Stokes v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 29 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-132,87-132
• Citation: 530 N.E.2d 801,26 Mass.App.Ct. 585
• Parties: Ronald A.X. STOKES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION et al. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 801

530 N.E.2d 801

26 Mass.App.Ct. 585

Ronald A.X. STOKES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION et al. ¹

No. 87-132.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Norfolk.

Argued Oct. 12, 1988.

Decided Nov. 16, 1988.

Further Appellate Review Denied Dec. 29, 1988.

John H. Cunha, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.

William D. Luzier, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Before WARNER, CUTTER and FINE, JJ.

FINE, Justice.

Ronald A.X. Stokes began serving a State prison sentence in 1979. Between that time and August 13, 1982, when he filed the complaint in this case against the Commissioner of Correction and the Superintendent of M.C.I., Cedar Junction, he accumulated a large number of disciplinary reports, many resulting in the imposition of sanctions against him. In his complaint, Stokes alleges that, with respect to sixty-eight disciplinary reports, the defendants acted in violation of prison regulations governing discipline, 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.17 (1978), and in violation of his right to due process under the United States Constitution. ² Stokes filed a motion for partial summary judgment. All of the disciplinary reports in issue were before the court. ³ After hearing, Stokes's motion was denied, and summary judgment was ordered for the defendants on the entire complaint. The defendants did not comply with due process requirements or the Department of Correction's own regulations in a relatively small number of the disciplinary reports. As to these cases material issues of fact remain for trial. The matter must be remanded to the Superior Court.

Regulations of the Department of Correction (department), adopted pursuant to G.L. c. 124, § 1(q), provide, as far as material here, that a record of disciplinary proceedings shall include a written decision containing "[a] description of the evidence relied upon [by the disciplinary board] in reaching the guilty finding [and a] statement of the reasons for the sanctions imposed" (§ 430.17 ) and, further, that "[t]he evidence relied upon for the guilty findings and the reasons for the sanction shall be set out in specific terms unless the hearing has involved use of informant information" (§ 430.17 ). In each instance referred to in the complaint, a correction officer signed a disciplinary report describing an offense, a hearing was held before a prison disciplinary board, and a decision was reached and recorded on a standard one-page department form. On each such form, there was space for the board to insert "a summary of the credible evidence," the "finding," the "sanction" imposed, and the "reasons for sanction and recommendation."

With respect to one category of cases (the first category), comprised of twenty-three disciplinary reports, the records of the disciplinary board's decisions neither bore any clear indication of the board's acceptance of the credibility of the officers' incident reports, nor did the board refer to other evidence supporting the charges. ⁴ These records fall short of what the department's regulations require. Compare Wightman v. Superintendent, M.C.I., Walpole, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 442, 446-447, 475 N.E.2d 85 (1985). It is true that in all cases copies of the correction officers' incident reports were attached to the records of the decisions. While it may be implicit in the board's disposition, it is impossible to tell from the face of the decision in any particular instance whether the board believed all, some, or none the contents of the officer's report.

The department's regulations have the force of law, and the defendants are required to comply with their terms. See Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 425, 427, 456 N.E.2d 1127 (1983); Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. 28, 33, 468 N.E.2d 616 (1984). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-2979, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), that an inmate facing State prison disciplinary proceedings, which could result in a deprivation of his or her liberty interests, has a right under the due process clause of the United States Constitution to be provided with a "written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken." As we assume also was true of the department's regulations, the minimum standards required by the Wolff case were designed to ensure fair administrative decision making and to enable a reviewing court or agency to determine whether a prison disciplinary board's finding was "based on substantial evidence or whether it was sufficiently arbitrary so as to be a denial of the inmate's due process rights." Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir.1981).

Applying Wolff, courts routinely have held that records of decisions in disciplinary cases that merely state conclusions about guilt or use rote phrases do not satisfy the requirement that a disciplinary board state the rationale and evidentiary basis of a decision. See, e.g., Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1114-1115 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 685 (1984); Scarpa v. Ponte, 638 F.Supp. 1019, 1024-1026 (D.Mass.1986). The Wolff requirements apply, even apart from the department's regulations, in at least the one case in the first category in which the disciplinary sanction imposed against Stokes included loss of statutory good time credits. As the loss of good time credits affected his liberty interests, he was entitled to the protection of the due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 389, 456 N.E.2d 1100 (1983).

The prison board's disciplinary records in the remaining cases do not fall short of the minimum requirements of either the department's regulations or due process. Stokes claims as to these remaining cases that there is insufficient specificity in the written decision as to the evidence the board relied on. ⁵ In each instance other than cases in the first category, however, the board refers in its decision to the officer's incident report, and a copy of the full report is appended to the decision. All of the officers' reports appear to be self-validating. Contrast Wightman v. Superintendent, M.C.I., Walpole, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 447, 475 N.E.2d 85. Thus, although more explanation might have been preferable, in each such decision the board's rationale is revealed, and there is at least a basis for a reviewing court or agency administrator to understand how the prison board reached the decision. See Jensen v. Satran, 688 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir.1982); Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.1987); Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1987). Contrast Wightman v. Superintendent, M.C.I., Walpole, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 446-447, 475 N.E.2d 85; Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d at 1114-1115.

There is no merit in the complaints Stokes makes that in some cases the stated reason for the particular sanction imposed by the board is inadequate. ⁶ In those cases, the prison board stated reasons such as "behavior cannot be tolerated," "report and testimony," or "seriousness of offense, officer's report." In each such instance, it is implicit in the decision that the penalty was based on the board's view of the seriousness of the particular offense. So construed and viewed in its entirety, each record adequately justified the sanction. Thus, apart from the cases in the first category discussed, none of the defendant's disciplinary reports violated either the regulations or the requirements set out in Wolff.

The contentions that the defendants failed to satisfy the applicable requirements as to the first category of cases discussed do not necessarily entitle Stokes to relief. There remain issues of fact to be tried. First, Stokes contests disciplinary reports and sanctions that date back to 1979. He first filed his complaint on August 13, 1982. It may well be that the delay in some of the cases would have made it impossible, even when the complaint was filed, for the defendants to retry Stokes on the disciplinary charges. If, as to any of the particular disciplinary reports, the defendants are able to show substantial prejudice resulting from the delay, they are entitled to have the complaint dismissed, as to those particular disciplinary reports, on grounds of laches. See Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction, 399 Mass. 137, 139-140, 502 N.E.2d 1385 (1987). ⁷

Secondly, it should be determined at trial whether Stokes waived his right to relief by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies. Under 103 Code Mass.Reg. § 430.18 (1978), he had an administrative appeal so long as he exercised this right within five days of receiving the board's written decision. In any case in which Stokes either did not take an appeal or took an appeal and failed to raise the issue of the required specificity of the written decision, he waived the right to have a reviewing court consider that contention. See ...