Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dept.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 54388-7,54388-7 |
| Citation | 756 P.2d 736,110 Wn.2d 806 |
| Parties | , 3 IER Cases 793 Brad STONE, Appellant, v. CHELAN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Scott & Schmidt, Robert H. Scott, Jr., East Wenatchee, for appellant.
Gary A. Riesen, Chelan County Pros., Wenatchee, for respondents.
Brad Stone brought this action against Chelan County and the Chelan County Sheriff's Department alleging he was wrongfully denied employment because he refused to take a polygraph examination, in violation of RCW 49.44.120. The question presented is whether a city law enforcement employee who requests transfer of employment to the county sheriff's office pursuant to RCW 41.14.250-.270 is "making initial application for employment" so as to fall within an exception to RCW 49.44.120, which prohibits requiring lie detector tests as a condition of employment. The trial court answered in the affirmative and granted the County summary judgment. We affirm.
In late 1983 a regional jail facility was built in Wenatchee to consolidate the jail services for Chelan County, Douglas County and the City of Wenatchee. The Chelan County Sheriff's Department contracted with the city and counties to operate the jail. As a result, the City of Wenatchee announced that at the end of 1983 it would close its jail and terminate all employees associated with its jailing function.
Stone was one of five Wenatchee jailers whose positions were to be terminated. All five requested a transfer of employment to the Chelan County Sheriff's Department pursuant to RCW 41.14.250-.270. Those statutes allow city police department employees, who qualify, to transfer into the civil service system for the county sheriff's office when their jobs are terminated as a result of the City contracting to have its law enforcement services provided by the County.
As a condition of employment, the Wenatchee jailers were required to comply with the County's civil service rules for new employees, which included that they pass a physical examination, be of good moral character, and pass a polygraph examination. They were not, however, required to take the written examination generally given other applicants.
Each of the jailers had taken a polygraph examination before being hired by the City. The County Sheriff's Department agreed that if it was satisfied with the results of those exams, the jailers would not be required to take another.
The Wenatchee City Police Department's polygrapher, Captain Derifield, reviewed the prior polygraph examinations and determined that all of the jailers had satisfactory results except Stone. Stone had taken the polygraph exam in 1981. At that time he revealed a pattern of limited and extensive use of amphetamines, hashish, cocaine, barbiturates and marijuana, continuing up to several days before the exam. Exhibit 1. Further, Captain Derifield found that Stone's answers to the questions "Are you now concealing any information about narcotics?" and "Are you now concealing any information about committing a serious crime?" indicated strong feelings in the area, but were inconclusive as to truth or deception. He stated a more specific examination with a narrower scope was needed to determine Stone's truthfulness. Based on Stone's responses during the pre-exam interview, Captain Derifield recommended that Stone be retested regarding his use of drugs before being hired by the County. 1
The County Sheriff's Department informed Stone that it was not satisfied with his polygraph results in the area of drug use, and would not hire him unless he took and passed Stone then brought suit, alleging the County was prohibited from requiring a pre-employment polygraph exam under RCW 49.44.120. The parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County's motion and dismissed Stone's claim. Stone appealed and we accepted certification from Division Three of the Court of Appeals.
another polygraph examination. Stone refused to do so and was not hired by the County. When the Wenatchee jail closed, Stone's job was terminated
RCW 49.44.120 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or the state of Washington, its political subdivisions or municipal corporations to require, directly or indirectly, that any employee or prospective employee take or be subjected to any lie detector or similar tests as a condition of employment or continued employment: Provided, That this section shall not apply to persons making initial application for employment with any law enforcement agency ...
Stone contends he does not fall within the statute's proviso. He argues he was not making initial application for employment with the County Sheriff's Department but was merely continuing his employment, as he had a right to transfer to the County under RCW 41.14.250-.270. The transfer statutes were enacted to give special protection and privileges within the county civil service system to city law enforcement employees who lose their jobs when the City contracts to have law enforcement services provided by the County. See RCW 41.14.260. 2 However, these statutes do not grant city employees an absolute right to employment with the County.
(1) was at the time such contract [between the city and county] was entered into employed exclusively or principally in performing the powers, duties, and functions which are to be performed by the county sheriff's office under such contract (2) will, as a direct consequence of such contract, be separated from the employ of the city or town, and (3) meets the minimum standards and qualifications of the county sheriff's office ...
(Italics ours.) RCW 41.14.250. The plain language of these statutes indicates city law enforcement employees do not have an unconditional right to transfer their employment, but must first meet the County's minimum employment standards and qualifications. The County therefore has the right to test these employees and refuse employment to those who may have met the City's standards, but do not meet the County's. To interpret the transfer statutes otherwise would render the third eligibility requirement in RCW 41.14.250 meaningless. Statutes should not be construed so as to render any portion meaningless or superfluous....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gorman v. Garlock, Inc.
...or superfluous.'" Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988)). Second, "[t]o resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more speci......
-
Cockle v. Dept. of Labor and Industries
...statutes must not be construed in a manner that renders any portion thereof meaningless or superfluous. Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988). The Legislature here decided against restricting qualifying benefits to a closed list of enumerated item......
-
Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Doc
...superfluous." Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996) (citing Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988); Tommy P. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash.2d 385, 391, 645 P.2d 697 ¶ 37 We reject DOC's proffered defin......
-
Rocha v. King Cnty.
...not do. See Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996) (citing Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep’t, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988) ).¶57 A remedy is consistent with this purpose. The low pay and low reimbursement rate amounts to an exclusi......
-
§ 7.4 - Limitations
...that unjustly discriminates against similarly situated persons. See Holbrook, 112 Wn. App. at 367; Stone v. Chelan Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wn.2d 806, 811, 756 P.2d 736 (1988) (en banc) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 Under the equal protection clause, persons similarly s......
-
Table of Cases
...19.2(12)(a), 19.4(2(), 19.5(7) Stevens Cnty. v. Burrus, 180 Wash. 420, 40 P.2d 125 (1935): 3.4(2) Stone v. Chelan Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wn.2d 806, 756 P.2d 736 (1988): 7.4(2)(c) Storedahl Props., LLC v. Clark Cnty., 143 Wn. App. 489, 178 P.3d 377 (2008), review denied, 164 Wn.2d 1018 (......