Stokes v. State
| Decision Date | 03 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–KA–01683–COA.,2012–KA–01683–COA. |
| Citation | 141 So.3d 421 |
| Parties | Damion Deandre STOKES a/k/a Damion D. Stokes a/k/a Damion Stokes, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Office of State Public Defender by W. Daniel Hinchcliff, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Laura Hogan Tedder, attorney for appellee.
Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, MAXWELL and JAMES, JJ.
MAXWELL, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Damion Deandre Stokes seeks a new trial following his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. He argues the State's use of perjured testimony violated his due-process rights, rendering his trial “fundamentally unfair.” But after delving into Stokes's argument, we find his actual complaint focuses on the prosecutor's comments that he personally disbelieved one of the State's witnesses, not on perjured testimony. And Stokes waived any appellate challenge to these statements by not contemporaneously objecting to them.
¶ 2. While we find the prosecutor's comments were improper, they did not cause a miscarriage of justice. So a reversal based on plain error is not appropriate. Because the overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the jury's guilty verdict, we affirm.
Background
¶ 3. The State's theory was that Stokes and three others hatched a plan to kill Ira Phillips because he failed to pay a drug debt. A murder investigation began after Phillips's bullet-riddled body was discovered lying in a dark, empty gravel cul-de-sac in Panola County, Mississippi. The two men who found the body had been summoned to help Stokes and Jacquentin Lawson push Lawson's car, which was stuck in the mud in the road leading to the cul-de-sac.
¶ 4. Because of the way Lawson's vehicle was situated, it was necessary for the two men to drive to the end of the cul-de-sac to turn around before attempting to push out Lawson's car. But Stokes and Lawson tried to dissuade them from driving into the cul-de-sac to turn around. When the two men did anyway, they spotted the body. At this point, the usually talkative Stokes was quiet and non-reactive, even when they turned the body over and learned the dead man was Phillips, Stokes's friend. Lawson began picking up shell casings, but was stopped when the two men told him not to tamper with the evidence.
¶ 5. While the group was waiting for the police to respond, Stokes walked off and left. Stokes's cousin testified that he received a call from Stokes to come pick him up near the cul-de-sac and to drop him off near Stokes's uncle's house.
¶ 6. Stokes's uncle, Vincent Ruffin, was one of the charged co-conspirators. At trial, Gary Dantzson, another charged conspirator, testified that Ruffin was a drug dealer, whom Stokes worked for selling marijuana.
¶ 7. According to Dantzson, the afternoon before the shooting, Dantzson and Ruffin were smoking marijuana together when Ruffin began complaining about someone who owed him money. Dantzson became scared because he knew he owed Ruffin money and thought Ruffin was talking about him. But Dantzson eventually realized Ruffin was talking about Phillips. Dantzson testified Ruffin offered to reduce Dantzson's debt if he agreed to “whoop” Phillips.
¶ 8. Dantzson then left Ruffin's house and saw Lawson across the street, putting gas in his car. Lawson asked Dantzson if he was “ready.” The two then picked up Stokes and Phillips. And the four men rode around in Lawson's car smoking marijuana. According to Dantzson, they discussed robbing someone as a ruse to keep Phillips from suspecting he was actually the target.
¶ 9. When they reached the deserted cul-de-sac, Lawson asked everyone to get out of the car so the smoke would air out. Stokes got out of the car and walked to where Dantzson was standing. Dantzson testified Stokes slipped him a Tek–9 handgun and told him, “Unk said handle this.” Stokes then approached Phillips, and asked Phillips why he had not paid Ruffin. At this point, Phillips started to run and Dantzson shot Phillips several times with the Tek–9. Phillips fell dead, and Dantzson handed the gun back to Stokes.
¶ 10. Dantzson took off running, after he, Stokes, and Lawson quickly devised a cover story to tell the authorities if questioned. Dantzson testified he later saw Stokes with the Tek–9 pistol at Ruffin's house, where Dantzson had gone to report what had happened.
