Stolp v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 15 April 1926
• Docket Number: 19777.
• Citation: 245 P. 20,138 Wash. 685
• Parties: STOLP v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

245 P. 20

138 Wash. 685

STOLP v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.

No. 19777.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 15, 1926

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County; Reynolds, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by A. M. Stolp for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Carlisle Lumber Company, employer. From a judgment reversing an order of the Department of Labor and Industries rejecting the claim, the Department of Labor and Industries appeals. Judgment affirmed.

John H Dunbar and M. H. Wight, both of Olympia, for appellant.

Dysart & Ellsbury, of Centralia, for respondent.

MAIN J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court reversing an order of the Department of Labor and Industries, by which the claim of A. M. Stolp for compensation was rejected. From the judgment of the superior court, the Department of Labor and Industries appeals.

On November 26, 1922, A. M. Stolp was employed by the Carlisle Lumber Company in an extrahazardous occupation, and on that day, in the course of his employment, accidentally struck his left eye on an air compressor pipe. Thereafter he consulted a physician, but neither he nor the physician at the time apprehended any serious injury from the blow. Respondent continued in his work for a period of about 14 months, wholly without appreciation that the sight of his eye was impaired, until on or about January 15, 1924, when he learned of this fact for the first time. After he became aware that he had lost the sight of his eye, and on May 22 1924, he filed an application with the appellant for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The application was filed approximately 4 months after the time he first discovered that he had lost the sight of his eye and, as above noted, the claim was rejected by the appellant.

There is but one question in the case, and that is whether the claim was filed in time. It was filed within 4 months after the respondent discovered that he had lost the sight of his eye but not within one year after he had struck his eye on an air compressor pipe. Section 7686, Rem. Comp. Stat. subd (d), provides that:

'No application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable unless filed within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued.'

Section 7675, among other things, provides that: '* * * The words 'injury' or 'injuried' as used in this act refer only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease. * * *'

In Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 158 P. 256, 91 Wash. 588, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 354, it was held that 'fortuitous event' meant 'accident,' and that there was no difference in meaning between the two. 'Accident,' as defined by Webster's New International Dictionary is:

'An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency; often an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character.'

'Injury' by the same authority is defined as:

'Damage or hurt done to or suffered by a person or thing; detriment to, or violation of, person, character, feelings, rights, property, or interests, or the value of a thing.'

The accident or the fortuitous event happened at the time the respondent struck his eye upon the air compressor pipe. That was the event. The injury which was the result of that accident or event was when the effect was produced and the sight of the eye lost. The statute (section 7686, supra) requires that the claim be filed within one year from the day upon which the 'injury' occurred. Prior to the time of the impairment of the sight, the respondent would not have been entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as up to that time he had not in any substantial respect suffered damage.

The question as to whether the limitation fixed by the statute appears to run with the happening of the accident or when the resultant injury develops has on a number of occasions been before the courts. In Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 156 N.W. 511, 99 Neb. 328, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, construing the statute of that state, held that when an accident to an eye, which at first appeared not to be serious, resulted thereafter in a diseased condition which destroyed its sight, the injury occurred when the diseased condition culminated. In that state the Workmen's Compensation Law defined 'accident' and also the word 'injury,' but the statutory definition there given is substantially the same as that given by the lexicographers to these words. That case was followed and cited with approval by the same court in Simon v. Cathroe Co., 162...