Stone v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 13 December 1951
• Docket Number: No. 2995,2995
• Citation: 244 S.W.2d 937
• Parties: STONE v. CITY OF DALLAS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 937

244 S.W.2d 937

STONE v. CITY OF DALLAS.

No. 2995.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Waco.

Dec. 13, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1952.

Finklea & Finklea, Dallas, for appellant.

H. P. Kucera, City Atty., H. Louis Nichols, Asst. City Atty., John C. Ford, Asst. City Atty., Dallas, for appellee.

TIREY, Justice.

The City of Dallas, a home rule city, brought this suit in the Justice Court against appellant for delinquent taxes, interest and penalties in the sum of $100.45, due on personal property consisting of automobiles owned by appellant for the years 1930 to 1945, inclusive, save and except the years 1934, 1935, 1937 and 1944, inclusive. The assessments were on unrendered personal property.

The defendant answered to the effect that he was not the owner of an automobile on the first of January of the years 1930, 1931, 1933, 1936 and 1938. He prevailed in the Justice Court and the City of Dallas appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1 of Dallas County. The court overruled both appellant's and appellee's motions for instructed verdict, and the jury in its verdict found substantially that defendant did not own an automobile on January 1, 1930, 1931, 1933, 1936 and 1938; that defendant was not the same L. C. Stone listed on the city tax rolls for the years 1930 and 1931; that defendant was the same L. C. Stone listed on the city tax rolls for the year 1938. Appellant filed motion for judgment, which was overruled. Appellee filed motion for judgment non obstante veredicto for the amount of $100.45, and in the alternative for $41.41. The court overruled plaintiff's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, but granted plaintiff's motion for judgment based 'on the jury verdict and undisputed evidence' to cover taxes, penalties and interest for the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1945, in the amount of $41.41, together with legal interest and costs of suit. Plaintiff and defendant excepted to the judgment entered and thereafter seasonable filed motions for new trial, which were overruled, to which both plaintiff and defendant excepted, and defendant perfected his appeal to the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals and the cause was transferred to our court by order of the Supreme Court.

Appellant assails the judgment of the court on seven points. Points 1, 2, 3 and 4 in effect assail the plan of the City of Dallas for assessing and collecting personal property ad valorem taxes on unrendered automobiles whose owners are residents of the City of Dallas on the ground that such plan is unlawful, arbitrary, discriminatory and a violation of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St., and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that such system is not equal and uniform. These contentions are without merit and are overruled. A statement is necessary.

