Stone v. Crown Diversified Industries Corp.
| Citation | 9 S.W.3d 659 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . David A. Stone and Barry Stone, d/b/a The JODA Partnership, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Crown Diversified Industries Corp., d/b/a Million Air St. Louis, and Corporate Aircraft Management, Inc., Defendants/Respondents. Case Number: ED75452 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: |
| Decision Date | 02 November 1999 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Hon. Philip J. Sweeney
Counsel for Appellant: David A. Stone
Counsel for Respondent: Leo W. Nelson, Paul B. Lee, Thomas K. Vandiver, Kimberly Cofman and Jan E. Dodd
Opinion Summary: Plaintiffs, David A. Stone and Barry Stone, d/b/a The Joda Partnership, brought suit against defendants for damages incurred in regaining possession of plaintiffs' collateral, a jet, which defendants released to a mechanic's lienholder. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the basis that defendants released the jet to a superior mechanic's lienholder and, thus, were not liable.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Division Two Holds: The trial court erred in granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in that the mechanic's lienholder to whom defendants released the jet did not have priority over plaintiffs' interest in the jet. Furthermore, material questions of fact exist on several issues making summary judgment inappropriate.
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. Crahan, and Teitelman, JJ., concur.
On January 25, 2000, the court corrected the opinion previously handed down on November 2, 1999. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.
Plaintiffs David and Barry Stone, d/b/a The Joda Partnership (hereafter "JODA"), appeal from the judgments of the trial court granting Summary Judgment in favor of defendants Crown Diversified Industries Corp., d/b/a Million Air St. Louis (hereafter "Million Air") and Corporate Aircraft Management, Inc. (hereafter "CAMI") and denying Summary Judgment to JODA. We reverse the trial court's grant of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and affirm the trial court's denial of JODA's Motion for Summary Judgment.
JODA is a general partnership engaged in the business of aircraft financing. In the course of their business, JODA loaned $1,050,000 to a Mexican corporation known as Aerotaxis del Noreste (hereafter "Aerotaxis"). Pursuant to the loan, Aerotaxis executed a promissory note and a security agreement, whereby Aerotaxis pledged a Dassault Falcon Jet (hereafter "jet"), which Aerotaxis owned, as collateral for the loan. At the time of the loan, JODA took possession of the jet and stored it at a maintenance facility in Los Angeles. The jet was kept there so Aerotaxis couldn't take possession of the jet until the loan was repaid. In addition, as further security for the loan, Aerotaxis issued an undated Bill of Sale naming JODA as the purchaser. The undated Bill of Sale was held in escrow so that, in the event of default, JODA could easily take legal title to the jet. On January 31, 1997, JODA made an additional loan in the amount of $180,000 to Aerotaxis bringing the loan to $1,230,000.1
In May of 1997, JODA moved the jet to St. Louis and stored the jet in a hangar at the Spirit of St. Louis Airport. The hangar was owned by defendant Million Air, a corporation in the business of storing and maintaining aircraft. Million Air leased space in its hangar to defendant CAMI, also in the business of storing and maintaining aircraft. JODA contracted with CAMI to store the jet in their hangar space for $1,000 per month.
On June 19, 1997, an unidentified pilot accompanied by a Chesterfield, Missouri police officer presented himself to the service front desk at Million Air's hangar. The pilot identified the jet in question by its tail number and requested that the jet be delivered to him on the ramp in front of the hangar. He did not identify himself or indicate why he was requesting delivery of the jet, nor did the Million Air employee seek this information. The employee complied with the request solely because the pilot knew the tail number of the jet. The pilot then took the jet to Texas.
The pilot to whom the jet was given was a representative from Skytech, an aircraft repair company located in Dallas, Texas. Skytech held an unrecorded and unregistered mechanic's lien in the amount of $64,954.59 for repairs made to the jet in 1995 and 1996. Skytech repossessed the jet to obtain payment of the lien. There is no evidence JODA had actual or constructive notice of Skytech's lien.
On June 24, 1997, JODA filed suit against Skytech in the District Court of Dallas County seeking to enjoin Skytech from releasing the jet to Aerotaxis or any other third party. On June 27, 1997, JODA and Skytech reached an agreement whereby JODA paid Skytech $64,954.59 in exchange for the jet. JODA then attempted to register the jet with the FAA in JODA's name so JODA could sell the jet to satisfy Aerotaxis' debt, now in default. However, in order for JODA to register the jet with the FAA in the United States, the jet had to be deregistered in Mexico. Despite a prior agreement to deregister the jet and for reasons unclear to this court, Aerotaxis blocked JODA's efforts to deregister the jet in Mexico, thereby preventing JODA from registering the jet with the FAA. Subsequently, JODA entered into an agreement with Aerotaxis entitled Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue dated September 25, 1997, pursuant to which Aerotaxis would allow the jet to be deregistered under Mexican law in exchange for JODA making payment to Aerotaxis in the sum of $175,000. Thereafter, the jet was deregistered in Mexico and reregistered in JODA's name by the United States FAA. On October 14, 1997, having registered the jet with the FAA, JODA then sold the jet to Central Business Jets for $1,750,000.
On February 25, 1998, JODA filed suit against both Million Air and CAMI asserting a bailment relationship existed between JODA and both defendants. With respect to the bailment theory, JODA alleged breach of bailment contract, specific negligence, general negligence, and conversion. Pleading in the alternative, in the event that no bailment relationship existed, JODA further asserted a count of general negligence against both defendants. JODA sought damages of $79,110.29, including the $64,954.59 JODA paid to Skytech and expenses incurred in regaining possession of the jet.
On September 11, 1998, Million Air filed its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and CAMI joined in the Motion. On September 23, 1998, JODA filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 16, 1998, the trial court granted Million Air's Motion and denied JODA's. The trial court held that Skytech's lien had priority over JODA's lien and that Skytech lawfully repossessed the jet. Therefore, because Skytech's rights to the jet were superior to those of JODA, the trial court held that JODA could not maintain an action against Million Air or CAMI under any recovery and defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment. The trial court further held JODA was not entitled to summary judgment because of the existence of material facts in dispute regarding JODA's claims. JODA filed this timely appeal seeking review of both the trial court's decisions granting Million Air's motion and denying JODA's.
Our review is essentially de novo. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo.banc 1993). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. Id. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. Id. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment. Id. When considering an appeal from summary judgment, this Court will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id.
Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and therefore is not reviewable on appeal. Reben v. Wilson, 861 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). In some instances, the denial of a motion for summary judgment may be reviewable on appeal where the merits of that motion are intertwined with the propriety of an appealable order granting summary judgment to another party. Kaufman v. Bormaster, 599 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo.App. E.D.1980). In this case, JODA seeks review of the trial court's order granting summary judgment for Million Air and CAMI and the denial of JODA's Motion for Summary Judgment. We hold that the merits of both parties' motions are sufficiently intertwined to warrant our review of the denial of JODA's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Our holding in this case essentially depends upon two issues: priority and bailments. Both defendants assert as a defense to JODA's suit that Skytech's lien had priority over JODA's. Defendants further claim that no bailment relationship existed as between them and JODA and that, regardless of the issue of priority, defendants owed no duty to JODA with respect to the storage of the jet. Therefore, in order for JODA to recover, it must establish: 1) Skytech's lien did not have priority over JODA's lien; and 2) a bailment relationship existed between JODA and defendants.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Million Air and CAMI and denied JODA's Motion for Summary Judgment because Skytech's lien had priority over JODA's lien. JODA claims the trial court erred in two respects:...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Washington University v. Catalona
...as soon as the purpose for the bailment ceases. Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo.1998); Stone v. Crown Diversified Indus. Corp., at 669. There was no evidence presented to this Court that any of the RPs, including the three (e) RPs that testified, had ever informed W......
-
Jaycox v. Terex Corp.
...Delaware law applies to the APA. Missouri generally enforces contractual choice-of-law provisions. Stone v. Crown Diversified Indus. Corp. , 9 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ; Sturgeon v. Allied Professionals Ins. Co. , 344 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) ; see also Davis v. Citiba......
- Jaycox v. Terex Corp.
-
Group Health Plan Inc. v. BJC Health Systems Inc.
...in determining whether Appellant may properly subpoena the records relating to the Unity Arbitration. Stone v. Crown Diversified Industries Corp., 9 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) (citations 3. The Colorado Court of Appeals recently faced a similar issue in A.T. v. State Farm Mutual Au......