Stokes v. Board of Trustees of Temple University
Decision Date | 23 March 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-5134.,86-5134. |
Parties | Shirley STOKES, et al. v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Dante Mattioni, Mattioni, Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
John B. Langel and Christine Eskilson, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
On June 30, 1986, Temple University terminated plaintiffs' employment as academic advisors in its Special Recruitment and Admission Program (SRAP) and, shortly thereafter, eliminated the program's advisory function. The complaint, as amended, charges racial and national origin discrimination (Count I) and free speech violations (Count II), under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. Four plaintiffs are black and the fifth is of Hispanic origin. The purpose of the program was to assist minority students with educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. The causes of the terminations are alleged to have been discrimination, plaintiffs' criticisms of Temple's minority educational programs, and the filing by plaintiffs of collective bargaining grievances and complaints with various governmental agencies.
Defendants move for summary judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
On July 14, 1986, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), filed unfair labor practice charges with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), alleging that Temple violated Sections 1101.1201(a)(1) and (3) of the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 43 Pa. S.A. § 1101.101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1987), by terminating plaintiffs' employment.1 Specifically, the union contended that plaintiffs were discharged "in retaliation for their filing of numerous grievances under the collective bargaining agreement and outspoken criticisms of Temple's administration of SRAP." AAUP v. Temple University, PERA-C-86-342-E, slip op. at 1 (PLRB, August 7, 1987). The PLRB decided the case in Temple's favor, concluding that the university's evidence overcame any showing of retaliation by the union. Id. at 6 n. 2.
Under University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, ___, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3227, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986), the PLRB's findings on "issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate" must receive the same preclusive effect here as would be given by a Pennsylvania state court. Defendants cite two of the PLRB's conclusions: 1) "the record does not show that the academic advisors having filed grievances and complaints motivated the decision to terminate the advisors," and; 2) "Dr. Banks credibly testified that the academic advisors were laid off for legitimate educational reasons." These findings, they assert, collaterally estop plaintiffs as to all of the material issues raised in this action.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied as to Count I and granted as to Count II.
Under Pennsylvania case law, collateral estoppel will apply to findings of an administrative agency, such as the PLRB, where four conditions are present: 1) the issues in the agency proceeding are identical to those before the court; 2) the agency rendered a final decision on the merits; 3) the party against whom the finding is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the agency proceeding; and 4) the party against whom it is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the agency. See Balsbaugh v. Zeck, 92 Pa.Commw. 627, 631, 500 A.2d 208, 210 (1985) ( ).
The issue before the PLRB was whether plaintiffs were discharged for engaging in activity protected by the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act. E.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Stairways, Inc., 56 Pa.Commw. 462, 467, 425 A.2d 1172, 1174-75 (1981). Here, the issue presented by Count I is, by contrast, whether plaintiffs were terminated because of race or nationality. Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915-16 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). To prevail on this claim they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for their race or nationality they would not have been discharged. Id. Because the issues in the two proceedings are not identical, collateral estoppel may not be effectuated. Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 575, 345 A.2d 664, 669 (1975); Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 366, 378, 336 A.2d 328, 334 (1975).
Defendants argue that the determinative issue before the PLRB was whether the proffered non-discriminatory explanation for the discharges was pretextual. The pretext issue, they maintain, will also be the crux of this action and plaintiffs should not have a second chance to litigate the same issue again. This argument has conceptual appeal. However, it misconstrues the purpose of the structure adopted for allocating the burdens and order of presentation of proof in discrimination cases.3 That structure, or formula, was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). When a defendant "fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the employment action at issue ... the district court is then in a position to decide the ultimate factual issue in the case." United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 523 (5th Cir.1982).
Although plaintiffs may have to establish pretext in order to prevail here, the context for that issue will be their specific claim of discrimination, not activity protected by the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act. The factual inquiry will be focused for the first time on race and national origin discrimination. For this reason, cases referred to by defendants are inapposite. See, e.g., Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 894-97 (7th Cir.1987) ( ).
At oral argument, plaintiffs represented that more discovery is necessary to develop fully their claim of discrimination. Additional discovery is the subject of a pending motion to compel. For this reason, defendants may be asserting prematurely that the very same evidence will be presented here as was submitted to the PLRB. See J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring). Furthermore, a discrimination plaintiff is not required to prove pretext by direct evidence. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 901-02 (3d Cir.1987). Indirect proof need not specifically relate to the nature of the discrimination or the discriminatory acts. See...
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