Johns Hopkins v. Correia

• Citation: 921 A.2d 837,174 Md. App. 359
• Decision Date: 30 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2453, Sept. Term, 2005.,2453, Sept. Term, 2005.
• Parties: The JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL, et al. v. Jane E.S. CORREIA, et ux.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

921 A.2d 837

174 Md. App. 359

The JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL, et al. v. Jane E.S. CORREIA, et ux.

No. 2453, Sept. Term, 2005.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 30, 2007.

Ronald W. Shaw (Amanda P. Just, on brief), Towson, for appellant.

Paul D. Bekman, Emily C. Malarkey (Gregory G. Hopper, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Panel SALMON, SHARER, MEREDITH, JJ.

SALMON, J.

About one hundred years ago, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that one who "is engaged in the undertaking of running an elevator as a means of personal transportation" is required to use the "highest degree of care and diligence practicable under the circumstances," which is the same standard that common carriers are required to meet. See Belvidere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514, 539-40, 525, 64 A. 44 (1906). The rule in Belvidere was reaffirmed in 1930 and again in 1937. See Owners' Realty Co. of Baltimore City v. Richardson, 158 Md. 367, 371, 148 A. 543 (1930); O'Neill & Co. v. Crummitt, 172 Md. 53, 60-61, 190 A. 763 (1937). Since 1937, no Maryland appellate decision has been called upon to decide whether the rule first enunciated in Belvidere is still binding precedent.¹

On August 30, 2000, Jane Correia was a passenger in an elevator owned and operated by Johns Hopkins Health Services Company and Johns Hopkins Hospital (hereinafter collectively "Johns Hopkins" or "appellant"). The elevator came to a sudden stop because of a mechanical defect. Due to injuries allegedly caused by this malfunction, Mrs. Correia and her husband sued Johns Hopkins, and others, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for negligence. The matter was considered by a jury in October 2005.

The Correias introduced evidence that showed that, in the six months prior to the accident, Johns Hopkins had received thirty-two complaints about the elevator Mrs. Correia was in when the accident occurred. The thirty-two complaints, if accurate, indicated that at various times prior to the accident the elevator was dropping, jumping, jerking, skipping, and sometimes trapping passengers.

At the end of a nine-day trial, the court gave the jury the following instruction:

The owner of a passenger elevator, in this case . . . Johns Hopkins is the owner of the passenger elevator[,] is bound to exercise to the highest degree of care and skill and diligence . . . practicable under the circumstances to guard against injury to individuals riding on those elevators. This rule of law applies to the owner of the elevator only. It does not apply to the service company [co-defendant] Schindler [Elevator Company].

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Correia in the amount of $264,500 and separate $35,500 verdict in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Correia, jointly, for loss of consortium. Both verdicts were against Johns Hopkins; the jury found that co-defendant Schindler Elevator Company was not negligent.

In this appeal, Johns Hopkins contends, among other things, that the trial judge committed reversible error in giving the instruction quoted above. According to appellant, the owner of a self-operating elevator owes a passenger the same duty that any other property owner owes its invitee, i.e., the duty to use reasonable care to see that the portion of the property that the invitee is expected to use is safe. In support of its position, Johns Hopkins advances four major arguments.

First, according to Johns Hopkins, "the application of a common carrier theory of liability to modern building owners is no longer appropriate," although such a heightened standard of care "may have been appropriate one hundred years ago when Belvidere decided the question as a matter of first impression." Second, "the cases upon which the trial court" relied in giving the instruction at issue are factually distinguishable from this case. Third, the instruction should not have been given because elevator owners are not common carriers under Maryland law. Fourth, since Belvidere was decided, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has decided a case that suggests that "the proper standard of care for an elevator owner is that of reasonable care."

I.

