Stoltman v. the City of Clayton
| Decision Date | 07 December 1920 |
| Citation | 226 S.W. 315,205 Mo.App. 568 |
| Parties | BERNARD H. STOLTMAN, Respondent, v. THE CITY OF CLAYTON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.--Hon. G. A Wurdeman, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).
Decree reversed and cause remanded.
C. C Wolff and A. E. L. Gardner for appellant.
(1) The plaintiff cannot sue by injunction to test the right of a city of the fourth class to extend its limits; so as to take in contiguous territory must be assailed directly by the State in quo warranto, or other direct proceeding by the State, and cannot be collaterally attacked as in this case citing the following cases, to wit: Kayser v. Trustees of Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; State ex rel. v. Mineral Land Co., 84 Mo.App. 32; City of Salem ex rel. Romey v Young, 142 Mo.App. 160; Inhabitants of Fredericktown v. Fox, 84 Mo. 65; Flynn v. The City of Neosho, 114 Mo. 573; State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 205, 221; Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 209; School Dist. v. Hodgin, 180 Mo. 70. (2) Under the provisions of section 9300, Revised Statutes 1909, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of a city of the fourth class, with the consent of a majority of the legal voters of such city voting at an election therefor, have power to extend the limits of such city over territory adjacent thereto, when in their judgment and discretion such extension may redound to the benefit of the city. Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 432; State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 205; State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 213; Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 599; State ex rel. v. Mining Co., 262 Mo. 490; State ex rel. Roney v. Young, 142 Mo.App. 160; State ex rel. Lashly v. City of Maplewood, 193 S.W. 989. (3) The mere fact that the land taken in by such extension is used for agricultural purposes and is not all platted does not make such extension unreasonable. Copeland v. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 432; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 558; State ex rel. v. Birch, supra; City of Salem ex rel. v. Young, 142 Mo.App. 160. (4) The question of benefits of the extension of the city limits is a legislative and not a judicial one, and the passage of the ordinance of extension makes a prima-facie case of reasonableness. Parker v. Zeisler, 73 Mo.App. 537; Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 451; City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 550; Morse v. Westport, 110 Mo. 502; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 431; State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 214; Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 599; Dillon on Municial Corporations, section 649.
Paul Bakewell, Jr., for respondent.
(1) An equitable action will lie in the instant case for an avoidance of the ordinance and an injunction, and there are precedents for its use in similar cases. Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 588; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417; Parker v. Zeisler (Collector), 73 Mo.App. 537. (2) The resistance to taxation made by owners of property included in a municipality, on the ground that the ordinance of extension is unreasonable, and, therefore, void, does not constitute a collateral attack on the corporate entity, and is a proper procedure. State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 205, 220; State ex rel. v. Mining Co., 262 Mo. 490, 504; Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 Mo.App. 18; Warren v. Barber Paving Co., 115 Mo. 572. (3) Injunction will lie to restrain the enforcement of an invalid city ordinance in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 329. (4) Suits may be brought by any taxpayer, for himself and others, similarly situated, to prevent the collection of an illegal tax. Ranney v. Rader, 67 Mo. 476, 480; Newmeyer v. Railroad, 52 Mo. 81; Dennison v. City of Kansas, 95 Mo. 416, 429. (5) The reasonableness of an ordinance extending city limits is a subject of judicial inquiry. State ex rel. v. Mining Co., 262 Mo. 505; Salem ex rel. v. Young, 142 Mo.App. 160, 170; State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 219; State ex rel. v. West Plains, 163 Mo.App. 166, 171. (6) The city of Clayton, and not its individual officers, is the proper defendant. State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 568. (7) Courts will avoid the incorporation of a municipal corporation where it encloses, within the limits of the town, large tracts of land devoted exclusively to agricultural purposes. State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State ex inf. v. Bellflower, 129 Mo.App. 138; State ex rel. v. Small, 131 Mo.App. 470. (8) A city may reasonably extend its limits and take in contiguous property when: First. They are platted and held for sale or use as town lots. Second. Whether platted or not, if they are held to be brought on the market and sold as town property when they reach a value corresponding with the views of the owner. Third. When they furnish the abode for a densely settled community, or represent the actual growth of the town beyond its legal boundary. Fourth. When they are needed for any proper purpose, as for the extension of its streets, or sewer, gas or water system, or to supply places for the abode or business of its residents, or for the extension of needed police regulation, and Fifth. When they are valuable by reason of ther adaptability for prospective town uses; but the mere fact that their value is enhanced by reason of their nearness to the corporation would not give ground for their annexation, if it did not appear that such value was enhanced on account of their adaptability to town use. State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 213; Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 599; Copeland v. St. Joseph 126 Mo. 432. (9) City limits should not be so extended to take in contiguous land: First. When they are used only for purposes of agricuture or horticulture and are valuable on account of such use. Second. When they are vacant and do not derive special value from their adaptability for city uses. State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 214; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, p. 619, section 273.
This suit in equity was filed on the 25th day of July, 1917, in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri. Plaintiff seeks to have declared unreasonable and void an extension of the city limits of Clayton, consummated on the 12th of September, 1916, and defendant restrained and enjoined from exercising municipal authority and levying and assessing taxes over the territory thereby annexed, and the residents thereof.
In plaintiff's petition it is alleged: that the defendant is a city of the fourth class; that plaintiff owns some ten acres of land upon which he erected a dwelling house, in which he resides, and that his ten acre tract is within the area included in the extension of the city's limits; that the Board of Aldermen of the City of Clayton passed an ordinance to change and extend the corporate limits of the city, which was approved by the Mayor, submitted to the voters of the City of Clayton, and an election held thereon; that by ordinance approved by the Mayor, the result of said election was ordained and declared to be in favor of such extension, and extended the limits of said city in accordance therewith; that by said extension his real estate is now included within the limits of said city, and that plaintiff has now become a resident of said city.
The grounds upon which the petition avers the ordinance is unreasonable, are: that said ordinance undertook to extend the corporate limits of the City of Clayton, westwardly, over a strip of territory approximately one and one-fourth miles east and west and of a like width north and south, covering some ten hundred and twenty-five acres; that there had been no growth or increase in the population of the city sufficient to necessitate such extension for any proper municipal purposes; and avers, that there had been no substantial increase in the population of said city, except an increase in area of population occasioned by a previous extension of the city limits eastwardly, made in the year 1913; that the land of plaintiff, included in such extension is used as a site for plaintiff's residence, a portion thereof is under cultivation, and that it is distant from the inhabited part of said city; that practically the entire land included within the limits of said extension is kept and used for farming and gardening purposes, and none of the ground has been platted or held for sale as town lots, or divided into lots for said purposes, and none of said real estate is held to be brought on the market and sold as town property when it reaches a value corresponding with the views of the owners; that none of said real estate furnishes an abode for a densely settled community, or represents the actual growth of the town beyond its former legal boundary; that none of the real estate is needed for any proper city purpose, as extension of its streets or sewers, gas or water system, or to supply space for the abode or business of its residents, or for the extension of needed police regulation; that none of said real estate is valuable by reason of its adaptability for prospective town uses, and that whatever value his real estate possesses is for farming or gardening purposes, or for the purpose of country residences for those desiring to live in the country within close proximity to the city of St. Louis; that the value of the land has not been increased by being taken into the corporate limits of Clayton, but on the contrary has been diminished thereby; that neither the land nor those residing thereon need the police protection, nor has either the land or residents thereof received any police protection since being taken into the limits of the city, nor have they received any other benefits from said city government; that none of the lands in the area covered by the extension...
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