Stone v. Boscawen Mills

Decision Date01 April 1902
Citation52 A. 119,71 N.H. 288
PartiesSTONE v. BOSCAWEN MILLS.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Exceptions from Merrimack county.

Action by Albert Stone against the Boscawen Mills for personal injuries alleged to be due to defendant's failure to properly instruct or warn plaintiff as to the dangers incident to his employment. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Case transferred from the superior court, and exceptions overruled.

The plaintiff's evidence tended to prove the following facts: The accident happened June 4, 1900, when the plaintiff was 15 years and 6 months old. The defendants operate a yarn mill in a building consisting of five stories and a basement The floors above the basement were referred to in the evidence as follows, beginning with the ground floor: Finishing room, spinning room, speeder room, card room, and attic. The bobbins are transported from floor to floor by means of a small freight elevator, which is started and stopped by raising and lowering a perpendicular iron rod called a "shipper," which extends from basement to attic beside the elevator well. The elevator is supported by a rope which winds around a drum in the attic, and is attached to a cross-beam above the middle of the elevator. When the elevator is stuck, and the machinery is set in motion for a descent the rope will uncoil from the drum. In such event if the elevator is a considerable way down the well, the rope will run down through the ceiling and fall into the elevator, or at least show slack; but if the elevator is near the top of the well the rope will simply uncoil on the attic floor, and there will be no visible indication at the elevator of what has happened. The elevator was usually operated by boys, who had orders to notify the mechanic in charge if there was trouble with it and it needed to be fixed. The plaintiff had worked in the mill for some time upon other jobs, and was familiar with the general operation of the elevator. He had seen the rope drop once, and supposed that, if there was any slack, it would always show. He also knew that riding upon the elevator was forbidden. In April, 1900, he was hired as a bobbin boy, his work consisting of transporting bobbins upon the elevator between the first, second, and third floors. He had no duties upon the two upper floors or in the basement, except such as might be inferred from his employment about the elevator. The elevator, when needed for use, might be at any part of the well, and was used by other employes besides the plaintiff. He was not instructed or warned by the defendants. Upon the day of the accident the plaintiff loaded the elevator at the first floor, set it in motion, and started to walk up the stairs. At the second floor he stopped to see if there would We a load for him to take on his return, and then looked out of the window at a wedding procession. When he returned to his duties he found that the elevator had gone to the attic, and in some way learned that it was stuck there. He then went up, and found that it was held fast by the shoe upon the bottom of the box of bobbins being caught between the floor of the elevator and the back of the well. He looked at the rope, which appeared to be pulling up on the elevator. Thinking that if the box were released the elevator would ascend, he stooped over a guard rail or board which was across the front of the well, and pulled the box. The elevator fell, the cross-bar at the top striking the plaintiff on the back of the head and precipitating him, with the elevator, substantially to the bottom of the well. The rope had theretofore become uncoiled upon the attic floor, out of sight of the plaintiff, and in a separate room, which he supposed was then locked, according to the usual custom. The plaintiff knew that if the elevator fell when his head was under the cross-bar he would be injured; that shifting the rod reversed the machinery, and caused the rope to unwind and the elevator to descend; that he could have tested the tension of the rope by taking hold of it; that the position of the finger on the shipping rod indicated how the machinery was set; that yanking the box as he did would loosen the elevator in the well so that it would go up or down according to the direction of the force propelling it; and that the elevator sometimes failed to work because the belts slipped. He did not think of these things at the time, and trusted to the appearance of the rope without further inspection or reflection. He knew that it was his duty to call the mechanic if the elevator needed fixing or would not work, but he did not consider that the removal of the box came within the definition of those terms, and did not think the trouble was such as he should report. After the plaintiff had rested, and the defendants' motion for a nonsuit had been argued, the plaintiff was allowed to introduce further evidence, subject to the defendants' exception. A portion of this evidence tended to show that those who worked as bobbin boys had occasion to take the elevator to the attic at times, but there was no evidence that Stone had had such occasion; that it was not the practice to watch the elevator very carefully, and, as a consequence, it sometimes went beyond its destination. The defendants excepted to this line of evidence as incompetent and for the further reason that the testimony did not disclose a sufficient number of instances to establish a custom. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the defendants moved for a nonsuit, and, at the close of all the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Johns Hopkins v. Correia
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 30, 2007
    ...the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition."); Stone v. Boscawen Mills, 71 N.H. 288, 52 A. 119, 121 (N.H.1902) (building owner should "exercise . . . ordinary care" with regard to the maintenance of elevators); Rosenberg v. Otis Elev......
  • Lacoss v. Town of Lebanon
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Hampshire
    • May 1, 1917
    ...H. 249, 56'Atl. 459; Keenan v. Perrault, 72 N. H. 426, 57 Atl. 335; State v. Sunapee Dam, 72 N. H. 114, 131, 55 Atl. 899; Stone v. Mills, 71 N. H. 288, 52 Atl. 119; Marden v. Company, 70 N. H. 269, 48 Atl. 282; Wilcox v. Busiel, 70 N. H. 626, 47 Atl. 703; Smith v. Bank, 69 N. H. 254, 45 Atl......
  • Ward v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • March 24, 1915
    ...Ry. Co., 110 Mass. 240; McDonald v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 108 Mich. 7; Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 78 Mo. 195; Stone v. Boscawen Mills, 71 N. H. 288; Lindsay v. Norfolk & So. R. Co., 132 N. C. 59; Orr v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel'g. Co., 132 N. C. 691. In Smithwick v. Hall, supra, the......
  • Ward v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • March 24, 1915
    ...Co., 110 Mass. 240; McDonald v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 108 Mich. 7; Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 78 Mo. 195; Stone v. Boscawen Mills, 71 N.H. 288; Lindsay v. Norfolk & So. R. Co., 132 N.C. 59; Orr v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel'g. Co., 132 N.C. 691. In Smithwick v. Hall, supra, the plaint......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT