Stokes v. US Postal Service, Civil Action No. 95-0795.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-0795.
• Citation: 937 F. Supp. 11
• Parties: Tonyia STOKES, Plaintiff, v. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

937 F. Supp. 11

Tonyia STOKES, Plaintiff, v. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-0795.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 19, 1996.

Tonyia D. Stokes, Burtonsville, MD, plaintiff pro se.

Wyneva Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Granting Defendants' Motion To Dismiss

URBINA, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court upon defendants' motion to dismiss; plaintiff's memorandum in opposition; defendants' reply;¹ plaintiff's reply and defendants' surreply.² The court concludes that the defendants' motion to dismiss shall be granted because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this controversy as the plaintiff has not met the "presentment" requirements contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 28 U.S.C. Sections 2401(b) and 2675 et seq.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Tonyia Stokes, filed the above-captioned action on May 12, 1995 alleging that the United States Postal Service (USPS) negligently handled the processing of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax levy against her wages. In March 1993, USPS received a request from the IRS for a tax levy of $2,672.71 on the plaintiff's wages. In response to the IRS's request, the USPS garnished $735.71 from plaintiff's paycheck for the pay-period (p/p) 5 of 1993 and $792.04 in p/p 6 of 1993. Subsequently, plaintiff entered into a Payroll Deduction Agreement with the IRS whereby $100.00 would be garnished from each of her paychecks until she satisfied all her outstanding tax obligations. This arrangement began with p/p 8 of 1993 and continued through p/p 15 of 1993.

In p/p 16 of 1993, the USPS witheld $731.09 from plaintiff's paycheck because of another IRS request for a tax levy, amounting to $1,977.12. In p/p 17 of 1993, the USPS garnished $701.77 for the same reason.

Plaintiff subsequently learned from the IRS that her previous Payroll Deduction Agreement had been unilaterally cancelled by the IRS because of the USPS' failure to complete the necessary paperwork. In response to these two large payroll deductions and the cancellation of her original Payroll Deduction Agreement, plaintiff entered into another Payroll Deduction Agreement with the IRS. A $100.00 deduction from her paycheck began with p/p 19 of 1993 and continued through p/p 21 of 1993.

In November 1993, the USPS received another request for a tax levy from the IRS to be deducted from plaintiff's wages. The amount of this levy was $1,124.21. The USPS received a fourth IRS request for a levy in February 1994 for the amount of $1,150.10. In response to this latest tax levy, the USPS withheld plaintiff's entire net pay for p/p 6 of 1994. The amount withheld from plaintiff's p/p 6 paycheck was $889.30, which represented her entire net pay. The USPS admitted that this action was the result of a computer error on its part. All levies have since been released by the IRS as plaintiff has satisfied all her outstanding tax obligations.

After the entire net pay was withheld from her p/p 6 paycheck, plaintiff sought and obtained a meeting with Linda Venable, Manager of Finance, at the General Mail Facility located in Washington, D.C. At this meeting, plaintiff requested a salary advance. Ms. Venable denied this request on behalf of the USPS. On April 2, 1994, plaintiff mailed Ms. Venable a letter again requesting a salary advance. Subsequently, plaintiff met with the Postmaster of Washington, D.C., Mr. David Clark, Ms. Venable and Mr. Herb Hollar, Supervisor of Finance at the USPS. Again, her request for a salary advance, to replace the amount taken from her paycheck due to the USPS's accounting error, was denied.

Plaintiff then sent copies of her April 2, 1994 written request for a payroll advance to various officials in the USPS. Sometime during this period, the USPS reversed its position, granted plaintiff a salary advance and forwarded two checks to her totalling $869.05.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Defendants' actions she has suffered great mental stress, loss of personal property and eviction from her place of residence. Plaintiff seeks $6,000.00 in compensatory damages and $444,000.00 in punitive damages.

