Stone v. Burke

• Decision Date: 06 May 1952
• Citation: 244 P.2d 51,110 Cal.App.2d 748
• Parties: STONE v. BURKE et al. Civ. 18747.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 51

244 P.2d 51

110 Cal.App.2d 748

STONE v. BURKE et al.

Civ. 18747.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 6, 1952.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 1952.

Hearing Denied June 26, 1952.

L. A. Lewis, Michael F. Shannon, and Thomas A. Wood, Los Angeles, for appellants.

William T. Selby, Ventura, and Edward M. Selby, Los Angeles, for respondent.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

Defendants appeal from an adverse judgment rendered against them in an action for declaratory relief under the provisions of section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure, construing a contract of employment entered into between them and plaintiff.

The action was predicated upon a contract dated April 16, 1947 wherein it was set forth that plaintiff had been in defendants' employ for a number of years past, that the former was 'to continue to assist first parties (defendants) in the care and control of the properties belonging' to defendants and that the latter were willing to compensate and reward plaintiff 'with a bonus or additional reward in excess of the monthly wages or salary to be paid' to plaintiff.

Following a pledge of 'the highest degree of good faith' between the parties, the contract provided that plaintiff 'will continue to assist' defendants in the care and maintenance of certain real properties belonging to the latter, and that in consideration for such services defendants agree to pay plaintiff current wages for the same type or similar work for services in the Rivera, La Habra and Whittier districts.

The agreement sets forth that 'the parties hereto each fully understand that first parties (defendants) have made an agreement with D. E. Stone, brother of the second party (plaintiff) wherein and whereby the North six acres of that certain 10.922 acres (giving legal description) is, after the death of first parties (defendants), to be distributed to said D. E. Stone'.

It is then provided that, 'as a further compensation and reward by first parties (defendants) to second party (plaintiff), the remaining portion of said last mentioned parcel of 10.922 acres (after setting apart said six acres for said D. E. Stone) shall not be sold by first parties (defendants) but that this contract shall affect said remaining portion of said parcel of land, and that in all instances where said land is referred to, it shall be understood as referring to the remaining portion of said 10.922 acres and being the balance of said 10.922 acres after deducting therefrom the North six acres thereof.'

Paragraph 4 of the contract reads:

'It is understood that if second party (plaintiff) shall well and truly in good faith serve and assist first parties (defendants) in the maintenance, care and upkeep of their real properties in the Rivera District, as long as either of the first parties (defendants) shall be alive, then upon the death of the survivor of first parties (defendants), said land hereinabove referred to shall be willed, distributed and set apart by the wills of first parties (defendants) to second party (plaintiff). This is upon the express condition that if any other overseer other than first parties (defendants), or either of them, or D. E. Stone, is put in charge of first parties' (defendants') real properties, than at that time this contract shall automatically mature in the same manner as if both of the first parties (defendants) were deceased and second party (plaintiff) would in that instance, and upon the happening of that event, be entitled to demand and to receive from first parties (defendants) a good and sufficient deed covering the land hereinbefore mentioned'.

Then follow two paragraphs dealing with the respective rights of the parties in and to an existing oil lease on defendants' properties in their entirety, and with reference to their respective rights in event subsequent oil leases might be consummated. Since such contractual provisions are not in issue here we do not set them forth.

Paragraph 8 is as follows:

'It is further understood and agreed that in the event of the termination of this contract by permanent illness, dissatisfaction or quitting of second party (plaintiff), then and in that event second party (plaintiff) shall be entitled only to the payment at the rate of $600.00 per year and shall have no interest in and to any oil rights or oil leases covering the land hereinabove referred to.'

Following a provision forbidding recordation of the contract, the tenth and final paragraph thereof provides:

'In the event that prior to the death of first parties (defendants), or both of them, it should be deemed advisable to sell the land hereinabove mentioned and covered by this contract, then and in that event it is agreed by second party (plaintiff) that first parties (defendants) may sell and dispose of said land in conjunction with the sale of their other properties adjacent thereto, and at the same proportionate price thereof and the proceeds of that portion covered by this contract shall be held intact and placed in Government Bonds at the discretion of first parties (defendants) and such bonds shall be substituted for and in place of the land covered by this contract'. (Emphasis added.)