The common law rule in the District of Columbia and fourteen of our sister states is in accord with Johns Hopkins' position that the duty of an owner or operator of an elevator to its passengers is to use ordinary or reasonable care and not the highest degree of care. See Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 202 Ariz. 190, 42 P.3d 621, 627 (2002) (the owner/operator of a passenger elevator does not owe "a higher duty toward its passengers than that of reasonable care under all of the circumstances"); Hafferman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 653 F.Supp. 423, 430 (D.D.C. 1986) (the hotel "owed a duty of reasonable care . . .; a duty that included the need to properly inspect and repair the elevator"); McKenna v. Grunbaum, 33 Idaho 46, 190 P. 919, 921 (1920) (it is the duty of the landlord to use reasonable care to keep and operate its elevator); Summers v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 243 Kan. 393, 757 P.2d 1255, 1261-62 (1988) ("[T]he elevator . . . is not a common carrier and . . . the duty to the public with regard to it is that of ordinary care."); Smith v. Otis Elevator Co., 217 F.Supp.2d 105, 108 (D.Me.2002) ("the owner or operator of an elevator in a lodging establishment" does not have the duty of common carriers to use the highest degree of care); Clarke v. Ames, 267 Mass. 44, 165 N.E. 696, 697 (1929) (office building owners "in operating an elevator were not common carriers" and thus owed only a duty to use reasonable care); Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 96 N.W. 29, 31 (1903) (owner of store with an elevator "was bound to use the care required of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances"); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So.2d 104, 107 (Miss.1969) ("The owner or occupier of business premises [where plaintiff was injured by elevator doors] owes business invitees the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition."); Stone v. Boscawen Mills, 71 N.H. 288, 52 A. 119, 121 (N.H.1902) (building owner should "exercise . . . ordinary care" with regard to the maintenance of elevators); Rosenberg v. Otis Elevator Co., 366 N.J.Super. 292, 841 A.2d 99, 105 (2004) ("An owner of a building has a non-delegable duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of tenants and persons contracts for maintenance of an elevator does not relieve it of that duty . . . ."); Griffen v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 59 N.E. 925, 928-29 (1901) (in a case involving a decedent who was struck by an elevator part, the court said that "sufficient security is afforded the public when owners or occupants of a building are required to use reasonable care in the character of the appliance they provide, and in its maintenance and operation"); Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348, 681 N.Y.S.2d 201, 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (1998) (common carrier's duty in New York is to use "reasonable care under the circumstances"); Williams v. 100 Block Associates, Ltd., 132 N.C.App. 655, 513 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1999) (no matter the status of the plaintiff or the presence of elevators, all landowners have "only the duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors"); White v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 267 Or. 628, 518 P.2d 631, 633, 635 (1974) (instructing the jury that an elevator operator owes the duty of using the highest degree of care is improper; the applicable duty is to use reasonable care); King v. J.C. Penney Co., 238 S.C. 336, 120 S.E.2d 229, 230-31 (1961) (the owner of an elevator has the duty to exercise "ordinary and reasonable care as to its operation rather than the high degree of care similar to that imposed upon common carriers"); Dallas Market Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1997) (owner/ operator of elevators owes passenger a duty to exercise ordinary care).

The common law in twenty-one of our sister states is in accord with the rule set forth in Belvidere. See Container Corp. of America v. Crosby, 535 So.2d 154, 156 (Ala.1988) ("[A]n elevator, whether passenger or freight, is a common carrier and, as such, is to be operated and maintained with the highest degree of care."); Little Rock Land Co. v. Raper, 245 Ark. 641, 433 S.W.2d 836, 841 (1968) (owner of elevator "has the same duty to protect passengers using his elevators from injury as do common carriers of passengers, i.e., to exercise the highest degree of skill"); Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga.App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1997) ("A building owner . . . `owes a duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers. . . .'"); Jardine v. Rubloff, 73 Ill.2d 31, 21 Ill.Dec. 868, 382 N.E.2d 232, 236 (1978) ("[O]wners of buildings with elevators are viewed as common carriers who owe their passengers the highest degree of care. . . ."); Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N.E. 915, 918 (1913) (as to elevator passengers, landlords must "exercise the highest care, as a duty owing by law, to third persons who have a right to their use, or for whom they are provided"); Monaghan v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 184 Iowa 352, 168 N.W. 892, 892 (Iowa 1918) ("[O]ne who operates a passenger elevator . . . is held to the same measure of care that is required of a public carrier of passengers; that is, the highest degree of skill and foresight consistent with the efficient use and operation of the means of conveyance."); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Ky.1961) ("[H]igh degree of care [is] required of the operator of elevators as in the case of other common carriers of passengers. . . ."); Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir.1964) (applying Louisiana law) (the duty of an owner of a passenger elevator "as to protecting the passengers in his elevator from danger is the same as that applicable for" common carriers); ...