Stokes v. Crumpton
| Decision Date | 05 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. COA14–1344.,COA14–1344. |
| Citation | 784 S.E.2d 537,246 N.C.App. 757 |
| Parties | Thomas A. STOKES, III, Plaintiff, v. Catherine C. CRUMPTON (formerly Stokes), Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Shanahan Law Group, PLLC, by Kieran J. Shanahan, Christopher S. Battles, and Kenzie M. Rakes, Raleigh, for Plaintiff-appellant.
Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, Raleigh, K. Edward Greene, and Robert A. Ponton, Jr., Raleigh, for Defendant-appellee.
Thomas A. Stokes, III ("Plaintiff") appeals from an order denying Plaintiff's motions seeking post-award discovery in an action resolved by voluntary arbitration under the Family Law Arbitration Act. We dismiss Plaintiff's appeal because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this interlocutory order deprives him of a substantial right which will be jeopardized without review prior to a final determination on the merits of his motion to vacate the arbitration award and set aside the trial court's order confirming the arbitration award.
Plaintiff and Catherine C. Crumpton ("Defendant") were married in June 1989 and separated in April 2011. Plaintiff filed an action in July 2011 seeking equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets and child support. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written agreement on 13 July 2011 to resolve the action through arbitration under North Carolina's Family Law Arbitration Act ("the arbitration agreement"). The trial court entered a Consent Order to Arbitrate Equitable Distribution and Child Support on 18 August 2011.
The arbitration agreement outlined the scope of pre-arbitration discovery. Plaintiff, through counsel, deposed Defendant as part of this pre-arbitration discovery. During Defendant's deposition, Defendant testified she was the C.E.O. and majority shareholder of Drug Safety Alliance, Inc. ("DSA"), a company that managed adverse event reporting for pharmaceutical, biotech, animal health, and over-the-counter dietary supplement companies. Defendant testified she had "no intention of selling" DSA at that time, although many people had contacted her who were interested in purchasing DSA. Defendant also testified she had commissioned an appraisal of DSA, which valued the company at less than $3,500,000.00. There appears to be no dispute that Defendant's interest in DSA was a marital asset.
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an Equitable Distribution Arbitration Award by Consent on 18 May 2012 ("the equitable distribution agreement"). The equitable distribution agreement provided, in part, that Defendant would pay Plaintiff $1,000,000.00 in a lump sum and then $650,000.00 over six years with interest. Moreover, in the event that Defendant sold her ownership interest in DSA, the entire balance owed to Plaintiff would become due. The trial court entered an Order and Judgment Confirming Equitable Distribution Arbitration Award by Consent on 18 May 2012.
Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Set Aside Order and Motion to Engage in Discovery on 26 November 2012. In the motion, Plaintiff alleged that "Defendant signed a Letter of Intent on [5 July] 2012 to sell [all] of the shares of DSA" to another company and that DSA was sold in August 2012 for $28,000,000.00. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant was planning on selling DSA for this large sum during arbitration and that she fraudulently induced Plaintiff to accept a distribution of only $1,650,000.00 based on her prior representations about the company. Plaintiff and Defendant then filed a number of competing motions to compel discovery and motions for protective orders from discovery, respectively. In an order entered on 7 August 2014 ("the order"), the trial court concluded:
Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff appeals from the order of the trial court denying his motions seeking post-award discovery. The order does not rule on Plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Accordingly, Plaintiff concedes that the order is interlocutory. See Bullard v. Tall House Bldg. Co., 196 N.C.App. 627, 637, 676 S.E.2d 96, 103 (2009) () (citation omitted). Interlocutory orders are generally not immediately appealable. Id. 676 S.E.2d at 103.
Nonetheless, in two instances a party is permitted to appeal interlocutory orders. First, a party is permitted to appeal from an interlocutory order when the trial court enters a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies in the judgment [pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 54(b) (2013) ] that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. Second, a party is permitted to appeal from an interlocutory order when the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits [pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b)(3)(a) (2015) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–277(a) (2015) ]. Under either of these two circumstances, it is the appellant's burden to present appropriate grounds for this Court's acceptance of an interlocutory appeal and our Court's responsibility to review those grounds.
Id., 676 S.E.2d at 103 (citation omitted). The trial court did not certify this order as immediately appealable under Rule 54(b). On appeal, Plaintiff argues only that this Court should review his appeal because the order of the trial court "affect[ed] a substantial right."
Cf. Bullard, 196 N.C.App. at 638, 676 S.E.2d at 103 (). Plaintiff does not identify any way in which the order on appeal raises any issue of a "failure to comply with the procedural aspects of" Chapter 50, Article 3, nor is it one of the rulings specifically listed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–60(a). See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–60(a).
It would seem logically inconsistent that an order, which itself is non-appealable under the substantive statute that governs appeals of such orders could be made appealable under another statute merely because it is interlocutory. The dissent cites Bullard for the proposition that "even when a specific order is not listed as one of the types of appeals permitted under the FLAA, an appeal of an interlocutory order may still be permitted if an appellant can demonstrate that absent immediate review, he would be deprived of a substantial right." See Bullard, 196 N.C.App. at 637, 676 S.E.2d at 103. But in Bullard, this Court held that "the list enumerated in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–569.28(a) includes the only possible routes for appeal under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act":
Id. at 635, 676 S.E.2d at 102 ().
The statutory language of the FLAA and the RUAA are substantively very similar and we interpret both the same way. See N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 1–569.28(a), 50–60(a) (2015). In Bullard, we engaged in a substantial right analysis only after we had determined that the appellant had appealed "from an order which has both currently appealable and non-appealable issues" under the RUAA. Id. at 637, 676 S.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added). The other two cases on which the dissent relies also do not support the dissent's position. See The Bluffs v. Wysocki, 68 N.C.App. 284, 285–86, 314 S.E.2d 291, 292–93 (1984) ; Laws v. Horizon Housing, Inc., 137 N.C.App. 770, 771, 529 S.E.2d 695, 696–97 (2000).
We also disagree with the dissent's statement that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–60(a)(6) is a "catch-all" provision. Subsection (6) refers to "[a] judgment entered pursuant to provisions of this Article." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–60(a)(6). The dissent emphasizes that the RUAA refers to "[a]final judgment entered pursuant to this Article." See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–569.28(a)(6) (emphasis added). The dissent argues that the absence of the word "fina...
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Stokes v. Crumpton
...whether the trial court's order denying discovery was immediately appealable as an interlocutory order. Stokes v. Crumpton , ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 784 S.E.2d 537, 539 (2016). Agreeing with defendant, the majority concluded that the order was not appealable under either the FLAA's appeal ......