Stone v. Nw. Sleigh Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1888
• Citation: 70 Wis. 585,36 N.W. 248
• Parties: STONE v. NORTHWESTERN SLEIGH CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

70 Wis. 585

36 N.W. 248

STONE

v.NORTHWESTERN SLEIGH CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

January 31, 1888.

Appeal from county court, Milwaukee county; JOHN E. MANN, Judge.

Action for wrongful discharge, under a contract of hiring. The complaint alleges, in effect, that in January, 1886, the defendant, a corporation of Wisconsin, at Milwaukee, employed the plaintiff, George W. Stone, Jr., as traveling salesman for the term of one year, for $1,200 and expenses, payable monthly, from which he was discharged without cause September 16, 1886, and for which he claims damages. The defense is, in effect, that such employment was by the month, and for no definite term, and a settlement therefor, and payment in full, September 16, 1886. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $404.58. From the judgment entered thereon, the defendant brings this appeal.Flanders & Bottom, for appellant.

Turner & Timlin and C. E. Armin, for respondent.

CASSODAY, J.

The testimony on the part of the plaintiff tended to prove that in January, 1886, at Milwaukee, one John A. Chapman, in behalf of the defendant, employed the plaintiff for the term of one year, substantially as alleged in the complaint. One of the plaintiff's witnesses, Linderman, having testified in relation to a conversation between the plaintiff and Chapman in January, 1886, at the time of the making of the alleged contract, was asked by the plaintiff's counsel on his direct examination, and before he rested, this question: “Did you at any time after this have any conversation with the manager (Chapman) of this Northwestern Sleigh Company in which he said anything about having hired Mr. Stone for a year?” This question was “objected to as irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial.” The objection was overruled, and the defendant excepted. The testimony was then given to the effect that in September, 1886, the witness met Chapman in Minneapolis, and was there told by him that his arrangement with the plaintiff was that his services should continue for the term of one year, the same as the witness and the other traveling men employed by the defendant. Chapman was subsequently sworn in the case, but was not questioned in relation to the conversation at Minneapolis mentioned by Linderman. Chapman made the contract, but was in no sense a party to it. His subsequent admissions cannot be regarded as evidence of the terms of the contract. In making the contract he was the agent of the defendant, and whatever he then said and did in relation to it was binding upon his principal, and hence was admissible in evidence as a part of the res gestœ. But what he said to the witness in another state, eight months...