A judgment of $41.41 was entered against appellant for taxes (and includes penalties and interest) accruing on his automobiles for the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1945. Appellee in its brief says: 'The evidence, insofar as these years are concerned, is undisputed. The appellant admitted residing in the City of Dallas during that period of time, he admitted owning an automobile on January 1st for each of those years, he further admitted that he did not render the automobile for taxes, and that he had never paid any taxes on automobiles of the years in question. In addition, he admitted that he had never appeared before the Board of Equalization to question the tax assessment made by the Tax Assessor on his automobile. Since the automobiles had not been rendered for taxation by the appellant as is required by the charter of the City of Dallas, the Tax Assessor was required to render such property for taxation and place such valuation thereon as he may deem to be just. In rendering these automobiles for taxes, the Tax Assessor adhered to the following procedure. Each year he obtained from the County Tax Collector a list of automobiles which had been registered and licensed in Dallas County, and from this list he prepared a list of automobiles and the owners thereof residing within the City limits of Dallas, and from this list a tax assessment roll on automobiles was prepared. The Tax Assessor then placed a valuation on these automobiles in accordance with a uniform method applied to all automobiles on the tax roll. In determining this value, the evidence showed that the Tax Assessor used as a preliminary guide a book known as 'The Official Used Car Dealers Guide', which listed the market value of various automobiles according to make, year, and model. Using these values as a guide, the Tax Assessor then placed a value on each automobile according to its make, year, and model, such value not being the same value listed in the used car dealers' guide. According to the undisputed evidence, the Tax Assessor did not use the figure in the used car dealers' guide as the value of the automobile. (here we insert the exact words of the Assessor: 'We use the value in that book as a basis to arrive at a value and he takes, perhaps, 50 per cent of that book value for the gross value for the assessing purposes and, then, we reduce that to an assessable-what we call the assessment value-maybe, using 65 per cent of that.') This value adopted by the Tax Assessor as the value of these automobiles was, in the opinion of the Tax Assessor, the reasonable value of such automobiles. After the assessment roll had then been prepared by the Tax Assessor, it was submitted to the Board of Equalization for its review. The Board of Equalization then issued notices and conducted public hearings, and after having equalized the taxes for each year in question, submitted the tax roll to the City Council for its approval and for the assessment of taxes for each of the years in question. After appellant's taxes became delinquent, they were placed on the delinquent tax roll which was prepared each year in the manner provided for by the charter of the City of Dallas and the Statutes of the State of Texas. The appellee introduced in evidence a certified copy of the delinquent tax roll insofar as it applied to the appellant, and also introduced in evidence certified copies of the current tax roll for each of the years in question. No evidence was offered by the appellant to show that his automobiles had been valued differently from other similar automobiles located in the City of Dallas, nor was any evidence offered to show that appellant's automobiles were valued at more than their true market value in money. There is no evidence in the record which would indicate that the method used by the City of Dallas in rendering for taxes the appellant's automobiles resulted in any injury to the appellant. Nor was there any evidence introduced which would have shown that the appellant would have paid less taxes if another method of rendition had been adopted by the City.

The foregoing statement is not challenged by appellant in his brief and we believe it presents an accurate summary of the controlling facts in this case.

Appellant testified in part: 'Q. Have they assessed your car for more than it is worth? A. Chances are, they have. Q. For which years? A. I don't recall which years.'

The City of Dallas has been a home rule city since 1907. Section 189 of the City Charter provides: 'All property, real and personal, shall be rendered for taxation by the owner thereof or his agent, as provided by the laws of the State for the rendition of property for assessment by the County, insofar as applicable; * * * It shall be the duty of the Assessor and Collector to value each and every item of the property so rendered in accordance with the fair market price thereof upon a basis of valuation to be applied alike to all taxpayers, * * *.'

Section 187 of said Charter provides: 'The Assessor and Collector of taxes shall assess all property which for any cause has not been rendered, placing such valuation thereon as he may deem just. If the owners of such property are unknown, such assessment may be made in the name 'unknown'.'

The foregoing provisions were construed in the case of the City of Dallas v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 497. The court there held in effect that since the Railway Company did not render the property in question for taxation for any of the years in suit, the Assessor and Collector of such City had the power under the Charter provisions to render the same for taxes. This case was later reversed in Tex.Com.App., 16 S.W.2d 292 on a point not pertinent here.

Section 188 of the Charter provides: 'No irregularity in the time or manner of making or returning the City assessment rolls or the approval of such rolls shall invalidate any assessment.'

Section 190 of the Charter provides: 'The said Board shall convene as near as practicable on the 15th day of June and continue its labors until its said work is complete, but not to continue longer than the 15th day of July following. It shall be the duty of the governing body, as soon as the assessment rolls are completed, to refer the same to the Board of Equalization, whose duty it shall be to equalize the taxes assessed on said rolls and to make all necessary correction and adjustment to that end; * * *.'

Section 191 of the Charter provides in effect that any person aggrieved by any act of the Assessor and Collector of Taxes in making up the assessments or in the valuation of property for taxing purposes shall have the privilege of making complaint to the Board of Equalization and to appeal to said Board for revision and correction of the matter upon which the complaint is based. In the case at bar appellant failed to perform any duty required of him by the City with reference to rendering his automobile for taxes for the years in which he was adjudged to have been in default.

Section 207 of the Charter provides, among other things, as follows: '* * * and no...