unconstitutional condition (that being the requirement that the owner of record sign the application), inverse condemnation and an uncompensated taking (based on Natrona County's requirement that lots visible from U.S. Highway 20/26 could not be developed), and an unconstitutional condition (Natrona County's requirement that Pedro/Aspen construct county roads). Ultimately, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the additional claims in the amended complaint and to entry of judgment in favor of Natrona County on the issue of the validity of NCZR, Chapter IX.² The district court issued its judgment consistent with the stipulation. Pedro/Aspen timely appealed that judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7] This matter is before us for review of the district court's judgment as a matter of law. Where a judgment raises only issues of law, we review the matter de novo without affording any deference to the decision of the district court. Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 4, 86 P.3d 1287, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2004); Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 703, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2003); Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 10, ¶ 4, 61 P.3d 1229, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2003); Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Electric Ass'n., 2003 WY 81, ¶ 9, 72 P.3d 272, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003).

1. Standing

[¶ 8] On appeal, Natrona County reasserted its claim that Pedro/Aspen lacked standing to litigate the issue of the validity of NCZR, Chapter IX, under the Declaratory Judgments Act and we address that issue first. We have described the concept of standing in these terms:

Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy.

Jolley v. State Loan and Investment Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2002) (citations omitted).

The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination. A litigant is said to have standing when he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake. The tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy.

Id. (quoting Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Wyo.2000)).

[¶ 9] We generally do not relax the standing requirement in the context of an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, but require:

1. The parties must have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests.

2. The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.

3. It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them.

4. The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues.

Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo.1994) (citations omitted); Riedel v. Anderson, 2003 WY 70, ¶¶ 18-19, 70 P.3d 223, ¶¶ 18-19 (Wyo.2003); also see Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d 500, ¶...