¶ 11. Dantzson's trial testimony differed from what he initially told police. When first interviewed by police, Dantzson claimed there was a second car in the cul-de-sac that night, and that the fatal shots came from that vehicle. Months later Dantzson notified authorities he had lied earlier to protect himself from Ruffin. Dantzson confessed to shooting Phillips and agreed to testify about what happened that night.
¶ 12. Stokes and Lawson had also told police there had been a second car that committed the drive-by shooting. But none of the three men could specifically identify the vehicle or shooter. Nor could they match their descriptions of the car or the location of the shooter to the others' versions of this second-car theory. According to the investigating officers, their general story was not supported by the physical evidence. There were no tire marks in the dirt and gravel indicating a second vehicle. And the shell casings were found lying on the ground in the spot Dantzson said he was standing when he shot Phillips. Had the shooter been inside a vehicle, as claimed, the casings would have likely fallen inside the car.
¶ 13. An officer further testified that the location of Phillips's body and the blood trail leading to it corroborated Dantzson's version recounted at trial.
¶ 14. The State charged Stokes, Lawson, Dantzson, and Ruffin in a two-count indictment with conspiracy to commit murder and the murder of Phillips. 1 At Stokes's trial, the State called Dantzson to testify about his and Stokes's conspiratorial roles and to establish that Stokes had supplied the murder weapon and relayed Ruffin's instruction to “take care” of Phillips. 2 The State also called Stokes's uncle, Ruffin, who testified about Stokes's connection to the murder weapon but strongly denied any role in the conspiracy.3
¶ 15. Anticipating Ruffin's denial, the assistant district attorney told the jury in opening statements that he did not personally believe Ruffin was not involved in Phillips's murder. And the prosecutor announced his plan to call Ruffin and “tell him on the stand I don't believe him.” Then, during Ruffin's direct examination, when Ruffin did indeed deny involvement with Phillips's murder, the prosecutor told Ruffin, “I've told you from day one I do not believe you.” Once more, in closing arguments, the prosecutor repeated his personal disbelief of Ruffin's denial of involvement.
¶ 16. The jury found Stokes guilty of conspiracy to commit murder but acquitted him of the murder charge. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, followed by ten-years' post-release supervision. After an unsuccessful post-trial motion, Stokes timely appealed.
Discussion
¶ 17. On appeal, Stokes makes distinct challenges to two of his charged co-conspirators' testimony. He first claims that, because the State did not believe Ruffin's testimony about not being involved in Phillips's murder, it could not call Ruffin without sponsoring perjured testimony. And second, as to Dantzson, Stokes argues the jury should not have believed his testimony, because it was self-interested, conflicting, and uncorroborated, and his conviction based on this testimony goes against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶ 18. Stokes argues the State could not call Ruffin because it believed Ruffin was lying about his involvement in the conspiracy. But this issue is waived, since Stokes neither objected at trial to Ruffin's testimony nor to the prosecutor calling Ruffin as a witness and commenting that he disbelieved him. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1288–89 (Miss.1994) ().
¶ 19. While Stokes acknowledges this procedural default, he asserts his failure to object does not bar appellate review because the State's use of Ruffin's testimony was “fundamentally unfair” and, thus, plain error. Hurt v. State, 34 So.3d 1191, 1197 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) . But though Stokes is now suggesting the State's use of perjured testimony violated his due-process rights, we find the actual claimed error involves the State's assertion of its personal belief, not its sponsoring of perjured testimony. And though this trial tactic was improper, after reviewing the entire record of Stokes's trial, we find it was harmless, since there was overwhelming evidence of Stokes's guilt on the conspiracy count.
¶ 20. (1935), Court made clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice.’ ” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). So when a “conviction has been obtained through the use of false evidence or perjured testimony,” a defendant's constitutional right to due process has been violated. Pearson v. State, 428 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Miss.1983) (citing Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112–13, 55 S.Ct. 340). And “[w]here such false evidence has in fact contributed to the conviction, the accused is entitled to...
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