Stone v. Graves

• Citation: 8 Mo. 148
• Parties: STONE AND OTHERS v. GRAVES.
• Decision Date: 31 July 1843
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

8 Mo. 148

STONE AND OTHERS

v.GRAVES.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1843.

APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT.

SLACK, for Appellants. The appellants insist that the judgment below should be reversed--1. Because a justice of the peace is responsible to the party injured, for all non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office which he may commit, or of which he may be guilty. Chitty's Pl. 89, 90, 151-2-3. 2. Because the declaration in this cause shows a sufficient state of facts to entitle the plaintiffs to recover, those facts taken to be true, as they are upon the general demurrer. 3. Because the causes of demurrer set forth in said defendant's special demurrer are not true, and are contradictory and inapplicable. 4. Because a justice of the peace is bound to preserve all papers filed in his office, fo the purpose of being sued on: this is implied from the reading of 6th section, Rev. Code, p. 350. 5. Because, where the instrument sued on is filed wth the justice at the commencement of the action, and purports to have been executed by the defendant, and the demand is liquidated by such instrument, and the defendant has been served with process, it then becomes the duty of the justice to render judgment against the defendant by default. See Rev. Code, p. 358. All these facts the declaration sufficiently shows.

STRINGFELLOW, for Appellee. The appellee relies on the following points: 1. The first and third counts (of the declaration) charge simply an error of judgment, if they show any error in the justice at all; and it being a matter of which he had jurisdiction, he is not liable. 2. The second count is for the loss of a note filed with the justice, for which he is not liable in damages; nor does it show that plaintiff was injured by such loss, nor could he have been injured. 3. Each count in the declaration is uncertain, and does not show any cause of action.

SCOTT, J.

The appellants, plaintiffs, brought an action on the case against the appellee, defendant, a justice of the peace, for misconduct in office. The declaration contained three counts: the first and third charged, that the defendant, being a justice of the peace, did corruptly and willfully refuse to enter a judgment in a suit pending before him, in which the appellants were plaintiffs, and one Pettigrew was defendant; the second count charged the appellee with neglect, by which the note on which suit was brought was lost or destroyed. To this declaration there was a special demurrer, which was sustained by the court, and a judgment rendered for the appellee, defendant. From this judgment the appellants, plaintiffs, appealed to this court.

This case presents the question whether a justice of the peace, when acting judicially and within the sphere of his jurisdiction, is liable to an action for any error he may commit, although he may act from impure and corrupt motives? It is not pretended, that for malice, corruption, partiality, or any misdemeanor in office, a justice of the peace, when acting judicially, is exempt from punishment, but the question is, whether he is liable to a civil action by the party aggrieved? In the case of Lansing v. Yates, 5 Johns. R. 291, a case of intense interest, and which was profoundly investigated both by the bench and the bar, Judge Kent remarks: “The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit for any act done or omitted to be done by him sitting as a judge, has a deep root in the common law. It is to be found in the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily maintained by an undisturbed current of decisions in the English courts, amidst every change of policy, and through every revolution of the government.” Serjeant Hawkins maintains (book 1, ch. 7), that the law has freed the judges of all courts of record from all prosecutions whatsoever, except in the Parliament, for anything done by them openly in such courts. Lord Holt, in Grosvelt v. Burwell, is equally explicit, that a judge shall not be questioned at the suit of the parties. 1 Ld. Raymond, 468.

The maintainance of this principle is essential to the due administration of justice. If, for every erroneous judgment in the discharge of his duties, a justice was held responsible in damages, hard, indeed, would be his condition. Law is a moral, and not a mathematical science. What is the law in many cases is a mere matter of opinion, and about which the most upright and enlightened judges will differ. The rules and principles which govern, in the exercise of judicial power, are not in all cases plain; they are often complicated, and appear in different views to different men. Few would accept the office of judge, if they were to answer with their estates for every error in judgment, or if they were to be harassed with litigation by every unfortunate or...