Stoll v. Almon C. Judd Co.

• Decision Date: 03 August 1927
• Citation: 138 A. 479,106 Conn. 551
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STOLL v. ALMON C. JUDD CO.

138 A. 479

106 Conn. 551

STOLL v. ALMON C. JUDD CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 3, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Leonard J. Nickerson Judge.

Action for loss of jewelry, deposited with innkeeper for safe-keeping, brought by Samuel Stoll against the Almon C Judd Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that he was a jobber, purchasing jewelry from the manufacturer and disposing of the same to the retail trade; on March 5, 1925 he and his salesman, one Resnick, registered at and became guests in the defendant's hotel at Waterbury; after registering they delivered to the hotel clerk two bags or cases, each closed, fastened with a strap, and one locked containing the plaintiff's stock of jewelry; the salesman stated to the clerk, " Now, these are jewelry cases, and we want them safely protected; " to which the clerk replied, " Oh, I can see those are jewelry cases. We have plenty of jewelry men stopping here." The clerk took the cases from the counter. At his direction Resnick wrote his name on two plain cards, the clerk then tore each card in half, gave Resnick one half of each card and put one of the other halves under the strap of each case. The next morning the plaintiff and Resnick presented the portions of the cards which had been so given them and requested delivery of the cases, but the defendant did not deliver and has never delivered the bags or their contents to the plaintiff.

The defendant offered evidence that neither the plaintiff nor Resnick made any mention of the nature of the contents of the bags at the time they were left at the desk and the clerk did not know that they contained jewelry; the clerk placed the bags behind the key rack in the rear of the office; subsequently one of two men, who were sitting in the lobby, but had not registered, gave to the clerk a traveling bag which the latter put on the floor near the safe, and one of these men, at another time, brought to the clerk another traveling bag, which the clerk checked, using an ordinary perforated check with duplicate numbering, and placed it in the coat room; later, while the clerk was at the telephone, one of the men entered the hotel desk enclosure and opened the bag which had been left by him and which was then on the floor near the jewelry cases; still later one of these men asked to have the bag brought from the coat room and put with the other bags, which was done. Early next morning the two men, who had eventually registered and been assigned rooms, approached the desk and asked the night clerk, who was not the clerk on duty during the evening before, for their bags, presenting the check, and pointing out and claiming the four stacked together on the floor, the two jewelry bags being on the bottom and the two others on top, one having the check corresponding to that presented. The white slips which were attached to the jewelry cases when plaintiff and Resnick left them were no longer so attached. The clerk accepted the check as sufficient and delivered all four bags to the men, who thereupon paid their bill and left the hotel.

William W. Gager, of Waterbury, for appellant.

Nathaniel R. Bronson and Richardson Bronson, both of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

HINMAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The general, common-law rule is that it is the duty of an innkeeper to keep the goods of his guest safely so that no loss shall happen through his default or that of his servants or others for whose presence in the inn he is responsible, and if he is guilty of any breach of this duty he is liable to the party injured for the loss sustained. The rule had its origin at an early period and is said to have been founded on considerations of public policy, including the encouragement of intercourse between different sections of the country, the fact that travelers must of necessity trust to and confide in the honesty and vigilance of the innkeeper and those in his employ, and because of his opportunity and temptation, then frequently yielded to, to collude with evil-disposed persons in despoiling his guests. Although in modern times this policy has been assailed as being without at least some of the justifications formerly obtaining, courts have been slow to be moved by this argument to materially relax the rigor of the rule; while admitting that modern innkeepers are generally trustworthy, they hold that to prevent, by continued strict accountability, new evils from springing up, is no less important than to suppress those which already prevail. By the vast majority of cases the innkeeper, in the absence of statutory modification of the common-law rule, is held to be practically an insurer as to the goods of his guest and is absolved from liability for their loss only when it results from the act of God or is caused by the public enemy or by the fault of the guest himself. In some jurisdictions this rule is ameliorated to the extent that, although the innkeeper is made prima facie liable for the loss of goods by a guest, he may discharge himself by showing that such loss was not occasioned by his negligence or default. However, even in those cases which do not adhere to the strict rule that the innkeeper is an insurer of the goods brought by a guest, he is not usually exonerated from a loss of such goods by theft, on the ground that he guarantees the good conduct of the persons whom he admits under his roof and when goods are so lost, even though the person who stole them is unknown, the law imposes liability upon him. 14 R. C. L. " Innkeepers," § 16 et seq.; 32 Corpus Juris, p. 545 et seq.; Beale on Innkeepers, § § 181-188.

In many states, however, statutes have been enacted, some merely declaratory of the common law, but most of them modifying, to some extent, the common-law rule, by limiting, or prescribing a mode of limiting, the liability of the innkeeper. See Appendix, Beale on Innkeepers. In so far as these statutes are in derogation of the common law they are to be strictly construed. 32 Corpus Juris, " Innkeepers," § 49, p. 551; 99 Am.St.Rep. 592. Connecticut was without legislation of this kind until 1915, when an act (chapter 98, Public Acts) was passed, which as section 4828 of the General Statutes was in effect when this cause of action accrued and reads as follows:

" Whenever a guest of any hotel or inn shall fail to offer to deliver to the person in charge of the office of such hotel, for safe-keeping, any securities, money, jewelry, watch or ornament belonging to such guest, the proprietor of such hotel shall not be liable for loss of any such property by such guest to an amount greater than one hundred dollars unless such loss shall occur through the negligence or misconduct of such proprietor or any of his employees; nor shall he be liable for the loss of any chattel belonging to such guest and not within a room assigned to him, unless the same shall be specially entrusted to the care of such hotel keeper or his servants."

It will be perceived that this statute works a considerable modification of the common-law liability of an innkeeper. The rights and liabilities of the parties are to be determined by these statutory provisions so far as they are applicable, and by the common law only as to those principles which remain unaffected by the statute.

While the assignments relate to claimed errors in the charge as given and in refusing to charge as requested, the points presented are, for the most part, reducible to concise questions. The appellant in its brief has so treated...