Stone v. Barnes, 18513
| Decision Date | 01 June 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18513,18513 |
| Citation | 248 S.C. 28,148 S.E.2d 738 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Johnny B. STONE, Respondent, v. Albert P. BARNES and Ewell C. Parnell, Appellants. : |
Thomas M. Howell, Jr., Walterboro, Brockinton & Brockinton, Charleston, for appellants.
Keith M. Kinard, Walterboro, Henry Hammer, Columbia, for respondent.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries sustained in a collision, about nine o'clock a.m., on January 31, 1962, at the intersection of Memorial Avenue and Carn Street in the Town of Walterboro, South Carolina, between the automobile in which he was riding as a passenger and a truck owned by defendant Barnes and driven at the time by his employee, the defendant Parnell. In the course of the trial the defendants' motion for a directed verdict was denied, that of plaintiff to strike the defenses of joint enterprise and contributory negligence granted upon the ground that there was no evidence to sustain them, and the case submitted to the jury on the sole issue of whether the defendant driver was guilty of any actionable negligence or recklessness. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $50,000.00, actual damages. Thereafter, an order was entered denying defendants' motions for judgment n.o.v. and, in the alternative, for a new trial, from which they have prosecuted this appeal.
The exceptions on appeal charge that the trial judge erred (1) in holding that there was sufficient evidence to require submission of the question of liability of the defendants to the jury, (2) in holding that there was no evidence to sustain the defenses of joint enterprise and contributory negligence, (3) in his rulings as to the admissibility of certain testimony, and (4) in the charge to the jury. Since the case must be remanded for a new trial, the only issues which we need decide are:
(1) Was there any evidence of actionable negligence or recklessness on the part of the defendant driver to require submission of the case to the jury; and, if so,
(2) Was there any evidence to sustain the defense of contributory negligence?
At the time of the collision, the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was proceeding east on Carn Street and the defendant's truck was proceeding north on Memorial Avenue. These streets intersect, with Carn running east-west and Memorial north-south. The posted speed limit was 15 miles per hour on Memorial Avenue and 20 miles per hour on Carn Street.
Traffic passing through the intersection was controlled by an overhead flashing signal which flashed red for traffic approaching on Carn Street, on which plaintiff's vehicle was travelling, and yellow for traffic on Memorial Avenue, on which defendant's truck was travelling. Therefore, under Sections 46--309 and 46--423 of the 1962 Code of Laws, traffic on Carn, which faced the red light, was required to stop before entering the intersection and yield to other vehicles on Memorial which had entered the intersection or were approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard; and traffic on Memorial, which faced the yellow light, was required to proceed through the intersection 'only with caution.'
There was testimony on behalf of plaintiff that, at the time of the collision, he was riding in an automobile owned and driven by a co-worker, Harvell Breland, and was being carried to the hospital from their place of work for treatment of an injury to plaintiff's thumb; that, as they approached the intersection, the driver stopped, looked in both directions, saw no traffic approaching on Memorial Avenue, and then drove into the intersection where the automobile was struck on the right side by the defendant's truck which was travelling at a speed of thirty to forty miles per hour.
On the other hand, the defendant Parnell, driver of the truck, testified that, as he approached the intersection, he slowed down, looked both ways, didn't see anything coming, then proceeded into the intersection; and just as he entered the intersection the automobile in which plaintiff was riding came 'flying at an outrageous speed and sideswiped the front of my truck from one end of his car to the other.' He estimated the speed of the automobile at '50 miles or better.'
There were no brake marks from either vehicle and both drivers testified that they did not see the other until the impact.
Since there must be a new trial, we will not attempt to review the evidence in further detail. It is sufficient to point out that the testimony was conflicting as to the manner of operation of the vehicles at the time, particularly as to the speed each was travelling, the lookout kept by the drivers, and the precautions taken before entering the intersection. Under all of the circumstances, viewed in the light of the duties imposed upon the respective drivers at the particular intersection, we think the trial judge properly held that the testimony...
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Thompson v. Michael
...208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963). Whether a warning should have been given is often a question of fact for the jury. See Stone v. Barnes, 248 S.C. 28, 148 S.E.2d 738 (1966). In this case, however, it is undisputed Meredith warned Niki to slow Further, the duty to warn and demand the car be stoppe......
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...or occupant of an automobile to exercise care to avoid injury are fully set forth in the fairly recent case of Stone v. Barnes, 248 S.C. 28, 148 S.E.2d 738 (1966), and it will serve no useful purpose to repeat them here. That case is strongly relied upon by the defendant, but it is clearly ......