Stokes v. State
Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 303 |
Citation | 462 So.2d 964 |
Parties | Timothy STOKES v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
William M. Dawson and George H. Jones, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jane LeCroy Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Timothy Stokes was convicted of theft of property in the second degree in violation of Ala.Code (1975), § 13A-8-4(e), and sentenced to seventeen years in the penitentiary as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the closing argument of the District Attorney was reversibly prejudicial.
The State's evidence established that John Beam, a security guard for K-Mart Corporation, observed Timothy Stokes and Diane Levert enter the K-Mart store where he was employed. The pair obtained a shopping cart, went to the cigarette stand, and began removing cigarette cartons from the rack. Stokes handed several cartons to Levert and she, in turn, put the cigarettes into the shopping cart. Then they went to the candy department where, according to Beam, Levert put the cigarettes into her purse as Stokes "was standing there with his back to her and looking across the store, just looking around."
Stokes and Levert then proceeded to the check-out lane where Levert paid for one small item but did not present the cigarettes for payment. At that point, Beam approached Levert and told her he was a security guard. She resisted his approach, and began to scuffle with him. Meanwhile, Stokes "turned and went back into the store, back into the automotive department."
Beam stated that, after he subdued Levert, he went to the automotive department, identified himself to Stokes, who was standing about ten feet from an exit, and requested that Stokes accompany him to the security office. Stokes said, "I don't know that woman." Beam testified that eight cartons of cigarettes belonging to K-Mart Corporation, worth a total of $54.96, were found in Levert's purse. On cross-examination, Beam acknowledged that Stokes never "rolled the [shopping] basket" and that Stokes "couldn't have seen [Levert] put the cigarettes in the bag because he had his back to her."
Jacquelyn Wilkes, a K-Mart check-out employee on the day in question, echoed Beam's testimony and characterized Stokes's conduct as "looking around the store like he was watching for [Levert]."
In order to prove a case of shoplifting, the State must show "[t]he theft of property which exceeds $25.00 in value, and which is taken from or in a building where said property is sold or stored...." Ala.Code (1975), § 13A-8-4(e). It must further establish that the defendant "[k]nowingly obtain[ed] or exert[ed] unauthorized control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property." Ala.Code (1975), § 13A-8-2(1).
The evidence here clearly established the statutory requisites of ownership, value, and location of the goods, as well as unauthorized control over the property. The only element of the offense with which Stokes takes issue is the criminal intent required for theft. He claims that even the testimony of the State's two witnesses negates his knowledge of Levert's theft, i.e., that he had his back to her while she put the cigarette cartons into her purse.
We find, however, that it was this very testimony which provided an inference of Stokes's guilt and was sufficient to make the matter of intent a jury question. As we said in Kimble v. State, 448 So.2d 429, 431 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).
"Although ... there was evidence that the appellant actually took Gordon's money, the evidence was, nevertheless, sufficient for the jury to infer appellant's participation in the robbery.
Stewart v. State, 405 So.2d 402 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). A permissible inference from the evidence in this case was that the appellant conspired with McHarris immediately before the robbery and participated therein as either a decoy or a look-out." (Emphasis added.)
The jury here was likewise authorized to draw the inference that Stokes and Levert had planned to shoplift before they entered the store and, once inside, Levert would conceal the cigarettes while Stokes acted as a lookout. In our judgment, the question as to whether Stokes intended to deprive K-Mart of its property was a question for the jury, which the jury decided adversely to him. Craig v. State, 410 So.2d 449, 453 (Ala.Crim.App.1981).
Stokes claims the court erred by denying his motion for mistrial following the District Attorney's reference in closing arguments to Diane Levert's conviction, a fact of which there was no evidence at Stokes's trial. From the record:
Citing Hill v. State, 210 Ala. 221, 97 So. 639 (1923), Stokes directs our attention to the general rule that evidence of the conviction or acquittal of a co-defendant for the same offense with which the accused is charged is inadmissible. "It is usually prejudicial for the prosecution to observe ... that another defendant has been convicted or has pleaded guilty." Whartons Criminal Procedure § 534 at 496 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1975). "A prosecuting attorney's argument or disclosure during trial that another has been convicted or has pleaded guilty is, of course, arguing from a fact not in evidence and getting before the jury a fact not admissible in evidence." Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1016, 1018 (1956).
A survey of the Alabama cases on this point reveals that disclosure of the outcome of a co-defendant's case has been denounced whether it occurred in argument, see Knowles v. State, 44 Ala.App. 163, 204 So.2d 506 (1967) ( ). Bell v. State, 41 Ala.App. 561, 140 So.2d 295 (1962) ( ); Lowery v. State, 21 Ala.App. 352, 108 So. 351 (1926) ( ); Felder v. State, 20 Ala.App. 603, 104 So. 444 (1925) ( ), in the State's case-in-chief, see Williams v. State, 369 So.2d 910 (Ala.Crim.App.1979) ( ); Lane v. State, 40 Ala.App. 174, 109 So.2d 758 (1959) ( ); Evans v. State, 39 Ala.App. 498, 105 So.2d 831 (1958) ( ), or during the presentation of the defense, see Dickens v. State, 49 Ala.App. 480, 273 So.2d 240 (1973) ( ); McGhee v. State, 41 Ala.App. 669, 149 So.2d 1 (1962) ( ); Hill v. State, 210 Ala. 221, 97 So. 639 (1923) ( ).
In all of the Alabama cases cited above, the reviewing courts have disapproved of reference to the disposition of a co-defendant's case on the theory that the outcome of another's prosecution is simply irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and may not be received as substantive evidence at defendant's trial. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 210 Ala. 221, 97 So. 639 (1923). This is not to say, of course, that for impeachment purposes, a co-defendant may not be questioned regarding his conviction for the same offense. See generally C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 149.01(8) (3d ed. 1977). The trial court should receive the latter kind of evidence, however, only as it bears on the testifying co-defendant's credibility and should, on request, instruct the jury regarding its limited purpose. See generally 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 13 (Fillers rev. 1983).
While we recognize the general rule of inadmissibility of a co-defendant's conviction, we find that in the circumstance of this case the error was cured by the trial court's admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment. See Williams v. State, 369 So.2d 910 (Ala.Crim.App.1979) (...
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Whitt v. State, CR-96-0349.
...prosecutor's remarks were not evidence and that the jury should not consider the comment in its deliberations. In Stokes v. State, 462 So.2d 964, 966-67 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), we addressed an almost identical comment and discussed the general rule of inadmissibility of a codefendant's convict......
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Griffin v. State
...Hill v. State, 210 Ala. 221, 97 So. 639 (1923).'" Whitt v. State, 733 So.2d 463, 483 (Ala.Cr. App.1998), quoting Stokes v. State, 462 So.2d 964, 967 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). "Traditional authority has held that the admission or confession of another that such person committed the crime for which ......
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Lewis v. State, No. CR-03-0480 (Ala. Crim. App. 11/2/2007)
...the use of the conviction." 591 So. 2d at 554 (citing United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1986), and Stokes v. State, 462 So. 2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984)). In Tomlin, this Court held that because evidence that Tomlin's codefendant had already been convicted and sentenced to dea......
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Lewis v. State
...the use of the conviction." 591 So.2d at 554 (citing United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th Cir.1986), and Stokes v. State, 462 So.2d 964 (Ala.Crim.App.1984)). In Tomlin, this Court held that because evidence that Tomlin's codefendant had already been convicted and sentenced to death c......