II. ANALYSIS³

Defendants' have moved for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the court may grant a motion to dismiss if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The court, on a motion to dismiss, shall accept the allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969).

Defendants' argue that plaintiff has failed to present her claim to the USPS, as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Defendants posit that plaintiff's failure to follow the presentment requirements embodied in the FTCA prevents this court from having subject matter jurisdiction over the present controversy. Conversely, plaintiff argues that the April 2, 1994 letter suffices to satisfy the presentment requirements of the FTCA. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that her filing of an amended claim on August 17, 1995 cured any defect that her April 2, 1994 letter contained.

A. The Presentment Requirements Of 28 U.S.C. Section 2675(a) and 2401(b)

The federal government and its agencies are "absolutely shielded from tort actions for damages unless sovereign immunity has been waived." Kline, 603 F.Supp. at 1316 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953-54, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). The FTCA, however, waives sovereign immunity in a limited number of tort actions. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). Sections 2675(a) and 2401(b) require plaintiff to file her claim with the appropriate federal agency before initiating a suit in federal court. Such a claim is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a lawsuit against the United States. Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C.Cir. 1984).

Therefore, if a plaintiff does not meet these requirements, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a tort claim against the United States. Id.⁴ Section 2675(a) reads, in pertinent part,

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States ... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency ...

28 U.S.C. Section 2675(a). Section 2401(b) requires such a claim to be presented to the appropriate federal agency "within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented."

Congress did not include the "presentment" requirements to frustrate plaintiffs who have tort claims against the United States. GAF, 818 F.2d at 917-18. Rather, the reason for such requirements is to give the implicated agency an opportunity to investigate claims that are lodged against it and further, to provide an opportunity for settlement discussions between the agency and the claimant to take place, when such discussions are appropriate. Id.

In reviewing the presentment requirement contained in 2675(a), the Supreme Court has ruled that pro se litigants should be held to the same standard as litigants who have retained counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). In announcing this rule, the Court stated "`in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.'" Id. (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2497, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980)).

Consequently, under the FTCA, prior to filing suit, a claimant must "make a presentment of his claims to an agency setting forth `(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its investigation, and (2) a sum-certain damages claim.'" Verner v. United States Government, 804 F. Supp 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1992) (quoting GAF, 818 F.2d at 919). A claimant must present her claim within two years of the alleged negligent act and, if the claim is denied by the agency, the claimant must file suit within six months of the notice of final denial. 28 U.S.C. Section 2401(b); Verner, 804 F.Supp. at 383 (citing Liles v. United States, 638 F.Supp. 963, 966 (D.D.C. 1986)).

In the present case, plaintiff has not presented her claim to the USPS in the manner required by 28 U.S.C. Section 2675(a) and Section 2401(b). Plaintiff claims her letter of April 4, 1994 to Linda Venable of the USPS constitutes a written notification of the claim for purposes of the FTCA. Close inspection of this letter however, reveals that it does not meet the requirements of Section 2675(a).

1. Letter To Linda Venable Was Not Sufficient To Enable USPS To Investigate Plaintiff's Claim And Did Not State A Sum-Certain Amount For Damages

Claimants are required to give notice to a federal agency of their tort claims to protect the agency from needless litigation and to provide it with an opportunity to investigate tort claims. GAF, 818 F.2d at 919. Moreover, a written request outlining a claim to an agency must be "couched" in terms of an administrative claim being brought pursuant to the FTCA, and not some other type of claim. Roper Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 869 F.Supp. 362 (D.S.C.1994).

The April 2, 1994 letter plaintiff sent to Linda Venable is a plea for an advancement of salary. Plaintiff states in the letter: "I am suggesting, again, that you would take a closer look at this situation and grant me an advancement of pay for pay period six (1994)."⁵ In her pleadings, plaintiff herself refers to this letter as a plea for a salary advance. Plaintiff argues that she was "... denied her request despite the authenticity of my evidence."⁶ The denials she refers to are the USPS's denials of her requests for a salary...