Since the cause was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts and the aforesaid contract, we deem it unnecessary to here set forth the contents of the respective pleadings, except as hereinafter referred to.

The agreed statement of facts is as follows:

'1. It is true that the defendants were the owners of 75 acres of land in the vicinity of Rivera, in the County of Los Angeles, mostly planted to citrus trees, including a parcel of 10.922 acres, during the years 1940 up to about the 20th day of January, 1950.

'2. It is true that on or about the 20th day of January, 1950, the defendants sold said 75 acres and received therefor net the sum of $225,375.25, or $3,005.00 per acre.

'3. It is true that plaintiff was employed by defendants for more than one year prior to 1943, but was employed elsewhere commencing in 1943, and until about the 10th day of March, 1946; that during said time, and for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to terminate employment elsewhere and to return to the service of defendants in the care-and maintenance of their properties, said defendants did state and represent and promise to plaintiff that if he would return to said service of defendants they would give to plaintiff permanent employment. That plaintiff did terminate his employment elsewhere and did return and enter the employment of defendants on the 10th day of March, 1946. At the request of said plaintiff, the terms and conditions of said employment was reduced to writing on the 16th day of April, 1947, a full and complete copy of said contract being set forth in paragraph IV of plaintiff's Amended Complaint.' (Emphasis added.)

'4. That the plaintiff continued in said employment pursuant to the terms and conditions of said contract, commencing as of the 10th day of March, 1946, up to and including the 12th day of April, 1950, when the plaintiff's employment was terminated by defendants.

'5. That the brother of plaintiff, D. E. Stone, was employed by the defendants under an oral contract, and that said employment terminated on or about the 12th day of April, 1950, with the exception of such work as the said defendants had in and upon the premises retained by said defendants, being approximately 3 acres.

'6. That the 10.922 acres described in said contract set forth in paragraph IV of plaintiff's Amended Complaint were sold by the said defendants for the price of $3,005.00 per acre.

'7. That the defendants have not paid to the plaintiff any sum as wages, or otherwise, since the 27th day of February, 1950, except that on or about the 14th day of April, 1950, the defendants tendered to the plaintiff their check No. 3257, drawn on the Whittier Branch, Bank of America, in the sum of $11.90, which purported to pay the plaintiff for services rendered in February and March of 1950, being a total of fourteen hours at eighty-five cents an hour.'

Following trial, the court made findings that 'for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to terminate employment elsewhere and to return to the service of defendants in the care and maintenance of their properties, said defendants did state and represent and promise to plaintiff that if he would return to said service of defendants they would give to plaintiff permanent employment. That plaintiff did terminate his employment elsewhere and did return and enter the employment of defendants on the 10th day of March, 1946. At the request of said plaintiff, the terms and conditions of said employment was reduced to writing on the 16th day of April, 1947'. (The agreement hereinabove set forth).

The court further found that pursuant to the aforesaid agreement plaintiff continued in his employment from May 10, 1946, to and including April 12, 1950, 'when the plaintiff's employment was terminated by defendants'. 'That the brother of plaintiff, D. E. Stone, was employed by the defendants under an oral contract, and that said employment terminated on or about the 12th day of April, 1950, with the exception of such work as the said defendants had in and upon the premises retained by said defendants being approximately 3 acres.

'That the 10.922 acres described in said contract set forth in paragraph IV of plaintiff's Amended Complaint were sold by the said defendants for the price of $3,005.00 per acre'.

It was further found 'That on or about the 12th day of April, 1950, defendants terminated the employment of said D. E. Stone as overseer of their said properties and placed said properties in charge of persons other than said D. E. Stone, or said defendants, or either of them, and then notified this plaintiff that he was no longer in their employ, and that he was not to report further for work.

'That by the sale of their property and the discharge of plaintiff and his brother D. E....