Stoll Oil Refining Co. v. Pierce

Decision Date24 June 1960
Citation337 S.W.2d 263
PartiesSTOLL OIL REFINING COMPANY, a Corp., Appellant, v. Vester E. PLERCE, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Richardson, Barrickman & Dickinson, Glasgow, for appellant.

C. O. Milby, Greensburg, George O. Bertram, Campbellsville, for appellee.

STANLEY, Commissioner.

The appeal is from a judgment for $5,000 nominal and punitive damages (without separation) for having wrongfully caused the ejectment of the plaintiff, now appellee, Vester E. Pierce, from a gasoline service station in Greensburg, which he had under lease from the defendant, now appellant, Stoll Oil Refining Company.

The complaint stated that the plaintiff was in possession of the property, and that on or about November 23, 1955, the defendant, through its agent 'and otherwise, wrongfully entered and ejected the plaintiff and took possession of the property.'

The material facts are not in dispute. The lease of the service station, dated March 9, 1955, for one year with the right of extension, called for the rental to be computed at the rate of one cent a gallon of gasoline delivered to the station for sale but not to be less than $150 a month, payable on the lessor's demand. The lease expressly provided that upon default in the payment of rent or performance of other agreements and obligations the 'lessor in any event shall have the right to declare this lease terminated and shall have the further right, without notice and without recourse to any legal proceeding to enter upon the premises and repossess the same, * * * and lessor shall further have all the rights and remedies provided by law for the recovery of rent and possession.' Such provisions are valid and effectual. Dean v. Stillwell, 284 Ky. 639, 145 S.W.2d 830; Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93, 163 S.W.2d 273.

A sales agreement was contemporaneously executed by the parties.

Early in November the company was claiming that the lessee had defaulted in the payment of rent to the amount of $383, and several demands for payment were made of him. On November 19, 1955, the company addressed a registered letter to Pierce, which, after referring to the terms and conditions of the lease, notified him that the lease 'was at an end and terminated because of your failure to pay the rental stipulated' for three months past. The letter stated that the company would take immediate possession of the premises.

The local attorney for the Stoll Company invited Pierce to his office for a conference after the letter had been received by him. The attorney, Mr. Henderson, testified that they discussed the default in the rental. He suggested to Pierce that 'there was no point in putting him into a lot of expense by having to go to court.' Pierce did not deny the debt. He asked about the goods in the station, and Henderson suggested that the place be locked up and at his convenience, in the presence of the sheriff, they would make an inventory. To this Pierce replied, 'All right.' Pierce did not deny this statement or his response.

During the course of the trial the plaintiff introduced some receipts for money paid and stated he had told Stoll's representative that he was not behind with his rent. He testified, however, he was not keeping 'records completely' and may have owed something on the gas and oil accounts. The rent was calculated upon the quantities delivered to Pierce. The company proved by its records that Pierce owed the sum claimed, namely, $383 for rent. Replying to a question as to whether or not he owed any rent, Pierce answered, 'I don't think I did.' He never positively claimed he owed nothing. Later he admitted owing $75 on the September rent.

Under the terms of the contract and the facts the lessor had the right to terminate the lease and did so in a proper way by notice. Hickman v. Fordyce, 179 Ky. 737, 201 S.W. 307; 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 830, 832, 855, 870. Soon after the conference in the attorney's office, referred to above, two deputy sheriffs went to the station to close it upon request of Henderson. Pierce refused to let it be done, and the officers left. Some kind of possessory action was filed by the lessor immediately thereafter. We presume that it was in accord with KRS 383.280, which provides for an action for trespass or of ejectment in addition to a proceeding for forcible detainer, since such proceeding must originate in a court of lower jurisdiction. KRS 383.210.

The circuit court clerk signed an order in that case directing the sheriff to take possession of the service station and 'turn the possession over to the Stoll Oil Refining Company.' Summons in the action and this order were served on Pierce within an hour after the first visit by the deputy sheriffs. Pierce then surrendered possession.

It is stipulated in this action that no bond had been executed before the order of ejectment was issued. On some later, undisclosed date, on motion of the defendant, the court 'set aside and held for naught' the order of ejectment. The present suit was filed in June, 1957.

The present action is for alleged wrongful eviction predicated on abuse of process. The lessor, having rightfully exercised its option to terminate the lease,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Sanders v. City of Pembroke
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • 6 d4 Agosto d4 2020
    ...at 811-12]. Broadly speaking, abuse of process is "the irregular or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding." Stoll Oil Refining v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 1960). The essential elements of an abuse of process claim under Kentucky law are "(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a will......
  • Powell v. Fugate
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
    • 8 d5 Março d5 2019
    ...or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding." Simpson v. Laytart , 962 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Stoll Oil Refining Company v. Pierce , Ky., 337 S.W.2d 263 (1960) ). The essential elements of the claim are: (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of the judici......
  • Bardstown Capital Corp. v. Seiller Waterman, LLC
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 12 d5 Junho d5 2020
    ...or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding.'" Simpson v. Laytart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Stoll Oil Refining Co. v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960)). "One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which ......
  • Packard v. Mariner Fin., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • 26 d2 Maio d2 2020
    ...of Process Abuse of process is generally "the irregular or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding . . . ." Stoll Oil Ref. Co. v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 1960). To properly plead an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: "(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT