Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. Co.

• Citation: 260 Va. 406,537 S.E.2d 305
• Decision Date: 03 November 2000
• Docket Number: Record No. 000175.
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Parties: Daniel F.P. STONE v. DOOR-MAN MANUFACTURING CO., et al.

537 S.E.2d 305

260 Va. 406

Daniel F.P. STONE v. DOOR-MAN MANUFACTURING CO., et al.

Record No. 000175.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

November 3, 2000.

Stephen C. Swain (Shuttleworth, Ruloff, Giordano & Swain, on briefs), Virginia Beach, for appellant.

Richard A. Saunders (Funiss, Davis, Rashkind & Saunders, on brief), Norfolk, for appellee Door-Man Manufacturing, Co.

James W. Walker (Wright, Robinson, Osthimer & Tatum, on brief), Richmond, for appellee Gala & Associates, Inc.

Robert W. Hardy (Clarke, Dolph, Rapaport, Hardy & Hull, on brief), Norfolk, for appellee Rudolph/Libbe, Inc.

(John D. Radd; M. Todd Gerber; Huff, Poole & Mahoney, on brief), Virginia Beach, for appellee Lake Erie Electric, Inc.

John S. Norris, Jr. (Norris & St. Clair, on brief), Virginia Beach, for appellee E.G. Middleton, Inc. Present: All the Justices.

CARRICO, Chief Justice.

The question for decision in this appeal is whether a worker in the employ of the owner of a manufacturing business was a statutory fellow employee of the architect and contractors involved in a construction project at the owner's plant. The question arose in a personal injury action brought by the plaintiff, Daniel F.P. Stone (Stone), an employee of the Ford Motor Company (Ford) at its motor vehicle assembly plant in Norfolk, against the defendants, Gala & Associates, Inc. (Gala), the architectural firm involved in the project, and Rudolph/Libbe, Inc. (Rudolph/Libbe), Door-Man Manufacturing Co. (Door-Man), Lake Erie Electric, Inc. (Lake Erie), and E.G. Middleton, Inc. (Middleton), the contractors and subcontractors involved in the project.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that Stone's sole remedy was provided by the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).¹ Finding that the defendants were engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of Ford and, consequently, were deemed to be statutory fellow employees of Stone, the trial court held that Stone's personal injury action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act and sustained the defendants' motions to dismiss. We awarded Stone this appeal.

At the time he was injured on April 11, 1996, Stone was employed as a utility upgrader at Ford's assembly plant. While operating a "tow-motor vehicle" or "tug" in the course of his employment, Stone attempted to drive through the doorway of the body shop where he worked. However, the overhead door "unexpectedly closed and struck [him] in the head and chest," paralyzing him from the mid-chest down.

The door in question was opened and closed automatically by a device activated by electrical "inductive loops." One loop was installed in the concrete floor immediately inside the shop door and another in the concrete ramp immediately outside the door. Stone claimed the loops were incorrectly positioned with the result that when he attempted to exit the shop through the open doorway at an angle, rather than head-on, the inside loop failed to detect the presence of his tug and to activate the device that would have kept the door from descending.

The door and the body shop were located in a former warehouse that had been remodeled and enlarged during a renovation of the assembly plant undertaken by Ford in 1994 to implement the manufacture of its redesigned F-150 pickup truck. Completed several months before Stone's accident, the new body shop was one phase of a five-phase project.² Designated the "PN96 Body Shop Project," the proposal for development of the shop had been the subject of an eighteen-month effort by Ford personnel to prepare a layout, together with "global specifications," showing "exactly how this building should be shaped; how all the toolings are going to fit inside; how the material is going to be brought in; how the material is going to be arranged together; and how it's going to be shipped from point A to point B."

Ford then entered into a contract with Gala for "Engineering Services for [the] Body Shop Building Addition." Gala's services were to consist, inter alia, of the review of "new proposed layout" and "construction shop drawings" as well as the preparation of "complete design and bid documents for bid purpose," "complete specifications," and "as-built drawings." Stone claimed in his motion for judgment that Gala negligently designed the body shop and the overhead door system, negligently supervised and inspected the installation of the system, and negligently approved or failed to disapprove the design of the system, proximately causing Stone's injuries.

Rudolph/Libbe won the bid and was awarded the contract for construction of the body shop. In what was termed a "Full Service Contract," Rudolph/Libbe as "Contractor" agreed to "furnish all materials, tools, equipment, facilities, labor, means, supervision and management to perform all work required to investigate, study, design, detail, fabricate, deliver, construct, install, launch and document this new PN96 Body Shop project . in strict accordance with the Owner's Instructions to Bidders, Project Specifications, Project Timing and Standard Specifications."

Specifically, Section 08200 of the Full Service Contract, termed "Vertical Lift Doors," provided for the furnishing of "all materials, equipment and labor necessary to provide and install new vertical lift doors at docks and ramps" and the submission of "complete shop drawings showing details of construction, fabrication and installation of all components for all work." Section 08200 also specified the use of a vertical lift door "as manufactured by" Door-Man and one other supplier. Stone claimed Rudolph/Libbe negligently installed the door system, negligently supervised the design, manufacture, and installation of the system by others, failed to inspect and/or negligently inspected the system, and failed to test and/or negligently tested the system, proximately causing Stone's injuries.

Rudolph/Libbie entered into a subcontract with Door-Man, requiring the latter to furnish and install the door that was later involved in Stone's injury. Door-Man manufactured the door, but subcontracted with another firm, not a party to this proceeding, to perform the actual installation. Stone claimed that Door-Man negligently breached its duties to design, manufacture, distribute, sell, install, inspect, and test the overhead door system, breached its express and implied warranties that the system was of good merchantable quality fit for its ordinary purposes and knew or had reason to know the particular purpose for which the door was being purchased, yet breached its implied warranty that the door was fit for its particular purpose, proximately causing Stone's injuries.

Rudolph/Libbie also entered into a subcontract with Lake Erie to perform the electrical work in connection with the installation of the door involved in Stone's injury. Lake Erie then subcontracted with Middleton for the actual performance of the electrical work. Stone claimed that Lake Erie and Middleton negligently installed the door system and its wiring and, after installation, failed to test and/or negligently tested the system, proximately causing Stone's injuries.

Stone also claimed that all the defendants: (1) failed to instruct the users of the door system how to operate it safely, (2) failed to warn the users of the dangers inherent in the design and manufacturing of the system, and (3) failed to warn the users of the risk of injury when using the system in a reasonably foreseeable manner and for its intended purpose, proximately causing Stone's injuries. Stone moved for entry of judgment jointly and severally against all defendants in the sum of $30 million compensatory damages and $350,000 against each defendant in punitive damages.

As noted supra, the trial court found that because the defendants were engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of Ford and, consequently, were fellow statutory employees of Stone, his personal injury action was barred by the Act's exclusivity provision. All the defendants contend this finding was correct and should be affirmed.

The exclusivity provision is found in Code § 65.2-307, which reads as follows:³

The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when his employer and he have accepted the provisions of this title respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.

The exclusivity provision does not apply, however, to a common law action for an employee's injury or death against an "other party." Code § 65.2-309; Stewart v. Bass Constr. Co., 223 Va. 363, 365, 288 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1982).

"The issue whether a person is a statutory employee presents a mixed question of law and fact which must be resolved in light of the facts and circumstances of each case." Cooke v. Skyline Swannanoa, Inc., 226 Va. 154, 156, 307 S.E.2d 246, 247 (1983). Where, as here, the facts relevant to resolution of the jurisdictional issue are not in dispute, "we must determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law to those facts." Cinnamon v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 238 Va. 471, 474, 384 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1989).

"As a general rule, the several trades involved in construction work are not part of the business of manufacturing products for sale ." Id. at 478, 384 S.E.2d at 621. "Every manufacturer must have a plant, but this fact alone does not make the work of constructing a plant a part of the trade or business of every manufacturer who engages a contractor to construct a plant." Raines v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 541, 343 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Ct. App.1986).

To support their contention that they were engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of Ford, the defendants emphasize the evidence concerning Ford's eighteen months of...