Stone v. St. Louis Stamping Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1892
• Citation: 29 N.E. 623,155 Mass. 267
• Parties: STONE v. ST. LOUIS STAMPING CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

155 Mass. 267

29 N.E. 623

STONE v. ST. LOUIS STAMPING CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 6, 1892

COUNSEL

S.J. Thomas and C.W. Bartlett, for plaintiff.

W.O Kyle, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The lease under which this action is brought, after stating the term as one year, contains the following language: "It is further agreed that this lease may be extended for two years by lessees giving thirty days' notice of such intention; the conditions to remain unchanged, except that an additional eight and one-third dollars per month shall be paid, making the annual rent thirteen hundred dollars." This does not contemplate the making of a new lease, but provides that the term shall be three years instead of one if the lessee so elects. It is like the leases set out in Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray, 550, and Bradford v Patten, 108 Mass. 153. In order to hold the defendant for rent in this action the plaintiff must show that the defendant elected to extend the term. This election could not be effectual against the lessor unless the lessee gave 30 days' notice of it before the expiration of the year. But the provision for notice was solely for the benefit of the lessor, and he could waive it. No writing was necessary, and no formal action, if in fact the lessee elected to hold for the longer term, and if 30 days' notice of the election was given, or the lessor waived the giving of notice. There was evidence that the defendant's agent, a month after the expiration of the year, being shown the lease, said the increase of rent was all right, and that the defendant would remain and continue to pay. Afterwards the rent was paid monthly without question for six months more before notice was given of an intention to terminate the tenancy. If the defendant's agent were the lessee, there could hardly be a question that this would warrant, if not require, a finding that the lease was extended in accordance with its provisions. We are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to warrant such a finding against the defendant. There was evidence that the lease was in possession of the defendant and that statements of the expenses of the Boston store, including the rent, were sent monthly to the office of the defendant in New York, and that the defendant "had seasonable notice of the payment by the agent of the increased rent, as provided in case of a renewal of the lease." Moreover, the lease provides that, if the lessee holds over, the rent shall be at the original rate. This makes the payment of increased rent significant. Such payments by the defendant, continuing for six months without objection after the interview between the plaintiff and the defendant's agent, even without its being expressly shown that the defendant's managing officers were informed of the interview, are enough to justify a jury in finding an election to continue the lease. It may fairly be inferred without express testimony that the defendant's officers understood the circumstances under which the tenancy was continued. The case in its principal features is almost identical with Kramer v. Cook, ubi supra, in which it is said that "the continuing to occupy the premises, and the payment of the rent at the increased rate...