Stokes v. National Presto Industries, Inc.

Decision Date30 August 2005
Docket NumberNo. WD 64182.,WD 64182.
Citation168 S.W.3d 481
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
PartiesJoel STOKES, Appellant, v. NATIONAL PRESTO INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.

Paul Redfearn III, Kansas City, for appellant.

William Lynch, Kansas City, Mark Arnold, St. Louis, for respondent.

PAUL M. SPINDEN, Presiding Judge.

Joel Stokes was severely burned when, as a 13-month-old toddler, he pulled over a deep fryer and dumped hot oil on himself. Stokes' parents, acting on their son's behalf, sued the deep fryer's manufacturer, National Presto Industries, Inc., and the boy's grandmother, who was cooking with the deep fryer when the mishap occurred. Stokes appeals the jury's verdict for National Presto. The jury returned a verdict for Stokes against the grandmother, but Stokes dismissed that action.

Stokes asserts that the circuit court erred in excluding evidence concerning substantially similar pullover accidents involving similar deep fryers manufactured by National Presto and in excluding evidence regarding correspondence between National Presto and the Consumer Products Safety Commission and Underwriter Laboratories concerning the danger of National Presto's deep fryers. He also claims that the circuit court erred in denying his request for discovery of claims and lawsuits involving similar incidents with National Presto's similar deep fryers after Stokes' injury. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for a new trial.

Stokes' injury occurred while his grandmother, Diane Scheu, was heating cooking oil in National Presto's deep fryer, a Kitchen Kettle model. Scheu set it on an island counter and plugged the electrical cord into a receptacle on the counter's side. The cord hung over the counter's edge. Stokes pulled on the cord. The deep fryer slid off the counter and spilled hot oil on Stokes, seriously injuring him.

Stokes sued Scheu for negligence and National Presto for products liability and negligence. Stokes claimed that the deep fryer was defective because it slid too easily—that National Presto should have been equipped it with rubber feet and an electrical cord that would have released when tugged by a young child. A jury returned a verdict for National Presto but against Scheu in the amount of $500,000.

The circuit court denied Stokes' post-trial motions concerning National Presto's and Scheu's separate motions for a new trial, but it granted Stokes' motion for additur against Scheu in the amount of $1.5 million. Scheu declined the additur, which necessitated a new trial on the issue of damages. Stokes attempted to appeal the circuit court's judgment to this court, but we dismissed the appeal after finding that Stokes filed it before the circuit court had issued a final judgment. Stokes v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 119 S.W.3d 193 (Mo.App.2003). Stokes dismissed with prejudice his claims against Scheu, and the circuit court entered judgment for National Presto. Stokes then filed this appeal.1

Stokes first contends that the circuit court erred in excluding evidence concerning substantially similar "pullover" accidents involving similar deep fryers manufactured by National Presto. We agree.

The Kitchen Kettle model was a cooker, which could be used not only for deep frying, but also for roasting, braising, blanching, boiling, stewing, steaming, and slow cooking. The unit featured an aluminum pot with a cooking oil fill line, four plastic feet, and a variable electric temperature control, which detached from the heating element. Although its electrical cord detached, detachment required a stronger tug than a young child would typically exert.

National Presto manufactured three other units that were designed primarily for deep frying food: the FryBaby, the FryDaddy, and the GranPappy models. They differed only in their capacities, and, like the Kitchen Kettle, they featured an aluminum pot with a cooking oil fill-line and plastic feet. Unlike the Kitchen Kettle, their electrical cords were not detachable.

At trial, Stokes attempted to introduce evidence concerning the history of "pullover" accidents involving children and Kitchen Kettle, FryBaby, FryDaddy, and GranPappy units. The circuit court restricted evidence of other pullover accidents to incidents involving the Kitchen Kettle. Repeatedly during the trial, the circuit court declared that it was confining the evidence to the "single product idea" or "one product idea."

Admissibility of evidence is a matter for the circuit court's discretion, and we will not disturb the circuit court's ruling unless we discern an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Gray Automotive Parts Company, 62 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Mo.App.2001). A circuit court abuses its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence when its ruling is illogical and so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks our sense of justice or indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration. Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Mo. banc 1991). Even if the circuit court abuses its discretion in excluding the evidence, we should not reverse the circuit court's judgment unless the abuse had a material effect on the trial. Thornton, 62 S.W.3d at 583.

Evidence of accidents similar to that suffered by the plaintiff generally is admissible in negligence and products liability actions. The key element is the similarity of the incidents. The similarity of the accident at issue and the previous incident must be sufficiently close to avoid undue prejudice and confusion. Id. To be sufficiently similar, the accidents must be (1) of like character, (2) occur under substantially the same circumstances, and (3) result from the same cause. Id.; Gerow v. Mitch Crawford Holiday Motors, 987 S.W.2d 359, 364-65 (Mo.App.1999); Benoit v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 33 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Mo.App.2000).

The circuit court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard of law. Rather than focusing on the similarity of the previous incidents, the circuit court imposed a ruling that it referred to as the "single product rule" and restricted evidence of previous incidents to those involving Kitchen Kettle units. The circuit court did not disclose the source for the single product rule, and we have not been able to find any courts or experts enunciating such a rule. If indeed the prior incidents were similar to the one leading to Stokes' injuries, the circuit court should have been permitted Stokes to present evidence of them.

National Presto, however, contends that, because the circuit court permitted Stokes to prove three prior incidents involving Kitchen Kettle units, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. It also points out that the jury learned from the evidence that the most frequent injuries associated with deep fryers were burns from hot oil and that such accidents often occurred when a small child tipped over the fryer by grabbing the electrical cord. The circuit court permitted Stokes to show that the Consumer Product Safety Commission had determined that deep fryers were susceptible to hot oil spills caused by children pulling on their cords. CPSC documents presented to the jury reported more than 100 incidents involving deep fryers and children during the last several years, including three deaths and 40 serious injuries. Although this evidence made clear the dangers involving deep fryers and children and established possible defect, risk, or notice, this evidence did not cure the prejudice to Stokes resulting from the circuit court's erroneous ruling.

We reach this conclusion from the closing arguments. National Presto took advantage of the circuit court's erroneous ruling to argue to the jury:

I want to talk about the evidence of other accidents, because this is—this is important. They keep talking about, you know, all these accidents and all these horrible...

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8 cases
  • Westmoreland v. Midwest St. Louis, LLC
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 2021
    ...we should not reverse the circuit court's judgment unless the abuse had a material effect on the trial." Stokes v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. , 168 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).Midwest has failed to satisfy its burden in this regard because there was ample evidence before the jury th......
  • Brock v. Dunne
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • September 11, 2018
    ...at issue and the previous incident must be sufficiently close to avoid undue prejudice and confusion." Stokes v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). Evaluation of whether evidence of similar occurrences is relevant and whether the circumstances bear sufficie......
  • Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Pyle
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 28, 2017
    ...well-settled rules of evidence simply don't matter." Point 5's argument acknowledges the statement in Stokes v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. , 168 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005), that "[e]ven if the circuit court abuses its discretion in excluding the evidence, we should not reverse the ......
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    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
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    ...arbitrary that it shocks our sense of justice or indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” Stokes v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Mo.App. W.D.2005).The Admission of Business Records Section 490.6801 operates as a “business records exception” to the hearsa......
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