Stone v. State
| Decision Date | 02 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 39541,39541 |
| Citation | 300 S.E.2d 500,250 Ga. 718 |
| Parties | Leonard STONE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Edward Parrish, Adel, David E. Perry, Tifton, for appellant.
Lew S. Barrow, Dist. Atty., Robert B. Ellis, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Nashville, for appellee.
The defendant, who was involved in an automobile collision, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, vehicular homicide and driving on the wrong side of the road. On appeal he alleged, inter alia, that he had been denied his right to cross-examination when the trial court restricted his cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses to matters elicited on direct examination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that it was within the trial court's discretion to restrict the scope of defendant's cross-examination of the witness in this manner. Stone v. State, 164 Ga.App. 781, 298 S.E.2d 321 (1982). We granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant may cross-examine a witness for the State upon a subject matter other than that for which the State called the witness.
The record in this case shows that the State called Dr. Jesus Hiromoto, the physician who attended the victim prior to his death, to testify to the cause of the victim's death. On direct examination Dr. Hiromoto testified to the victim's condition upon arrival at the hospital, the cause of the victim's death and the efforts of the hospital staff to resuscitate the victim. On cross-examination defense counsel attempted to ask the witness about the defendant's condition when he was brought to the hospital. The State objected to this line of questioning on the ground that defendant "was limited on cross-examination to the issue covered in direct examination." The district attorney suggested that the defendant make the witness his own and proceed with these questions on direct examination. Defense counsel responded: The trial court then ruled that Defense counsel then stated, "We would have no desire to cross on his testimony so far." Defense counsel then extensively questioned Dr. Hiromoto about the extent of the defendant's injuries on the night of the accident.
The purpose of cross-examination is "to allow a searching and skillful test of [the witness's] intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity." Harris v. The Central Railroad, 78 Ga. 525, 534, 3 S.E. 355 (1887). In Georgia "[t]he right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against him." OCGA § 24-9-64 (formerly Code Ann. § 38-1705). The right of cross-examination in this state includes questioning a witness about subjects relevant to any of the issues in the case, not simply those matters elicited on direct examination. 1 Ficken v. City of Atlanta, 114 Ga. 970, 41 S.E. 58 (1902); Agnor, Georgia Evidence, § 4-8, p. 41 (1976); McCormick, Evidence, § 21, p. 47 (2d Ed.1972). However, the permissible scope of cross-examination is not without limitations.
The trial court is vested with a discretion to restrict repetitious cross-examination, Duckworth v. State, 246 Ga. 631, 272 S.E.2d 332 (1980), and to prevent a party from attempting to elicit hearsay matters. Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 78, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981). Further, "[t]he right of a party to a thorough and sifting cross-examination as to a witness called against him is not infringed by confining such examination to matters that are relevant to the issues in the case." Bass v. Bass, 222 Ga. 378, 384, 149 S.E.2d 818 (1966). Likewise, questions which are not material to the issues in the case are properly excluded. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895 (1966). It is within the trial court's discretion to curtail argumentative questions or questions which misstate the witness's testimony. Haralson v. State, 234 Ga. 406, 216 S.E.2d 304 (1975).
In the case before us the defendant maintained he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the collision and that he had a total failure of memory as to the events surrounding the collision. The defendant also claimed he was temporarily blind following the...
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